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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is a declaratory judgment action filed by Bret Kunz ("B. Kunz"), an insurance 
agent, to interpret a written contract for services that he has with Nield, Inc., an insurance agency 
business. 1 The parties dispute whether the express terms of their contract create a legal duty for 
Nield, Inc. to provide B. Kunz with profit sharing payments2 that Nield, Inc. receives from 
. . 
msurance cornpames. 
The business relationship between B. Kunz and Nield, Inc. began in 1996 when the 
parties entered into a written contract for Bret Kunz to act as a subcontractor for Nield, Inc., 
under his brother Michael Kunz ("M. Kunz"). Nield, Inc. and M. Kunz had a contract 
substantially similar to the one between Nield, Inc. and B. Kunz, except Nield, Inc. and M. Kunz 
were 50/50 co-owners of the book-of-business M. Kunz placed with Nield, Inc. 
When M. Kunz died in July 2008, B. Kunz decided to purchase M. Kunz's half of the 
book-of-business. B. Kunz also desired to have a new contract with Nield, Inc. that would give 
him the same ownership interest in the book-of-business that his brother, M. Kunz, had in his 
contract. Nield, Inc. was agreeable to B. Kunz's request, so B. Kunz and Nield, Inc. entered into 
a new contract on or around November 2008 for the purpose of adding the ownership clause into 
the contract. 
1 The judgment appealed from is only a partial judgment. Other claims below have not been certified as final for 
appeal. 
2 Throughout this brief, Nield, Inc. uses "profit sharing" as a term to include "bonus commissions, contingent 
commissions, or profit sharing," unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. See R. 504, fn. 8. 
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The question that the District Court was tasked to address below was whether it was 
reasonable for B. Kunz to ascribe new meaning to language contained in the 2009 contract that 
would provide a legal duty for Nield, Inc. to provide profit sharing. The District Court correctly 
disagreed with B. Kunzes' interpretation, and decided that profit sharing was not contemplated 
by the new contract because: 
1. The only purpose of entering into the 2009 Contract ("Agent Contract") was to create a 
new contract to include an ownership clause for the book of business; 
2. The exact same contract language in dispute is also contained in the 1996 Contract 
("1996 Contract") between B. Kunz and Nield, Inc.; 
3. For the thirteen (13) years that the parties operated under the 1996 Contract, B. Kunz did 
not have an expectation that the 1996 Contract provided a duty for profit sharing; and, 
4. B. Kunz's suggested interpretation of the term "commissions" conflicts with other 
sections of the Agent Contract. 
B. Kunz now appeals. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
It is appropriate to add to B. Kunz' s Appellant's Brief section on the Procedural History 
that after the Kunzes filed their November 12, 2015 Amended Notice of Appeal, this Court 
issued an Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal on December 8, 2015, stating that the Trial 
Court's November 5, 2015 Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate was not a final 
judgment. This Court further ordered that the Kunzes were allowed additional time to obtain a 
final judgment from the trial court or file a response with this Court indicating the reasons why 
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the appeal shouldn't be dismissed. R. 744. The District Court sua sponte, and outside the 
presence of the parties, contacted the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the November 5, 2015 
Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate. Tr. Hearing Date 1/21/16, p. 16, L. 14 - p. 17, 
L. 4. After discussions with the Idaho Supreme Court, the District Court entered a subsequent 
Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate on December 22, 2015. R. 746-748. B. Kunz 
then filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal on December 28, 2015. R. 7 49-752. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
B. Kunz reproduced the Trial Court's Findings of Facts from its August 31, 2015 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order in their 
entirety, and Nield, Inc. does not dispute those are the facts as determined by the Trial Court. 
However, Nield, Inc. adds that some of the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law in its August 31, 
2015 Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order are 
actually findings of fact, and should be included here: 
1. There was little or no negotiation between the parties or their representatives regarding 
their business relationship at the time the Agent Contract was entered. R. 518, 1123. 
2. There was little discussion regarding the details of the Agent Contract and it was obvious 
from the express language of the Agent Contract, course of dealings, and trial testimony 
that the parties had the following understanding: 
a. B. Kunz would receive 80% of commissions related to new business or policies 
sold; 
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b. B. Kunz would receive 80% of commissions associated with renewals relative to 
his existing book of business; and, 
c. B. Kunz would own 50% of his book of business and Nield, Inc. would own 50%. 
R. 518, 1]24. 
3. Besides profit sharing payments received from Gem State Insurance Company, there was 
no meeting of the minds between the parties on any agreement to pay profit sharing 
percentage splits, and Nield, Inc. never agreed by express terms or course of dealings to 
pay B. Kunz 80% of the profit sharing attributable to Gem State Insurance. Also, the 
course of dealings by the parties only allowed for the 50/50 split of the amount paid to 
Nield, Inc. and accepted by B. Kunz. R. 524, 1]29. 
4. The parties intended to limit the meaning of "commissions" to a "percentage of premium 
paid to agents by insurance companies for the sale of policies" for both new business and 
existing renewals. R. 522-523, 1]35. 
5. The language in B. Kunz' 1996 Contract and Agent Contract is virtually identical; 
Paragraph 6 of the two contracts is substantively identical; and, Paragraph 7 is virtually 
identical. R. 523, 1]36. 
6. Under B. Kunz's 1996 Contract he did not expect to receive profit sharing or contingent 
commissions. R. 523, 1]36. 
7. The purpose of entering into the Agent Contract was to include an ownership clause 
similar to the one contained in the Agent Contract between M. Kunz and Nield, Inc. R. 
523, ,i36. 
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8. The course of dealings between B. Kunz and Nield, Inc. reflect that commissions were 
paid monthly on "initial commissions" earned from premiums received from new policies 
and business and "residual commissions" from premiums received from existing renewed 
policies, and that paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Agent Contract are limited to commissions 
capable of payment monthly and not annually. R. 523-524, ,137. 
9. B. Kunz's definition of "commission" is unreasonable. R. 524, ,i38. 
I 0. The parties do not have an "individual agreement" outside of and separate to the Agent 
Contract, and their Agent Contract is not intended to set out terms as to profit sharing or 
contingent commissions connected with Acuity, Alliance, and Allied. R. 524, ,139. 
11. There is no agreement between the parties that requires Nield, Inc. to pay B. Kunz a 
50/50 split, an 80/20 split, or any amount of split connected with contingent bonuses paid 
from Acuity, Alliance, and Allied. Any payments labeled as "profit sharing" were 
arbitrary and gratuitous. R. 524, ,140. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE 
CONTRACT WAS AMBIGUOUS 
II. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
I.R.C.P. 41(b) IS INAPPLICABLE TO DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
ACTIONS 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Nield, Inc. requests its costs and attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Code§§ 10-1210, 12-120(1) & (3), 12-121; and LA.R. 11.2 and 40. 
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ARGUMENT 
Nield, Inc. will address each of the Kunzes' six ( 6) issues presented on appeaI3 in the 
order raised in the Appellant's Brief, before discussing the two (2) additional issues raised on 
appeal and the matter of attorney fees. 4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellate court considers an appeal from a district court sitting as the fact finder, 
it does so through an abuse-of-discretion lens; that is, the appellate court examines whether the 
trial court (I) rightly perceived the issues as ones of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of that discretion and appropriately applied the legal principles to the facts found; and 
(3) reached its decision through an exercise ofreason. In conducting the review, the appellate 
court liberally construes the district court's findings in favor of the judgment. A district court's 
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. A trial court's findings of 
fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence. The appellate court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the 
trial court. Questions of credibility and the weight of the evidence are matters uniquely within 
the province of the trial court. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,857,230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010) 
( citations omitted). 
3 The Kunzes' first issue on appeal contained in their Second Amended Notice of Appeal was "Did the Court err in 
Bifurcating these Proceedings?" R. 75013(1). By failing to include this issue in their brief, the Kunzes have waived 
this issue on appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(4); Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass 'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525, 272 P.3d 
491,497 (2012). 
4 The Appellant's Brief is littered with ad hominem diatribe against Nield, Inc., specifically its President, B. Nield. 
Rather than responding to each irrelevant and improper aspersion, this Respondent's Brief focuses on the issues 
germane to the appeal. Suffice it to say though that Nield, Inc. disagrees vehemently with the Kunzes' 
animadversions. 
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I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM 
"COMMISSION" IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
It appears that the Kunzes believe that it was in error for the District Court to call certain 
payments "a gratuitous bonus," when they were labeled "profit sharing" in extrinsic evidence. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 18; R. 525 ~40. The Kunzes reach an illogical presumption that the only 
way the District Court could have concluded these "profit sharing" payments were a "gratuitous 
bonus" was by accepting Bryan Nield's ("B. Nield") "subjective, undisclosed intent," mistakenly 
applying contract principles of construction contained in JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 
611, 167 P.3d 748 (2006) and Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235,254 P.3d 1231 (2011) to support 
their position. 
A. The Kunzes Misapply the Objective Law of Contract Interpretation 
In interpreting contracts, courts are to ascertain the meaning and mutual intent of the 
parties at the time the contract is made by looking to the language used in the contract. Liberty 
Bankers Lfe Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679,688,365 
P.3d 1033, 1042 (2016). Beus, Bosen, and other Idaho appellate court decisions have recognized 
the objective law of contract interpretation. Beus, 151 Idaho at 239, 254 P.3d at 1234 (2011 ); 
Bosen, 144 Idaho at 614, 167 P.3d at 751; Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical 
Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 720, 330 P.3d 1067, 1078 (2014). The objective law of contract is 
a law of contract interpretation that mandates that a court is to give force and effect to the 
objective meaning of the words used in the contract, without considering what a party thought 
the language meant or what a party actually intended for the terms to mean. Bosen, 144 Idaho at 
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61 167 P.3d at75 l. The Maryland Court of Appeals provides helpful explanation on the 
subject: 
[ A court is to J determine from the language of the agreement itself what a 
reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it 
was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and 
unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the 
parties meant what they expressed. In these circumstances, the true test of what is 
meant is not what the paiiies to the contract intended it to mean, but what a 
reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. 
Consequently, the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give 
away to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean. 
Spacesaver Systems, Inc. v. Adam, 98 A.3d 264, 268-69, (Md. 2014) (quoting Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (Md. 1985). 
The Kunzes misapply the objective law of contract interpretation.5 They take issue with 
extraneous documents where payments are labeled as "profit sharing," R.Ex. 720 (Ex. 202), 
R.Ex.192 (Exh.204), R.Ex.216 (Exh.205), and argue that the Court erred in construing these 
payments as "gratuitous bonuses," when they were never referred to as such, prior to litigation. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 17-18. 
The Beus and Bosen cases cited as authority by the Kunzes are distinguishable. Those 
cases dealt with application of the objective law of contract interpretation to the language 
contained in a lease and contract at issue and whether or not it was reasonable, not language that 
was used in extraneous evidence. 
5 A correct application of the objective law of contract interpretation is the rejection of B. Kunz's subjective, 
undisclosed interpretation of the term "commission" in paragraph 7, where this term was used in the 1996 Contract, 
where he did not have any reasonable expectation of profit sharing. R. 50217. B. Kunz failed to discuss profit 
sharing prior to entering into the Agent Contract. Tr. Vol. Ip. 144, L. 18-22. 
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The Kunzes fail to cite anything in the record that shows the District Court found the 
Agent Contract unambiguous but gave meaning to Nield, Inc.'s "subjective intent" of contract 
terms anyway. In order for this Court to accept the Kunzes' position, it would require an 
astonishingly novel application of the objective law of contract interpretation. The Kunzes fail to 
cite any authority that supports extending the objective law of contract interpretation to extrinsic 
written communication in the manner suggested, and this Court should therefore not consider 
this issue on appeal. Hopper v. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801,806,317 P.3d 698, 703 (2013) 
(Where an appellant fails to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of 
error are too indefinite to be heard by the appellate court). 
If this Court decides to consider this issue, it can determine that the Kunzes have failed to 
show that the objective law of contract interpretation is applicable to this matter. This Court can 
easily determine that the District Court did not err on this issue. 
B. The Argument that the District Court Accepted the Subjective 
Undisclosed Intent of Nield, Inc. Applies the Logical Fallacy of False 
Cause 
The Kunzes' presumption that the only way the District Court could have concluded that 
payments were a "gratuitous bonus" was through accepting Nield, Inc.' s "subjective, undisclosed 
intent" is non causa pro causa. Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Mo. 
1997). The Kunzes overlook the reasonable approach in how the District Court reached its 
conclusion. 
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C. The District Court Reached the Conclusion that there is no Contractual 
Duty for "Profit Sharing" through an Exercise of Reason 
The District Court began by determining that the contract term "commission" in 
paragraph 7 was ambiguous. R. 516-17, ,i,r 17-20.6 The District Court recognized the law in Beus 
that ambiguous terms are interpreted by "looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in 
the document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of the 
particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by 
their conduct or dealings." Beus, 151 Idaho at 238,254 P.3d at 1234; R. 517, ,i 21. 
The District Court found that the intention of the word "commission" is a percentage of 
premium paid to agents by insurance companies for the sale of policies both new business and 
existing renewals. R. 522-23, ,i 35. In arriving at its conclusion of the interpretation of 
"commission," the Court relied upon the fact that (1) the language of paragraph 6 in B. Kunz' s 
1996 Contract, R.Ex. 7 (Ex. 102), and Agent Contract, R.Ex. 18 (Ex. 105) are substantively 
identical; (2) the language of paragraph 7 in the 1996 Contract and Agent Contract are virtually 
identical; (3) the purpose of the Agent Contract was to create a "new contract that would include 
an ownership" clause like M. Kunz's contract with Nield, Inc. (4) B. Kunz's admission that 
under the 1996 Contract, he did not receive and did not expect to receive profit sharing; (5) other 
paragraphs in the contract refer to the term "commissions" in the context of monthly payments 
and the contract does not distinguish its meaning or usage from the use of "commission" in 
paragraph 7; (6) the parties' conduct reflects that commissions were paid monthly on "initial 
6 Nield, Inc. disagrees with this conclusion. See Issue Vil, herein. 
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commissions" and "residual commissions"; and (7) "contingent commissions" are only paid 
annually. R. 523 ~ 36. 
Having found that the intention of the parties was that the meaning of "commission" had 
a more restrictive meaning, the District Court concluded that the contract did not contain a duty 
to pay "profit sharing." R. 524, ~ 39. The District Court rejected B. Kunz's much broader 
meaning of the term "commission." R. 522 ~ 34 and 524 ,r 38. 
The District Court's mentioning that the payments were a result of "gratuitous bonuses" 
was simply an explanation of the conclusion that it had reached. R. 524 ,r 40. It certainly was not, 
as the Kunzes contend, a tendentious acceptance ofNield, Inc.'s "subjective, undisclosed intent." 
The Kunzes fail to show that the District Court abused its discretion. The objective law 
of contracts does not apply in this case. The Kunzes have adopted the logical fallacy of false 
cause for their position that the only way the District Court could have arrived at the conclusion 
that payments were a "gratuitous bonus" was accepting the subjective intent of B. Nield. The 
District Court found through an exercise of reason based on substantial evidence that the contract 
does not contain a legal duty for profit sharing. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE UNDUE 
WEIGHT TO THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES 
It appears that the Kunzes' argument on this issue is that the District Court erred in using 
the parties' conduct as a basis for interpreting an implied in fact contract or side agreement for 
profit sharing and should have given the conduct of the parties more weight in interpreting the 
term "commission." The Kunzes are correct that it was improper for the District Court to 
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conclude that an implied in fact side agreement existed; however, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in interpreting the meaning of the term "commission." 
A. The District Court Erred in Concluding an Implied in Fact Contract 
Existed 
No doubt, the Kunzes' frustration with the District Court's finding of a "side agreement" 
is premised upon the Court's finding being completely contrary to the Kunzes' theory of the 
case.7 B. Kunz's position all along has been that his Agent Contract is the source for his right to 
profit sharing and that his appropriate share therefrom is eighty percent (80%). R. 8 ,i 7. He 
confirmed this singular legal theory at trial and this same argument continues to be his position 
on appeal. Appellant's Brief p. 29 ("Profit sharing is, at a minimum, a derivative of his Agent 
Agreement, and not some side agreement."). 8 
Prior to trial, Nield, Inc. filed a Motion in Limine, raising the issue that the Kunzes' Trial 
Brief alleged facts and theories not contained in the pleadings. R. 397-98, ,i 7. The District Court 
heard argument on the Motion in Limine on the morning of the first day of trial. During 
argument on the motion, Nield, Inc. expressed its concern that the Kunzes appeared to be raising 
the issue of an implied in fact contract at the eleventh hour. Tr. Vol. I, p. 4, L. 25 - p. 5, L. 3. The 
District Court determined that it was proper for Nield, Inc. to raise this issue in light of the 
information contained in the Kunzes' Pretrial Brief. Tr. Vol. I, p. 10, L. 3-8. The District Court's 
questioning at the hearing shows that the Kunzes were not asserting an implied in fact contract: 
7 In re Stone's Estate, 78 Idaho 632, 639, 308 P.2d 597, 60 I (1957) (An appellant cannot complaint of error 
favorable to him.). 
8 See also Appellant's Brief, p. 33-34, discussing how it was erroneous for the District Court to conclude that there 
was an implied in fact contract between the parties. 
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THE COURT: So you don't believe you're asserting an implied in fact 
contract? 
MR. WUTHRICH: No. I think that case was probably a U.C.C. case. 
That's probably why it talked in those terms. I was just pointing out that a course 
of performance is something that the courts look to for interpretation of contracts. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 11, L. 8-10. After hearing from both sides on the matter, the District Court ruled: 
The court will consider extrinsic evidence for the purpose of determining what the 
parties intent is, what the course of dealings may have been to assist with the 
interpretation and understanding of that contract as it relates to any ambiguities 
associated with that contract. I will not consider the same in the light of a 
breach of an implied in fact type of contract or the establishment of an 
implied in fact contract. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, L. 25 p. 14, L.8 (emphasis added). 
Even though it seemed clear at the beginning of trial what limited purpose the extrinsic 
evidence was being offered for, the District Court ignored the parties' understanding and its own 
ruling when it entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and 
Order. R.519 'if 28. After considering certain extrinsic evidence as it related to the parties' 
conduct from the years 2008 through 2012, R.518 ,r,i 25-27, the District Court concluded that B. 
Kunz had established a "course of dealing" sufficient to establish a separate agreement from the 
Agent Contract. R. 519 ,i 28. The Court's determination that there was a "separate agreement" 
was clearly based on an implied in fact legal theory. Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 
703, 707, 52 P.3d 848, 852 (2002) (An implied in fact contract exists where there is no express 
agreement but the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in 
contract exists.). 
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The District Court erred in making findings concerning this separate, implied in fact 
agreement, because this legal theory was not pled and was specifically understood by the parties 
to be a non-issue at trial. Wilson v. Wilson, 6 Idaho 597, 57 P. 708, 711 (1899) (A district court's 
findings must be responsive to and within the issues created by the pleadings.); Accord 
Cameron's Run, LLP v. Frohock, 9 A.3d 664, 667 (Vt. 2010) ("Generally, all parties are entitled 
to be spared having their litigation unexpectedly decided on the basis of issues and doctrines 
outside of the understood course and direction of the case as pleaded and tried." (Citations 
omitted)). 
Even though the District Court erred in considering an implied in fact contract theory, 
Nield, Inc. recognizes that because judgment was ultimately entered in its favor, the District 
Court's error on this issue is probably harmless.9 Fonseca v. Corral Agriculture, Inc., 156 Idaho 
142, 149, 321 P.3d 692,699 (2014). In addition, the Kunzes fail to show how the District Courts 
finding of an implied in fat contract is prejudicial. Clark v. Truss, 142 Idaho 404,409, 128 P.3d 
941, 946 (2006) ("The appellant bears the burden of showing prejudicial error on appeal"). 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Interpreting The 
Meaning Of "Commission" 
In claiming that the District Court erred in its factual interpretation of the term 
"commissions,"10 the Kunzes fail to understand that evidence of the parties' conduct and 
dealings is just one of several factors that a Court considers when interpreting a contract. Beus v. 
9 It is possible that this issue could be prejudicial to Nield, Inc. should this appellate court decline to affinn the 
District Court or reverse any portion of its Judgment. Nield, Inc. failed to raise any defenses for an implied in fact 
contract theory. 
10 Although contained in the District Court's Conclusions of Law Section, this was most likely a finding of fact 
since the Court employed the Beus factors in arriving at the intent. 
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Beus, 151 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011). The District Court appropriately applied 
the Beus factors to the facts of the case when it made its factual finding regarding the 
interpretation of the term "commission." Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,857,230 P.3d 743, 749 
(2010) (An appellate court liberally construes the district court's findings in favor of the 
judgment and will not disturb the trial courts findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.). 
This Court has repeatedly held that it "will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial 
court," and questions of "the weight of the evidence are matters uniquely within the province of 
the trial court." Id. 
The contention that the District Court "ignored its own factual findings" or "misconstrued 
the evidence" is without merit. Browning v. Ringel, 134 Idaho 6, 14,995 P.2d 351,359 (2000) 
("[T]he trial court is not required to provide a lengthy discussion on every single piece of 
evidence and every specific factual issue involved in the case."). The District Court's findings on 
the interpretation of the meaning of "commission" are "clear, coherent and complete." Id. It was 
not necessary for the District Court to provide an extensive discussion of the evidence and 
testimony. Id. ("A decision between the positions of two litigants necessarily rejects contentions 
made by one or the other. The trial court's failure to discuss each party's contentions does not 
make the findings inadequate or suggest that the court failed to understand the propositions."). 
In contending that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the term commission, 
the Kunzes fail to show how that finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,857,230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010) (Appellate court will not disturb a 
district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.). Instead, the Kunzes choose to 
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make inadequate arguments that the District Court's findings on the interpretation of the term 
"commission" conflicts with extrinsic evidence regarding the conduct of Nield, Inc. Id. (A 
court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence ( emphasis added)). The District Court's interpretation 
of the term "commission" is supported by substantial and competent evidence. R. 522 ,r 35. 
The Kunzes have not shown that the District Court's finding of fact on the interpretation 
of the term "commission" lacks support of substantial and competent evidence. The Kunzes' 
position on this point of their appeal is nonsensical. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED AND REJECTED THE "OTHER 
FUNCTIONS" LANGUAGE IN THE CONTRACT AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
BASIS FOR PROFIT SHARING 
The issue raised by the Kunzes is whether the Court ignored or otherwise did not address 
paragraph 7 as a basis for profit sharing. This issue is absurd. 
The District Court concluded that it could not find the contract "intended to set out terms 
and conditions associated with profit sharing or contingent commissions associated with Acuity, 
Alliance, and Allied." R. 524 ,r 39. This finding shows that the Court considered the contract, 
including paragraph 7, but could not find any contractual duty for profit sharing. Browning v. 
Ringel, 134 Idaho 6, 10-11, 995 P.2d 351, 355-56 (2000) ("The findings of the trial court will be 
liberally construed to support a judgment or order. Consequently, if facts can be inferred from 
those set forth in the findings, 'such inferences will be deemed to have been drawn."'). 
The District Court addressed the language in Paragraph 7, "Other functions based on 
commission split and individual agreement," in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
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concluded that "these phrases seem to have no place within this document other than to notify 
the reader and the parties that there are other unexpressed functions and individual agreements 
not discussed and/or outlined in the body of this document." R. 517120 (emphasis added). The 
District Court found that there was a limited purpose for this sentence in paragraph 7, which is to 
alert of the possibility of other outside agreements. The Kunzes' reading of paragraph 7 does not 
comport with the interpretation given by the District Court. This means that paragraph 7 cannot 
be a justifiable "alternative basis" for profit sharing. 
The argument that the District Court simply "ignored" or "failed to consider" the 
language in paragraph 7 is without merit. The Kunzes fail to show a legitimate basis for how the 
District Court erred on this point. 
IV. THERE WAS NO MUTUAL ASSENT ON THE DIVISION OF PROFIT 
SHARING 
Another reason that the District Court erred in finding an implied in fact contract is lack 
of mutual assent, or failure of the parties to have a tacit understanding, as to the division of profit 
sharing. Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002) ("The 
implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding."). The 
District Court's finding that there is an implied in fact contract as to Gem State profit sharing 
payments we based upon the conduct of the parties between 2008 through 2012. R.520129. 
However, during this period, the parties disagreed on how to split the payment, an essential term 
of any contract, 11 and because mutual assent was lacking on this point, there could not have been 
II Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 751, 864 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct. App. 1993) (applying Black's Law Dictionary 
definition of essential to a contract) (An essential term is one that is indispensably necessary or important in the 
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a contract. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 898, 204 P.3d 532, 538 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(There must be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement). 
The Kunzes suggest in their Appellant's Brief, p. 34 that the Court predicated the 50/50 
split for the implied in fact contract on the ownership provision contained in 18 of the contract. 
However this is incorrect. The Court found the split based upon the conduct of the parties. R. 521 
~29. 
In order to accept the Kunzes' argument that the split for profit sharing should be at the 
commission rate, one must accept that the term "commission" in the contract includes profit 
sharing. 12 This is something the District Court declined to find. This Court can determine that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE 
THE AGENT CONTRACT AGAINST NIELD, INC. 
Construing contract language against the drafter is a rule of last resort. Farnsworth v. 
Dairymen's CreameryAss'n, 125 Idaho 866,870,876 P.2d 148, 152, fn. 4 (Ct. App. 1994) 
( citing 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559, at 268 (1969); See Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 
Idaho 693,697,692 P.2d 337,341 (1984) ("If the court or jury is unable to determine the intent 
of the parties, then the ambiguity should be resolved against the party who used the ambiguity in 
drafting the contract."). The District Court went through the normal process of ascertaining the 
highest degree.); See Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 63,305 P.3d 499,507 (2013) 
(A payment price, or defined calculation for a certain price, is considered a material term of a contract.). 
12 Nield, Inc. is left wondering what the Kunzes are referring to when they suggest that there are conflicting 
contractual provisions. 
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mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract was made by looking to the language of the 
agreement R. 520 i: 29 and considering the relevant extrinsic evidence R. 522 ,ri: 35-36. 
Through this process, the District Court was able to make a determination as to the intent 
of the parties. R. 520 ,i,r 35-38. There was therefore no need to fall back on a rule oflast resort 
and construe the contract language against the drafter. 13 
VI. THE KUNZES FAILED TO RAISE BELOW THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM SHOULD HA VE INCLUDED 
ADDITIONAL CLAIMS 
An appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Un[fund 
CCR, LLCv. Lowe, 159 Idaho 750,755,367 P.3d 145, 150 (2016). The Kunzes did not raise 
below the issue of whether the Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate entered on December 22, 
2015 ("December 22, 2015 Judgment"), R. 760, was deficient. 
Additionally, the Kunzes' current argument on appeal is inconsistent with their prior 
position. Nield, Inc. made a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, R. 765, and the Kunzes 
objected to "any amendment" to the December 22, 2015 Judgment. R. 782. At the hearing, 
counsel for the Kunzes specifically stated that the December 22, 2015 Judgment should be left 
alone. Tr. Hearing Date 1/21/16, p. 21 LL. 11 12. At that time the District Court made clear that 
the December 22, 2015 Judgment is a partial judgment that was certified as appealable under 
13 The issue of who was the drafter of the contract is immaterial because the District Court resolved the issue of 
interpretation of the contract without applying the rule of contra proferentem. However, it should be noted that the 
contract between B.Kunz and Nield Inc. was not a contract of adhesion or made on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis." 
Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass 'n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 702-03, 351 P.3d 622, 630-31 (2015). The evidence showed that 
the contract was the product ofat least some discussion. R.50311 10-11, Tr. Vol I. 132 LL 16-18, Tr. Vol 1. 33 LL 
13-25. See First Interstate Bank of Idaho v. Gill, 108 Idaho 576, 577-78, 701 P.2d 196, 197-98 (1985) (no contract 
of adhesion when the contract at issue was a result of arms-length negotiation). 
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54(b) and that "[t]here are and continue to be unresolved claims." Tr. Hearing Date 1/21/16, p. 
20 LL. 16-23. 
Moreover, the Kunzes have failed to provide any legal authority supporting the assertion 
that the Court erred in failing to address additional claims in the December 22, 2015 Judgment, 
R. 760, and have therefore waived this issue on appeal. Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 
821, 979 P.2d 1174, 1179 (1998) (A party waives an issue on appeal by failing to provide 
authority supporting its argument.). In fact, the Kunzes seem to recognize that their position on 
this issue is without merit. The Kunzes state, "This counsel recognizes that the declaratory 
judgment appealed from is interlocutory in nature, and only certified as final under Rule 54." 
Appellant's Brief p. 39. 
The Kunzes' position that the District Court failed to enter judgment on other claims as 
part of its December 22, 2015 Judgment, R. 760, is without merit and inconsistent with I.R.C.P. 
54. After this appeal is concluded, the District Court will resume jurisdiction and be required to 
enter judgment on all remaining claims. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 868, 
55 P.3d 304,322 (2002) (There is no final judgment until a judgment is entered resolving all of 
the claims in the complaint.). The District Court did not err on this issue. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE CONTRACT 
WAS AMBIGUOUS 
The Kunzes' maintain an unreasonable interpretation of the term "commission" in 
paragraph 6 and "Other functions based on commission split and individual agreement" found in 
paragraph 7 of the contract. Thus, this Court can conclude that the contract is unambiguous. 
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Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156,166,355 P.3d 1, 11 (2014) ("Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question oflaw which may be freely reviewed by an appellate court."); Potlatch 
Education Ass 'n v. Potlatch School District No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,633,226 P.3d 1277, 1280 
(2010) (A contract term is ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations.). 
In looking at the Agent contract as a whole, it is clear that the contract terms at issue are not 
susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. Steel Farms v. Croft, 154 Idaho 259, 266, 197 P.3d 
222, 229 (2012) ("A court must look to the contract as a whole and give effect to every part 
thereof."). 
"If the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of those provisions is a 
question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties." JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 
Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 750 (2006). Ambiguity may be either patent or latent. Rangen, 
Inc. v. Idaho Dept. o_f Water Resources, 159 Idaho 798, 807,367 P.3d 193,202 (2015). A 
contract phrase is patently ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations or 
the language is nonsensical. Buku Properties, LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 832, 291 P.3d 1027, 
1031 (2012). A latent ambiguity exists where an instrument is clear on its face, but loses that 
clarity when applied to the facts as they exist. Rangen, 159 Idaho at 807, 367 P.3d at 202. Idaho 
law permits first, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that the latent ambiguity actually 
existed; and, second, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to explain what was intended by the 
ambiguous statement. Id. A contract is not rendered ambiguous on its face because one of the 
parties thought that the words used had some meaning that differed from the ordinary meaning of 
these words. Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748, 752 (2007). 
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"The relevant inquiry in determining whether a contract is ambiguous is the meaning intended by 
the parties at the time of contracting, not at some future time." Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308,315,246 P.3d 961,968 (2010). 
A. "Other Functions based upon on commission split and individual 
agreement" is not Ambiguous 
The District Court reached the erroneous legal conclusion that the last sentence of 
Paragraph 6 is ambiguous. R. 517 ,r 19. This conclusion was based upon the contract not defining 
what "other functions" means or identifying what "individual agreements" relates to. R. 517 ,r 
20. Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667 (2003) (Words or 
phrases that have established definitions in common use or settled legal meanings are not 
rendered ambiguous merely because they are not defined in the document where they are used.). 
Even though the District Court concluded this sentence was ambiguous, the District 
Court gave these words their ordinary and common meaning and determined that this sentence's 
purpose is "to notify the reader and the parties that there are other unexpressed functions and 
individual agreements not discussed and/or outline in the body of this document." R. 517 if 20. 
B. Kunz' s claim that "other functions" could be inclusive of profit sharing is inconsistent 
with the language in the contract. "Other functions" is based upon the commission split and 
individual agreement. No individual agreement is set forth as a provision in the contract and the 
language suggests that any "other functions" would be a separate agreement from the contract 
itself. Because it is contemplated that "other functions" will be agreed to in a separate 
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"individual agreement", apart from the contract, the suggestion that the language "other 
functions" is inclusive of a duty to pay profit sharing is unreasonable. 
The interpretation that B. Kunz gives to "other functions" does not fit with the rest of the 
section and his interpretation of this language is therefore inconsistent. This Court can determine 
as a matter of law that paragraph 6 is unambiguous and does not include a duty for profit sharing. 
B. The Term "Commission" is not Ambiguous 
The District Court allowed extrinsic evidence to be admitted in order to determine 
whether the term "commission" is ambiguous. The conclusion reached was that "commission" is 
latently ambiguous because it could be read broadly to include "contingent commissions" based 
upon its meaning in the insurance industry. R. 522135. 
However, the Court fell short in its analysis of whether the term "commission" as used in 
the contract is actually ambiguous. The Court only seemed to determine whether the term 
"commission" was susceptible to two different interpretations, rather than analyzing whether B. 
Kunz's interpretation of the term "commission", with the help of extrinsic evidence was a 
reasonable interpretation as applied to the facts of the case. Rang en, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 159 Idaho 798, 807, 367 P.3d 193,202 (2015). If the District Court would have 
conducted such an analysis, it would have readily concluded that B. Kunz's proposed 
interpretation is unreasonable. 
The paragraph in the Contract regarding Plaintiffs compensation states: Agent will 
receive 80 percent of commissions received on insurance placed by agent with Company. 
Company will receive 20 percent of commissions placed by agent with Company." Other 
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paragraphs m the contract refer to the payment of "commissions," without attempting to 
distinguish its meanmg or usage from the term "commission" as used in paragraph 7. 
Specifically paragraphs 5 and 6 provide, in relevant part: 
Agent is responsible for all premium and return commission on business placed. 
When collections are not on time, deductions may be made from payment of 
commission due. When collection is completed the deducted commission will be 
paid. 
Agent is responsible for the collection of premiums and returned commissions on 
business placed. . . Company will provide agent with a commission earned 
statement and commission check based on agreed percentages on the 15th of each 
month .... 
The profit sharing payments that B. Kunz claims he is due are reliant upon formulas that 
are based on more than mere premiums collected. According to the extrinsic evidence including 
testimony and Exhibits 202,204 and 205, R.Ex. 720 (Ex. 202), R.Ex. 192 (Exh.204), R.Ex. 216 
(Exh.205), the guidelines for profit sharing or similar bonuses distinguished from basic 
commissions are dependent upon formulas which take into consideration such factors as annual 
volume of premiums written, earned premiums over several years, total losses incurred, incurred 
loss percentages, gross profit percentages, reduction for delinquencies, administrative expenses, 
Workers' Compensation dividends paid out during the year, and growth from year to year. (See 
Tr. Vol I. p. 41, L. 14 - p. 42, L. 10, Tr. Vol II. p. 352 L. 12-24, p. 358, L. 12-24, and p. 408, L. 
18-23). 
It is also clear that the commissions identified in the contract are limited to the ability of 
being paid on a monthly basis rather than annually. However, the parties both agree that profit 
sharing is paid annually. (Tr. Vol I. p. 56, L. 19-23, Tr. Vol II. p. 352, L. 21-24). 
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Additionally, B. Kunz's testimony was that he did not use the term "contingent 
commission" until after the suit was filed. (Tr. p. 177, L. 21-25). Although dated several years 
after the Agent Contract, B. Kunz's use of the terms "profit sharing" and "commissions" in his 
written correspondence to Defendant, dated January 16, 2013, entered as Exhibit 108, shows that 
B. Kunz understood that profit sharing and commissions have two distinctly separate meanings. 
It was in error for the District Court to determine that the term "commission" was 
ambiguous without considering whether B. Kunz's proposed interpretation was reasonable given 
all of the facts as they applied to the interpretation of the contract. This Court can therefore 
conclude that the District Court erred as a matter of law that the term "commissions" is 
ambiguous. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT I.R.C.P. 4I(b) 
IS INAPPLICABLE TO DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS 
The District Court denied Nield, Inc.' s motion for involuntary dismissal made pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 41(b), because, according to the District Court, a motion for involuntary dismissal under 
I.R.C.P. 41(b) is not applicable in declaratory judgment actions. Tr. Vol 2 p. 339, L. 20-p. 348, 
L. 3. 
stated: 
At the time of argument on the Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, the District Court 
... It seems to the court that by it's very nature a declaratory judgment 
action, brought pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1201, is asking for just that, a 
declaratory judgment of the court regarding the rights of the parties, vis-a-vis in 
this case the contract in question. 
Even if Mr. Kunz and Ms. Kunz do not prevail with the court on their 
interpretation of this contract, or their asserted interpretation of the contract, 
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doesn't the court still have an obligation under 10-1201 to grant the declaratory 
relief and identify and determine what the rights of the parties are vis-a-vis this 
contract? And if that is correct, isn't your motion of no consequence? 
THE COURT: I'm not being asked to render affirmative relief in this case 
as far as a money judgment or a dismissal. I'm being asked to provide declaratory 
judgment and identify and explain the rights as between the parties. 
In my years of practice and my years on the bench I've never seen this 
motion brought in this context in a declaratory judgment hearing. I'm not sure it's 
appropriate and I'm not sure how it would work. Then I have not done what I was 
asked to do in the complaint and that is to declare the rights of the parties, vis-a-
vis this contract. 
Tr. Vol 2, p. 345, L. 4 p. 346, L. 11. The ruling that I.R.C.P. 4l(b) motions for involuntary 
dismissal are inapplicable in declaratory relief actions was clearly erroneous and an abuse of 
discretion. Idaho Courts recognize I.R.C.P. 41(b) as a procedural tool for defendants in 
declaratory judgment actions, and there was sufficient basis to grant Nield, Inc.'s I.R.C.P. 41(b) 
motion. 
A. I.R.C.P. 4l(b) is a Procedural Tool for Defendants in Declaratory 
Judgment Actions 
Idaho Courts allow a defendant to receive a judgment in its favor, made on a motion 
under I.R.C.P. Rule 4l(b), when the claim is for a declaratory judgment. Smith v. State Bd., 74 
Idaho 191,259 P.2d 1033 (1953); Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 812 P.2d 
253 (1991); Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002); Accord 
JvfcHenry State Bank v. City of McHenry, 446 N.E.2d 521, 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (In a bench 
trial on a declaratory judgment action, the defendant may move for judgment in his or her favor 
at the close of the plaintiffs case.). 
Idaho Code§ 10-1201 Declaratory judgments authorized-Form and effect reads: 
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Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
Idaho Courts prefer that a declaratory judgment should actually "declare rights, status, 
and other legal relations," rather than merely setting forth which side prevails. TracFone 
Wireless, Inc. v. State, 158 Idaho 671, 683, 351 P.3d 599, 611 (2015). However, a dismissal of a 
claim for declaratory judgment rather than a negative declaration is not a fatal flaw, should the 
trial court's findings and order clearly define the rights of the parties. Camp v. East Fork Ditch 
Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002); Brown v. State of Minnesota, 617 N.W.2d 421, 
425 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
In Ketterer v. Independent School District No. I of Chippewa County, 79 N.W.2d 428 
(Minn. 1956), the trial court's judgment merely dismissed the plaintiff's complaint which 
contained a claim asking for declaratory relief. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated: 
The judgment in better from [sic] should have declared the rights of the parties in 
conformity with findings and conclusions of law. The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect. However, since the court's findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment resulting in a dismissal herein 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits, the failure to declare the rights of the 
parties on the state of the record in this case is, we think, here without prejudice 
and not reversible error. See State, by Burnquist, v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 
63 N.W.2d 278; Wright, Minnesota Rules, pp. 294, 295. Since the trial court's 
findings and order clearly defines the rights of the parties, we therefore do not 
find it necessary upon the particular facts of this case to order a modification of 
the judgment as entered. 
Id. at 440. 
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I.R.C.P. 4I(b) allows, that should the applicable standard be met, a declaratory judgment, 
negative in effect, to be entered. The language in the rule speaks in terms of "render judgment 
against the plaintiff' and "renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff." 
However, even if a declaratory judgment, negative in effect, could not be entered 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4I(b), it is still appropriate to dismiss a declaratory judgment action. Camp 
v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002) Gudgment of the district comi 
dismissing a claim for declaratory judgment resulting from defendant's motion for involuntary 
dismissal under l.R.C.P. 41(b) at the conclusion of the plaintiffs presentation of evidence at trial 
was affirmed). I.R.C.P. 4l(b) requires that "the court must make findings as provided in Rule 
52." So long as those required findings, as provided by I.R.C.P. 52 clearly define the rights of the 
parties, a dismissal of a declaratory judgment action would appropriately resolve the dispute and 
therefore be appropriate. 
B. There was Sufficient Basis to Grant Nield, lnc.'s I.R.C.P. 41(b) Motion 
The Kunzes failed to show at trial that they were entitled to declaratory judgment in their 
favor. Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 952, 812 P.2d 253,259 (1991) ("The 
burden of proof in a declaratory relief action is governed by the same rules and considerations as 
are applicable to the same problem when it arises in legal proceedings of other types."); 
1vfelaleucca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920,924,318 P.3d 910,914 (2014) ("A Plaintiff who 
wishes to recover for a breach of contract bears the 'burden of proving the existence of a contract 
and fact of its breach .... "' Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 747, 9 P.3d 
1204, 1213 (2000)). 
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The Kunzes could not receive the relief they requested because the contract was 
unambiguous. 14 They failed to show mutual assent. R. 520,129. Even if this Court agrees with 
the District Court that the contract is ambiguous, the Kunzes still failed to meet their burden in 
showing that the meaning of the contract term "commission" included profit sharing. R. 521, 1 
34 - 524, 138. 
The Kunzes failed to meet their burden of proof, and the District Court erred in denying 
Nield, Inc. 's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4 l(b ). Such error by the 
District Court was clearly a misunderstanding of the law. 
IX. NIELD, INC. IS ENTITLED TO ITS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL 
The Kunzes are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Idaho Code § 12-120 does not 
support their claim. 
Nield, Inc. requests that it be awarded its costs and fees on appeal. If this Court declines 
to award attorneys' fees at this time because the Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certification appealed 
from is a partial judgment and does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, creating a 
question on who is the prevailing party, Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' 
Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 338, 345-46, 271 P.3d 1194, 1201-02 (2012), Nield, Inc. asks that this 
Court direct the trial court, after a final judgment has been entered, to award Nield, Inc. its costs 
and fees for defending and prevailing on appeal. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 804-05, 
241 P.3d 972, 977-78 (2010). 
14 See Issue VII, above. 
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Idaho Code § 10-1210 and I.A.R. 40 provide Nield, Inc. a basis to recover costs on 
appeal. Idaho Code§§ 12-120(1) and (3), 12-121, and LA.R. 11.2 all provide independent 
grounds for an award ofNield lnc.'s costs and fees on appeal. 
A. The Kunzes are not Entitled to Attorney Fees Under J.C.§ 12-120 
The Kunzes are not entitled to attorney fees under LC. § 12-120 as claimed because they 
are not the prevailing party to this appeal. Furthermore, the Kunzes appear to misapply which 
subsections under LC. § 12-120 they would be entitled to attorney fees. Any award of attorney 
fees to the Kunzes is unjustified. 
B. Nield, Inc. Should be Awarded its Costs Under I.C. § 10-1210 
While Idaho Code § 10-1210 does not provide a statutory basis for awarding attorney 
fees, it does provide a foundation for this Court to award Nield, Inc. its costs. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 542-43, 112 P.3d 825, 830-31 (2005). 
It would be equitable and just to award Nield, Inc. its costs on appeal where this case stems from 
an action brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and the Kunzes' arguments are 
umeasonable and lack foundation in law. 
C. Nield, Inc. Should be Awarded its Costs Under I.A.R. 40 
LA.R. 40 provides costs to the prevailing party on appeal. This Court can determine that 
Nield, Inc. prevailed on appeal and award its costs. 
D. Nield, Inc. Should be Awarded its Costs and Fees Under I.C. § 12-120(1) 
LC.§ 12-120 applies to attorney fees on appeal as well as to trial. St. Alphonsus Regional 
~Medical Center, Ltd., v. Killeen, 124 Idaho 197,201, 858 P.2d 736, 740 (1992). Attorney fees 
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are permitted as part of costs to the prevailing party where the underlying pleading requests 
under $35,000 in damages. Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728,740,366 P.3d 1088, 1100 
(2016). Here the amount pled by the Kunzes was under $35,000, and Nield, Inc. prevailed on 
appeal. Nield, Inc. is entitled to its attorney fees as the prevailing party on appeal. 
E. Nield, Inc. Should be Awarded its Costs and Fees Under I.C. § 12-120(3) 
LC.§ 12-120(3) serves as a clear basis for an award of attorney fees to Nield, Inc. in this 
case. Section 12-120(3) provides that in any action to recover on a contract relating to "services" 
and "in any commercial transaction" the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney 
fees to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. LC. § 12-120(3). 
The contract at issue is a services contract whereby B. Kunz agrees to sell insurance 
policies on behalf of Nield, Inc. The relationship between the parties is also a commercial 
transaction. The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. LC. § 12-120(3). This was a transaction to 
provide professional services, and is not a transaction for personal or household purposes. 
Additionally, because Nield, Inc. was successful in defending an action where the 
plaintiff pled for attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120 in his Complaint, Nield, Inc. is entitled to 
attorney fees as the prevailing party. Bryan Trucking Inc. v. Gier, 160 Idaho 422, P.3d 
(2016) (A prevailing party may rely on LC.§ 12-120(3) if pled by another party for recovery of 
attorney fees even if the alleged commercial transaction is found not to have existed." (Citing 
Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 839, 87 P.3d 934, 948 
(2004)). 
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F. Nield, Inc. Should be Awarded its Costs and Fees Under I.C. § 12-121 
It is appropriate for this Court to find that the Kunzes have brought this appeal 
unreasonably and without legal foundation and therefore award Nield, Inc. its attorney fees on 
appeal. Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 Idaho 541,546, 6 P.3d 397,401 (2000) ("This Court may award 
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.AR. 41 and J.C.§ 12-121 if it finds the appeal was brought 
without foundation."). The issues raised by the Kunzes ask this court to ignore firmly-established 
law. Id. The crux of their appeal is an improper invitation for this Court to "substitute its own 
judgment for that of the trial court." Id. Because the Kunzes merely ask this Court to reweigh the 
evidence, their appeal is brought without foundation. Kelley v. Yadon, 150 Idaho 334,338,247 
P.3d 199,203 (2011). As the prevailing party on appeal, an award ofNield, Inc.'s costs and 
attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121 is appropriate. 
G. This Court Should Impose Sanctions Under I.A.R. 11.2 
Nield, Inc. requests attorney fees on appeal as an appropriate sanction because the 
Kunzes' Second Amended Notice of Appeal and Appellant's Brief violates I.A.R. 11.2. This 
Court has held that I.A.R. 11.2 is to be construed the same way as I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l) because the 
rules have virtually identical wording. Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907, 913 
(2014). I.A.R. 11.2 is construed as follows: 
The attorney's or party's signature on a document constitutes two substantive 
certifications: (a) that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and 
belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal 
of existing law, and (b) that it [ the document] is not interposed for any improper 
purpose. Both certifications must be accurate in order to comply with the rule. If 
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either of them is not accurate, then the document would be signed in violation of 
the rule. 
Id. at 913-14 (emphasis in original). Attorney fees may be awarded as sanctions when a party or 
attorney violates either (a) the frivolous filings clause, or (b) the improper purpose clause. Id. at 
914. Sanctions in this appeal are appropriate under either prong of I.A.R. 11.2. 
1. The Issues Advanced on Appeal are Frivolous 
Advancing arguments that are without basis in law or fact satisfies the frivolous filings 
clause of I.A.R. 11.2. Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 342 P.3d 
639, 648 (2015). The arguments advanced by the Kunzes in this appeal are without basis in law 
or fact. 
Examples of frivolous arguments in this appeal include claiming that the Court relied on 
undisclosed subjective intent when there is no basis in fact that such was the case; applying an 
unreasonable extension of the objective law of contracts; claiming that the Court ignored facts 
and legal arguments, when these claims conflict with the record; suggesting that the trial court 
did not let the facts lead its conclusions, Appellant's Brief, p. 32; arguing that the Court erred in 
failing to construe the contract against the drafter, but recognizing that the facts of the case did 
not fit within the cited law, Appellant's Brief, p. 36, fn. 35; raising issues on appeal of 
deficiencies with the December 22, 2015 Judgment, and at the same time recognizing that this is 
only an appeal of a partial judgment, Appellant's Brief, p. 39. Generally, Appellant's Brief 
frivolously asks this court to ignore firmly-established law and invites this Court to simply 
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reweigh the evidence and substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court Kelley v. Yadon, 
150 Idaho 334,338,247 P.3d 199,203 (2011). 
The Second Amended Notice of Appeal and Appellant's Brief is not well grounded in fact 
and is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law. This Court should award Nield, Inc.' s attorney fees on appeal as an 
appropriate sanction for violation of Rule 11.2. 
2. Appellant's Brief is Brought for an Improper Purpose 
No doubt the Appellant's Briefis brought for the improper purpose of harassing and 
needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. The Appellant's Brief improperly airs personal 
grievances, which disparage B. Nield as a deceitful liar. Appellant's Brief, (references to such 
allegations are made throughout but specifically p. 20, fn 22). Such diatribe does nothing to 
reasonably advance the argument of whether the District Court erred on the issues raised on 
appeal and can only be seen as being made for an improper purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Nield, Inc. requests that this Court affirm the December 22, 2015 Judgment; render an 
opinion that the District Court erred in concluding the contract was ambiguous and erred in 
dismissing Nield, Inc.'s I.R.C.P. 4l(b) motion for involuntary dismissal; and grant Nield, Inc. its 
costs and fees incurred in defending this appeal, or, at a minimum, direct the District Court, after 
a final judgment in this case has been entered, to award Nield, Inc. its costs and fees. 
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DATED this 4th day of August, 2016. 
oseph T. Preston 
Attorney for the Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of August, 2016, I served two true and correct 
bound copies of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner 
indicated. 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
Attorney at Law 
1011 Washington St., Suite 101 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
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[2J U.S. Mail 
D Hand Deliver 
D Overnight Mail (FedEx) 
D Facsimile (Fax) 
D Electronic Mail (Email) 

requests that judgment be entered against the Defendant for the total sum of the unpaid 
commissions owed under the Contract the amount as shall be proven at trial, but not less 
than ten-thousand dollars ($10,000.00). 
26. That Plaintiff did, more than ten days prior to the filing of this action, make demand upon 
the Defendant, and Defendant has refused to provide an accounting, other than to advise the 
Plaintiff that Defendant was invoking the buy-out provisions of the Contract. 
27. Plaintiff should have and recover his court costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sec. 12-120, which sum would be $750 is judgment be by default, or a greater sum if this 
matter is contested. 
28. That Plaintiff should have and recover prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum on 
all sums found properly due Plaintiff pursuant to I.C. §28-22-104 from the time such sum 
was due until judgment herein shall enter. 
COUNT TWO - DECLARATORY RELIEF 
29. All prior averments are incorporated herein by reference. 
30. Pursuant to I.C.§10-1201 et seq., Plaintiff prays for declaratory relief that (1) the agent 
contract in question does include all bonuses commissions, incentives, profit sharing or other 
remuneration received by Nield Inc., in anyway affected, increased, decreased or influenced 
by Plaintiffs sales of insurance policies; (2) that the appropriate share of Plaintiff's portion 
of the bonus or profit sharing is 80% of that portion generated by Plaintiff's insurance sales; 
and (3) that Defendant has no interest in life and health insurance sold by Plaintiff or his wife 
and no interest in the health insurance book of business bought from Mike Kunz' widow and 
enhanced or prospered thereafter by Marti Kunz. 
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David A. Hooste (I.S.B. No. 6425) 
ECHOHAWKLAW 
P.O. Box 6119 
505 Pershing Ave.> Suite 100 
Pocatello; Idaho 83205-6119 
Telephone; (208)478-1624 
Facsimile: (208)478-1670 
Attorneys for Nield, Inc., dba Insurance Designers 
IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 




NIELD, INC., dba INSURANCE 
DESIGNERS, m Idaho Corporation 
Defendmt. 
Case No.: CV-2013-232 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO 
STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL 
BRIEF/OPENING STATEMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant, Nield, Inc., dba Insurance Designers, an Idaho Corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as Nield, Inc. or Defendant for convenience), by and thtough its counsel 
of record, Echo Hawk Law~ md moves this Court for an order Striking Plaintiff's Trial 
BriejlOpening Statement or other appropriate sanction against the Plaintiffs, not to include a 
continuance of the trail. 
Defendant1s motion is based upon Idaho Rules of Civil'Procedure (IRCP) 16(a). the 
Court's Scheduling Order dated April 14, 2014, and the following points: 
1. lRCP l 6(a) gives the Court authority to addresses scheduling conferences and 
scheduling orders. 
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2. The Court's Scheduling Order dated April 14) 2014 provides: 
TRIAL BRIEFS: The Court encourages (but does not require) the submission of 
trial briefs which address important substantive or evidentiary issues each party 
expects to arise during trial. Any trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged 
between the parties, and lodged with the Clerk (with copies to Chambers in Soda 
Springs, Idaho) at least ten (10) days prior to trial. 
3. Defendant received Plaintiffs' Trial Brief/Opening Starement on December 4, 2014, one 
and a half working days prior to trial. 
4. Defendant is prejudiced by the Plaintiffs' severe tardiness in submitting their Trial Brief, 
and failure to submit the brief in a simultaneous manner. 
5. It appears that Plaintiffs used the Defendant's Trial Brief in the preparation of their own 
Trial Brief 
6. By submitting their Trial Brief at such a late date, Plaintiff has taken an unfair advantage, 
particularly as the party with the burden of proof and which is generally tasked "With the 
initial presentation of statements and evidence. 
7. In addition, Plaintiffs' Trial Brief alleges facts and theories that are not relevant or at 
issue in accordance with the current pleadings. 
8. Defendant is left guessing whether Plaintiffs plan on trying to present and prove at trial 
evidence beyond the scope of the scheduled trial on only the declaratory judgment, and is 
prejudiced by the late presentation of alternative theories contained in Plaintiffs' Trial 
Brief 
9. The Plaintiffs have in essence put the onerous on the Defendant by waiting to first 
receive and re·view the Defendant's Trial Brief before making responses and arguments in 
its Trial Brief. 
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6 In fact, because of B.Kunz' business relationship with M.O. Kunz, NJ. and B.Kunz entered 
into an "Agent Contract" in 1996 as well. See Tr. 102. This "Agent Contract" mirrored the 
agreement that B.Kunz had with M.O.Kunz and paid B.Kunz "80% of commission received on 
insurance placed with" NJ. with NJ. receiving 20%. See Tr. Ex. 102. 
7. B.Kunz testified that he never received any profit sharing or contingent commission 
while operating as a sub-producer for M.O.Kunz. Tr., p. 27, LL. 18-19. He testified further that he 
did not expect to receive or share in any profit sharing or contingent bonuses. Tr. p. 90, LL. 21-23. 
The reason why B.Kunz did not expect to share in the bonuses is outlined in his cross-examination 
testimony when he was asked to read from his prior deposition testimony. In doing so, his 
deposition testimony relates that the reason he did not receive bonuses under the 1996 "Agent 
Contract" is because he "didn't own the book of business." Tr. p. 138, LL. 22-23. 
8. Following M.0.Kunz' death, B.Kunz and M.Kunz purchased M.0.Kunz' share of the 
book of business or "business placed" by M.O.Kunz with NJ. and the insurance agency located in 
Montpelier from M.O.Kunz' surviving spouse, Judy Kunz. Tr., p.27, LL. 7-8, and Tr. Ex. 128. 
9. Around the time that B.Kunz and M.Kunz purchased M.O.Kunz' book of business and 
the insurance agency, B.Kunz and NJ. began to have discussions with N.I. concerning their 
business relationship. B.Kunz testified that a "new contract became necessary that would include 
6 As outlined above, a certified copy of the transcript of these trial proceedings was prepared by the Court's Court Reporter, 
Rodney M. Felshaw. The Trial Transcript consists of two (2) volumes; the first volume includes the testimony for the first day of 
trial and consists of pages I through 262. The second volume includes the testimony for the second day of trial and consists of 
pages 263 through 427. The Court will cite to this transcript in these F.F.C.L. & M.D.O. as "Tr." followed by the relevant page 
and line numbers. 
7 Although Tr. Ex. 102 purports to be signed on January I, 1982, the Court finds this to be a scrivener's error. B.Kunz's 
testimony is clear that he did not begin working in the insurance industry until 1996. See Tr., p. 23, LL. 24-25 and p. 24, L. I. 
He also testified that this date was in error. See Tr., p. 132, LL. 24-25, p. 133, LL. 1-10. What appears to have happened is that 
N.I. used its Agent Contract with M.O.Kunz as a template for its Agent Contract with B.Kunz and in making the revisions, 
modifications and additions to the document in order to memorialize the parties' agreement, NJ. did not modify the date of the 
Agent Contract. This is supported not only by B.Kunz's testimony but by the fact that the date on M.O.Kunz's "Agent Contract" 
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an ownership clause similar to the one contained in M.O.Kunz' "Agent 
B.Kunz' 1996 "Agent Contract" did not contain an ownership clause. p. 
with N.L 
B.Kunz 
testified that one of the advantages of being a sub-contractor or having an "Agent Contract" with 
N.I. was to gain access to better contracts with certain insurance companies. Tr. p. 98, LL. 22-25. 
10. B.Kunz testified that it was suggested by B.Nield that B.Kunz and NJ. just sign the 
same contract that it had with M.O.Kunz. Tr., p. 34, LL. 5-7. Later, B.Kunz testified that he and 
M.Kunz wanted the same kind of contract that M.O.Kunz had with N.I. Tr., p. 132, LL. 16-18. 
11. B.Kunz testified that in October of 2008, a draft of the prospective "Agent Contract 
was prepared and brought, by B.Nield, to his office, in Montpelier, for his and M.Kunz' review. 
Tr., p. 33, LL 13-25. B.Kunz testified that both he and M.Kunz closely reviewed the draft of the 
prospective "Agent Contract." See Tr. Ex. 103. B.Kunz testified that this draft of the prospective 
"Agent Contract" appeared, to him and M.Kunz, "to mirror the [Agent] Contract with [M.O.Kunz]. 
Tr. p. 34, LL. 4-8. 
12. B.Kunz testified that upon being presented with a draft of the prospective "Agent 
Contract between B.Kunz and N.I., he was told that if he and M.Kunz "were okay with it, he 
[B.Nield] would take it back and put it on [N.I.'s] letterhead." Tr. p. 33, LL. 21-25. 
13. B.Kunz testified that following this meeting in October of 2008, he expected that the 
final document he was to be presented for signature would contain the terms of draft of the 
prospective "Agent Contract" between B.Kunz and N.I. as reflected in Tr. Ex. 103. 
14. B.Nield testified that typically N.I. has its contracts on N.I. letterhead. He also stated 
that the language in Tr. Ex. 103 is similar to that contained in its contracts, but because it is not on 
was January I, 1982. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7 
503 of 789 
NJ. letterhead, he "does not believe that [he] drafted it." Tr. p. 195, LL. 1-5. He also denies that he 
crune to Montpelier and delivered it to B.Kunz and M.Kunz. Tr., p. 195, LL. 5-7. 
15. B.Kunz testified that during the latter part of October, 2008 or the early part 
November, 2008, T.Nield, B.Nield, and Ben Nield came to B.Kunz' office in Montpelier, Idaho. 
B.Kunz' testimony continues that he was presented with the "Agent Contracts" for himself and 
M.Kunz. B.Kunz explains that because "I had looked at draft [of the prospective "Agent Contract" 
between B.Kunz and N.I. as reflected in Tr. Ex. 103] [he] did not look at that contract very closely." 
Tr. p. 35, LL. 8-16. The "Agent Contracts" for B.Kunz and M.Kunz were signed on this occasion. 
See Tr. Ex. 104 (M.Kunz "Agent Contract") and Tr. Ex. 105 (B.Kunz "Agent Contract"). 
However, the "Agent Contract" reflects that the effective date of the contract is January 2009. 
16. The "Agent Contract" between B.Kunz and N.1. was drafted by B.Nield. Tr. p. 195, 
LL. 17-19. 
17. B. Kunz also testified that on this occasion, B.Nield "mentioned ... that they had had 
some pretty good profit sharing checks with [M.O.Kunz].'.s Tr. p. 35, LL. 15-16. 
18. The 2009 "Agent Contract" entered into between B.Kunz and N.I. contains the 
following provisions that are pertinent to the dispute of the parties: 
(1) Paragraph 5 outlines the responsibilities of the agent, B.Kunz. These responsibilities 
include: (a) being identified as a subcontractor and having responsibility for all expenses related to 
s...Contingent commission" and ~profit sharing" are phrases that appear to be used interchangeably in the insurance industry and 
certainly amongst the parties in this litigation. B.Kunz defines these phrases in the following tenns: "Profit sharing, sometimes 
called 'contingent commissions,' is remuneration paid by the insurance company on generally an annual basis and predicated on 
a variety of factors. including written premium, loss ratios, and new business." Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 5, 1 23. Similarly, N.I. defines these phrases in the following fashion: "A contingent commission or 
profit sharing is a form of compensation that is different than monthly commission because the contingent commission or profit 
is conditioned upon an agent certain guidelines:· Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order, p. 9, 'II 35. 
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looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstances under 
which it was made, the objective and purpose the particular provision, and any construction 
placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings."' Beus v. Beus, 
151 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (201 l)(Beus). 
17. The Court, upon review of the parties' 2009 "Agent Contract", also concludes that 
there is at least one ambiguity in the 2009 "Agent Contract." 
18. At trial the Court allowed the introduction of extrinsic or parol evidence with the 
understanding and expectation that there was an ambiguity in the parties' "Agent Contract" and 
that it would be necessary for the Court, as the fact finder in this litigation, to attempt to asce1tain 
the intent of the parties by resorting to the review and consideration of extrinsic evidence of the 
type allowed and discussed in Beus. In addressing this issue, the Court noted as follows: 
I think the crux of this case is that there is an ambiguity, or arguably an ambiguity, 
regarding commission. So the court is going to allow extrinsic evidence or parol 
evidence to determine what the intent of the parties was. And it's very relevant 
and important, both what Mr. Kunz's understanding was as well as what Mr. 
Nield's understanding or belief of the term commission was as utilized in this 
document, both in paragraph seven and other paragraphs .... 
Tr. p. 238, LL. 3-11. 
19. The ambiguity relates to the same language cited above to support the Court's 
conclusion that the document is not integrated. See Conclusions of Law Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 15. 
Paragraph 6 begins with the heading titled "Responsibilities of Company", N.I. Paragraph 6 of 
the parties' "Agent Contract" reads as follows: 
[N.I.] will maintain contracts with companies for placing of insurance. [N.I.] will 
do all billing and accounting functions (except collections). [B.Kunz] is 
personally responsible for the collection of premiums and returned commissions 
on business placed. [N.I.] will provide to [B.Kunz] a 1099 Form showing annual 
earnings. [t~.I.] will provided [B.Kunz] with a commission earned statement and 
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commission check based on agreed percentages on the 15th day of each month. 
Other functions based on commission split and individual agreement 
The Court, in reviewing this specific provision and the "Agent Contract" as a whole, concludes 
that the last sentence of Paragraph 6 is ambiguous and the Court cannot ascertain what it means 
based upon the reading of the individual sentence, the paragraph as a whole, or the "Agent 
Contract" as a whole. 
20. Nothing in the parties' "Agent Contract" expressly identifies or defines what "other 
functions" means or what "individual agreements" relates to. To this Court these phrases seem 
to have no place within this document other than to notify the reader and the parties that there are 
other unexpressed functions and individual agreements not discussed and/or outlined in the body 
of this document. One of these, after considering all of the evidence, is the separate and 
individual agreement dealing with Gem State Insurance's profit sharing. See Findings of Fact 
Nos. 30, 31 and 32. 
21. Pursuant to Beus, the intent of the parties with respect to ambiguous or unclear 
contract provisions "is to be determined by looking at the contract as a whole, the language used 
in the document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of the 
particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by 
their conduct or dealings." 151 Idaho at 238, 254 P.3d at 1234. The Court will refer to these 
factors as "the Beus factors" in its discussion of the same. 
22. The problem with both parties' positions is that the evidence, in the trial record, 
demonstrates that there was much not much, if any, discussion regarding this contract or its 
individual provisions. 
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23. The nature and character of the parties' relationship changed upon the death of 
M.0.Kunz. It appears to the Court that there was little or no negotiation concerning their 
business relationship between B.Kunz, B.Nield or any other representative of NJ. What little 
negotiation there was appears to be limited to one (1) meeting in Montpelier, Idaho in October of 
2008 where the "Agent Contract" was discussed. However, the extent of that discussion appears 
to be limited to the fact that the "Agent Contract" would minor that of M.O.Kunz. The second 
meeting in Montpelier is where the document was presented and signed by B.Kunz without much 
review or discussion. See Findings of Fact Nos. 9 through 11. 
24. The details of the "Agent Contract" and the language were not discussed. It was 
obvious from the express language of the "Agent Contract", the parties' course of dealings, and 
their trial testimony, that B.Kunz would receive 80% of the commissions relative to new business 
or policies sold (initial commissions) and 80% of the commissions associated with renewals with 
respect to his existing book of business (residual commission). It was also obvious from the 
express language of the "Agent Contract", the parties' course of dealing, and their trial testimony, 
that B.Kunz would own 50% of his book of business and that NJ. would own the other 50%. 
However, it is far from clear when one considers the express language of the parties' "Agent 
Contract" (which this Court has found to be ambiguous and unclear), the parties' course of 
conduct, and their trial testimony, what their intent was concerning profit sharing. 
25. However, the parties' course of conduct does reflect a course of dealings between the 
parties for each of the relevant years 2008 through 2012, except 2009,23 with respect to profit 
sharing or contingent commissions, or bonuses. 
231n 2009, B.Kunz did not qualify for profit sharing from Gem State Insurance. In addition, he did not receive any profit sharing 
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26. In October or November of 2008, when the parties were meeting to finalize their 
"Agent Contract" B.Kunz testified that B.Nield "mentioned ,. . that they [NJ. and M.0.Kunz] 
had had some pretty good profit sharing checks with [M.O.Kunz]." See Finding of Fact No. 17. 
A second statement was made by B.Nield to B.Kunz at N.I.'s office in Pocatello, Idaho between 
November 2008 and February of 2009 concerning "how nice the profit sharing checks were."24 
See Finding of Fact No. 19. 
27. In 2009, B.Kunz received profit sharing with respect to Gem State Insurance for 
profit sharing earned in 2008 (See Finding of Fact No. 20), in 2010, B.Kunz received profit 
sharing with respect to Gem State and Acuity (See Finding of Fact No. 22), in 2011, B.Kunz 
received profit sharing with respect to Gem State and Alliance (See Finding of Fact No. 23), and 
in 2012, B.Kunz received profit sharing from Gem State and Acuity. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 
24 and 25).25 
28. As a result of the foregoing, this Court concludes that B.Kunz has established a 
course of dealing with B.Nield, a representative and principal of NJ., sufficient to establish an 
agreement, separate and apart from their non-integrated "Agent Contract" (an "individual 
or contingent commission with respect to any other company. See Finding of Fact No. 21. 
24The Court recognizes that these claims by B.Kunz concerning statements made by B.Nield are disputed and that B.Nield denies 
making said statements. However, the Court has determined that B.Kunz' testimony is more credible and reliable on these points 
and accepts his testimony as being accurate and truthful on these points. There are a number of reasons for the Court's 
determination on this point, chief among them being that long before the litigation was filed or even contemplated by these 
parties, B.Nield and N.I. freely used the term profit sharing in dealing with B.Kunz with respect to Gem State Insurance, Acuity 
and Farmers Alliance. Not only was this term used on check receipts (B.Nield testified that the phrase profit sharing was used on 
some documents generated by N.l., because of its accounting software). See Tr. Ex. 111, p. 2, it was also freely used in B.Nield's 
Memo's to B.Kunz. See Tr. Ex. 's 106, 107, and 109. Never once, prior to this litigation, did B.Nield dispute, correct or suggest 
to B.Kunz that profit sharing was not part of their relationship and that B.Kunz was off base in his understanding that there was 
profit sharing. It is inconceivable to this Court, that a business, such as N.I., and/or a principal in said business, such as B.Nield, 
would allow a partner or colleague such as B.Kunz to continue uncorrected when it was so clear that he believed that he was 
entitled to profit sharing. The dialogue was never about whether profit sharing existed, but the amount of the split. See Tr. Ex. 's 
108, 109, and 110. 
25The Court recognizes that this Conclusion of Law is contrary to the position asserted by NJ, specifically when B.Nield, in his 
testimony, wherein he states that NJ. does not pay profit sharing. See Finding of Fact No. 29. Instead he characterizes these 
payments as purely gratuitous bonuses made by N.I. See Tr. p. 202, LL. J0.1,. However, for the same reasons articulated in 
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agreement" as discussed in Paragraph 6) for the payment of profit sharing or contingent bonuses 
to B.Kunz with respect to Gem State Insurance. 
29. However, the Court cannot make a finding that there has been a meeting of the minds 
or an agreement as to the percentage split As most recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 2015 WL 4381069, *4, the "'formation of a valid 
contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual 
intent to contract.' Whether a contract has been formed 'is generally a question of fact for the 
trier of fact to resolve."' In this instance, this Court cannot conclude that N .I. ever agreed, either 
by the express terms of the "Agent Contract", or by a course of dealings with M.O.Kunz or 
B.Kunz, to pay B.Kunz 80% of the profit sharing attributable to Gem State Insurance. The 
reasons include, but are not limited to: (1) except for in 2012, N.I. never paid 80% of the 
contingent commission from Gem State to B.Kunz and even in 2012 they did so as an attempt to 
show good faith to B.Kunz rather than accepting his position; (2) there was no evidence that N.I. 
ever paid M.0.Kunz 80% of the contingent commission from Gem State, M.O.Kunz' contract 
with N.I. being the contract and business relationship after which the B.Kunz contract and 
relationship with N.I. was modeled; and (3) even the oral and written discussions in which this 
agreement is established contain no reference to a percentage split either 50/50 or 80/20. As 
such, the course of dealings established between 2008 and 2012 with respect to Gem State 
Insurance is that the parties had an individual agreement that they would split the profit sharing 
associated with Gem State Insurance, but that the amount was never agreed upon. Despite the 
amount never being agreed upon, the parties' course of conduct, as established by the evidence at 
Footnote 22, the Court does not find this position to be credible. 
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trial, is that N .1. paid B.Kunz 50% of the profit sharing attributable to State and retained 
50%. B.Kunz accepted these amounts each year, albeit it under protest. This is the parties' 
course of dealings. The Court cannot write the terms of this parties' "Agent Contract". The 
course of dealings only allows for the 50/50 split, the amount paid by NJ. and accepted B.Kunz. 
30. Therefore, the Court concludes that by course of conduct, N.I. did commit and 
contract to pay B.Kunz 50% of the profit sharing attributable to Gem State Insurance. 
31. However, the more difficult question is whether a course of dealing has been 
established sufficient to conclude that an "individual agreement" has been reached between NJ. 
and B.Kunz for the payment of contingent commissions or profit sharing with respect to the other 
companies at issue, Acuity, Allied and Alliance. 
32. B.Kunz would have this Court, "by looking at the contract as a whole, the language 
used in the document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of 
the particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown 
by their conduct or dealings (the Beus factors), determine that the parties had an agreement for 
profit sharing or contingent commission splits and that this agreement provides that B.Kunz is 
entitled to 80% of the profit sharing or contingent commission arising from his book of business 
(including Gem State, Acuity, Alliance, and Allied) and N.I. is entitled to 20% of the profit 
sharing or contingent commission from his book of business. See Finding of Fact No. 28. 
33. In order to reach this conclusion the Court would have to find that the term 
"commission" as used in the parties' "Agent Contract", is ambiguous. 
34. Nowhere in the "Agent Contract" is the term "commission" defined. Not 
surprisingly, the parties attempt to define commission in different fashions, each utilizing a 
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definition that best suits their purpose. B.Kunz wishes to apply a more generalized and laymen's 
definition to this term and have it include all types commission, including what has been 
characterized as the "initial commission" ( commissions paid on the premium obtained for new 
business and/or policies), "residual commissions" (commissions paid on the premium obtained 
for existing business that is renewed), and "contingent commissions'' ( commissions paid based 
upon factors, contingencies, and criteria established by the insurance company on whose behalf 
the insurance agent is selling insurance products). N.I. in tum wants the Court to use a much 
narrower and restrictive definition to the term "commission. N.I. argues that the term 
"commission" is a term of art in the insurance industry. N.I contends that term "commission" as 
utilized in the parties' "Agent Contract" should be limited to the definition applied to this term 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners as contained in its Glossary of 
Insurance Terms. See Tr. Ex. 209. 
35. The Court agrees that the term "commission", especially in the insurance industry 
can be viewed in broader terms, encompassing all forms and character of "commissions", 
including, but not limited to "initial commissions", "residual commission, and "contingent 
commissions." Similarly, the Court recognizes that it could be used in a more restrictive context. 
The problem is that their document, the "Agent Contract" itself, makes no express attempt to 
establish which definition is being used. However, the Court, by employing the Beus factors: (I) 
the language used in the document, (2) the circumstances under which it was made, (3) the 
objective and purpose of the particular provision, and ( 4) any construction placed upon it by the 
contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings, the Court concludes that the parties' 
intended to limit the meaning of "commissions" to the more restrictive and narrow meaning of 
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commission of a "percentage of premium paid to agents by insurance companies for the sale of 
policies" both new business and existing renewals. See Exhibit 209, p.5. 
36. The reasons the Court reaches this conclusion are as follows: (I) the language of 
Paragraph 6 in B.Kunz' 1996 "Agent Contract" and his 2009 "Agent Contract" is substantively 
identical. There are a few stylistic revisions or modifications in the 2009 "Agent Contract", but 
substantively this Court can discern no difference between the two; (2) the language of the 
Paragraph 7 in B.Kunz 1996 "Agent Contract" and his 2009 Contract is virtually identical;26 (3) 
B.Kunz freely admits that under the 1996 "Agent Contract" and his previous relationships with 
both M.0.Kunz and NJ., he did not receive and did not expect to receive profit sharing or 
contingent bonuses (See Finding of Fact No. 7); (4) reading the contract as a whole, other 
paragraphs referring to the payment of "commissions" (the same term being used and no attempt 
being made to distinguish it in meaning or usage from the term "commission" as used in 
paragraph 7) in the context of monthly payments of commission (Company will provide agent 
with a commission earned statement and commission check based upon agreed percentages on 
the 1511, day of each month."); and (5) B.Kunz' own statement that the purpose of entering the 
2009 "Agent Contract" was to create a "new contract that would include an ownership" clause 
similar to the one contained in M.O.Kunz' "Agent Contract" with N.I.27 
37. The parties' course of dealings clearly reflect that the commissions were paid 
monthly on "initial commissions" earned off of premiums received from new policies or business 
and "residual commissions" earned off premiums received from existing policy renewals. 
26The only difference the Court could see is in the phrase "by agent'' is added immediately following the term "placed." The 
Court cannot see that this insertion of"by agent" changes the meaning in any manner. 
270ne would certainly expect that if this issue (profit sharing and the percentage split between N.I. and B.Kunz) had been 
contemplated by the parties and intended to be part of their agreement, it would have been expressly addressed in their 2009 
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However, both B.Kunz and B.Nield acknowledge that contingent commissions (at least with 
respect to the insurance companies at issue Gem State Insurance, Acuity, Alliance and Allied) 
are paid annually. As such, it appears that the use of commissions in paragraph 6 is referencing 
the same commission in paragraph 7 and both seem clearly to be limited to commissions capable 
of payment monthly rather than annually. 
38. Therefore, the Court cannot accept B.Kunz' asserted definition for "commission." 
39. Unfortu.fl.ately, the Court cannot find that the parties have an "individual agreement" 
outside of and separate to their "Agent Contract". Neither can the Court find that their Agent 
Contract is intended to set out terms and conditions associated with profit sharing or contingent 
commissions associated with Acuity, Alliance, and Allied.28 
40. However, once again the Court cannot find that an agreement exists outside the four 
comers of the parties' "Agent Contract" wherebyN.I. contractually agreed to pay B.Kunz a 50/50 
split, an 80/20 split, or for that matter any amount of a split associated with contingent bonuses 
"Agent Contract." 
28The Court's use of the tenn "unfortunately" is not suggestive of this Court harboring a prejudice or bias in favor of Kunz. 
Rather it is suggestive of the Court's conclusion that it believes B.Kunz' testimony in many respects regarding the verbal 
statements made by B.Nield concerning profit sharing, specifically as it relates to Findings of Fact Nos. 17 and 19. Just as the 
Court addressed in Footnote No. 24, the Court has detennined that B.Kunz' testimony is more credible and reliable on these 
points and accepts his testimony as being accurate and truthful on these points. There are a number of reasons for the Court's 
determination on this point, chief among them being that long before the litigation was filed or even contemplated by these 
parties, B.Nield and N.l. freely used the term profit sharing in dealing with B.Kunz with respect to Gem State Insurance, Acuity, 
and Farmers Alliance. Not only was this term used on check receipts (B.Nield testified that the phrase profit sharing was used on 
some of documents generated by N.l.'s because of its accounting software), (See Tr. Ex. l I l, p. 2); it was also freely used in 
B.Nield's Memo's to B.Kunz. See Tr. Ex. 's I06, 107, and 109. Never once, prior to this litigation, did B.Nield dispute, correct 
or suggest to B.Kunz that profit sharing was not part of their relationship and that he was off base in his understanding that there 
was profit sharing. It is inconceivable to this Court that a business, such as N.I., and/or a principal in said business, such as 
B.Nield, would allow a business partner or colleague such as B.Kunz to continue uncorrected when it was so clear that he 
believed he was entitled to profit sharing from all insurance companies in the amourit of 80/20 split. It is also curious to the 
Court that the profit sharing was paid in odd amounts, suggestive of the application of some type offonnula (B.Kunz argued that 
this is indicative ofan intent to deceive B.Kunz into believing he was receiving a profit sharing check pursuant to a 50/50 split or 
80/20 split). Although the Court declines to make such a finding, any time in this Court's experience that it has been the 
recipient of a gratuitous bonus from a fonner employer or as an employer providing an employee with a gratuitous bonus, it has 
been a rounded number, for example $500.00 or $1,500.00, not once has it been in an odd amount such as $663.50, $629.00, or 
$424.00. 
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paid from Acuity, Alliance, and Allied. Rather, it appears to Court that N .I.' s payment of 
bonuses, characterized as "profit sharing, to B.Kunz was a purely arbitrary and gratuitous act on 
N .I.' s pati. "29 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law outlined above, the 
Court provides the parties with the following declaratory relief and pursuant to I.C. §10-1201 
will enter a Declaratory Judgment as follows: 
(1) The parties' "Agent Contract" is not integrated and is not intended to be a final 
expression of their agreement or for that matter the only agreement between the parties with 
respect to their business relationship. 
(2) The parties had a separate and "individual agreement" which was established by 
their testimony at trial and their course of dealing with one another whereby N.I. paid B.Kunz 
profit sharing in the amount of a 50/50 split for profit sharing or contingent bonuses earned from 
Gem State Insurance Company. 
(3) In addition to their "Agent Contract" being a non-integrated document, Paragraph 6 
of their "Agent Contract", specifically the last sentence is unclear, vague and ambiguous, 
specifically, the last sentence of Paragraph 6. However, the Court cannot determine, upon 
29This Court questions the business practices of B.Nield and N.I. This Court believes N.I. allowed B.Kunz to proceed with the 
purchase of M.O.Kunz' book of business, allowed B.Kunz to operate under the parties' "Agent Contract" equipped with the 
understanding that he would receive profit sharing, and later when these discussions occurred regarding profit sharing, did 
nothing to outline clearly its position concerning profit sharing and correct B.Kunz on these issues. In fact, N.I. never asserted 
this position or infonned B.Kunz of it until litigation. However, despite this Court's discomfort with this scenario, the Court can 
find no legal basis upon which to find the parties had a legally enforceable contract regarding profit sharing. However, while the 
Court has spent, perhaps an inordinate amount of time questioning the business practices ofN.I., B.Kunz is not without blame in 
this matter. The Court is not sure B.Kunz exercised due diligence with Judy Kunz, M.O. Kunz, and N.l. concerning their 
business relationship. If he had, he likely would have found some evidence of profit sharing which would have bolstered his 
claim in this proceeding or found that this course of dealings did not exist and been more vigilant in negotiating for it and 
reducing it to some form ofwritten documentation. 
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An AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed in the District Comt on November 12, 20 l 5, 
from the DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE entered by District Judge 
Mitchell W. Brown and file stamped on November 16, 2015. The DECLARATORY .JUDGMENT 
AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE filed on November 5, 2015, contains legal analysis, a histo1y of 
prior proceedings and, a Rule 54(b) Cetiificate was attached. The DECLARATORY JUDG!VfENT 
AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE is not a final judgment as it does not comply with Rule 54(a) and 
should not have a Rule 54(b) Certificate unless part of the case is continuing at the District Court: 
therefore, 
lT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the above entitled appeal be. and hereby is, 
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSED as it appears the Amended Notice of Appeal was not filed from a 
final, appealable district court order or judgment from which the Amended Notice of Appeal may be 
taken. Appellant shall be allowed TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF TI-IIS ORDER 
to obtain a final judgment or order from the District Court or, file a RESPONSE with this Court 
showing why this appeal should not be dismissed. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that further proceedings in this appeal SHALL BE SUSPENDED 
pending an Order of'thi~t. 
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JUDGMENT 
NIELD, INC., 
AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
dba INSURANCE DESIGNERS, 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Declaratory Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant, Nield, Inc. 
DATED this 22nd day ofDecember, 2015. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
Sixth District Judge 
JUDGMENT AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE -1 
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Comi has detennined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Comi has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue 
and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2015. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
Sixth District Judge 
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Fax: (208) 847-1230 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
BRET D. KUNZ and MARTI KUNZ, 
Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 43724-2015 
Bear Lake County No. CV-2013-000232 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, Nield Inc., AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, 
Joseph T. Preston, PO Box 6119, Pocatello, Idaho 83205, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE 
ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, Bret and Marti Kunz, appeal against the above named 
Defendant to the Idaho Supreme Court from: The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Memorandum Decision and Order entered in the above entitled action on the 31st day of 
August, 2015; the Declaratory Judgment entered September 18, 2015; the Declaratory 
Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate entered November 5, 2015; and the Judgment and Rule 
54(b) Certificate entered December 22, 2015, Honorable Mitchell Brown presiding. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and putsuant to 11 I.A.R., 
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Rule 54(b ). This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 1-204. 
3. I. Did the Court err in Bifurcating these Proceedings? 
II. Did the Court err in making Conclusions of Law that are non sequetor from the Court's 
own findings? 
III. Did the Court err in concluding that the parties had a separate contract with respect to 
Gem State when the parties themselves never identified any such separate contract? 
IV. Did the Court eIT in construing the contract in favor of the drafter? 
V. Did the Court err in construing the course of dealings as not indicated contingent 
commissions or profit sharing on the pa1t of the contract when the Defendants themselves 
identified each and every payment as a contingent commission or profit sharing? 
VI. Did the Court err in construing the contract to require only 50% be paid to Gem State 
based on ownership when that is contrary to the plain language of the agreement between the 
pmties? 
VII. Did the Court err in granting declaratory judgment only to Defendant when Defendant 
had stipulated to partial declaratory relief in favor of Plaintiffs on the eve of trial? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Trial Transcript (already prepared); Transcript of hearing held 11/20/2014 is requested. 
Transcript of hearing on 11/5/2015 is also requested. 
6. The appellees request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
7. All exhibits admitted or offered for admission; complaint filed 11/13/2013, Answer and 
Counterclaim filed 12/2/2013, Cross-Claim Complaint filed 12/2/2013, Motion for a 
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Protective Order filed 12/11/2013, Motion for Change 
to Crossclaim filed 1/2/14, Reply to Counterclaim filed 
filed 12/12/2013, Answer 
Motion to Bifurcate and 
Proceedings filed 1/31/ 14, Brief in Support of Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Proceedings file 
1/31/14, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Proceedings file 
2/24/14, Motion to Amend Reply and Answer to Crossclaim filed 3/11/14, Reply in Support 
of Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Proceedings file 3/1 1/ 14, Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Proceedings filed 3/26/14, Minute Entry and Order filed 
4/17/14, Continued (Motion 11/20/14) Motion to Amend Answer Counterclaim & 
Crossclaim, Minute Entry and Order filed 11/14/14, Amended Minute Entry and Order filed 
11/14/14, Response to Motion to Amend Answer and counterclaim filed 11/18/14, Tape of 
hearing on 11/19/14, Defendants Trial Brief filed 12/1/14, Trial Briefi'opening statement filed 
12/4/14, Joint Pre-trial Stipulation filed 12/5/14, Notice of Lodging of Transcript filed 
2/13/15, Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed 3/3/15, 
Plaintiffs Closing Arguments filed 3/3/15, Defendant's Proposed Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Order filed 3/17 /15, Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum filed 3/23/15, 
Objection and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum filed 3/25/15, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order filed 8/31/15, Declaratory 
Judgment filed 9/18/15, Order on Nield, foe's Memorandum of Costs filed 9/18/15, Tape of 
hearing held 10/5/15, Minute Entry and Order for hearing held on October 6, 2015 filed 
10/7 /15, Offer of Proof filed 10/15/15, Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate and 
Minute Entry and Order, both entered on 11/5/2015; Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate 
entered December 22, 2015. 
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8. I 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been required as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and Address: Rodney Felshaw,159 So. Main, Soda Springs, ID 83276 
b. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the rep01ier's transcript. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
of December, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a tme copy of the foregoing was mailed and/or sent by telefax this~day of 
December, 2015, to the following: 
Joseph T. Preston 
ECHOHAWKLAW 
PO Box 6119 
Pocatello, ID 83205-6119 
Rodney Felshaw 
rodney.felshaw@gmail.com 
Hon. Mitchell Brown 
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01STRICT COURT 
SIXTH JUDICIAL COURT 
BRR VKE COUNTY IDAHO /el ~~ ;;iJ/t; .. . : 
DATE. . ·•TIME/ W. CLERK 
QEPUTY CASE NO. 
Ili THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTR JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF ID.AlIO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BE.AR LAKE 
BRET D. KlJl'.\fZ, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CASE NO. CV-2013-000232 
JUDGMENT 
N1ELDj XNC., 
AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
dba INSUF:A.1,lCE DESIGKfERS, 
an Idaho Corporation, 
De:fundants. 
J1JDG1VIENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Declarato:ry Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant, Nield, Inc. 
nATED this 22nn day ofDecember, 2015. 
~#~ 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
Sixth District Judge 
Jr!TaGMEN1' AND RVLE 54{b) CERTIFICATE -1 
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Joseph T. Preston 
ECHO HA WK & OLSEN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 6119 
505 Pershing Ave., Suite 100 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-61 l 9 
joseph@echohawk.com 
Facsimile: (208) 47&-1670 
Telephone: (208) 478-1624 
Idaho State Bar# 9082 
Attorneys for Nield, Inc., dba Insurance Designers 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SL-X.TH mDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR BEAR LAKE COUNTY 




NIELD, INC., dba INSURANCE 
DESIGNERS, an Idaho Corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-2013~232 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Defendant, Nield, Inc., an Idaho co:1poration, dba Insurance Designers, 
by and through its counsel of record, and hereby moves this Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
59(e) to alter or amend the Judgment filed on December 22, 2015 ("New Final Judgment"). This 
Motion is made upon the following grounds and reasons: 
BACKGROUND 
On December 8, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court sent an Order Conclitionally Dismissing 
.Appeal ("Dismissal Order"). The Supreme Court raised issues with th.is District Court's 
Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate, filed on November 5, 2015 ("Previous Final 
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Jan. 4. 2016 5:27PM Echohawk Law Off ice No. 2488 P. 2/14 
Judgment"). The Dismissal Order informed Plaintiff-Appellant that he had twenty-one (21) days 
from the date of the Dismissal Order to obtain a more appropriate judgment from the 
District Court or that Plaintiff-Appellant was to file a response with the Supreme Court. The 
consequence for failing to satisfy the Supreme Court with either of these actions appears to be 
the dismissal of Plaintiff-AppeUant' s appeal. The Supreme Court further ordered that further 
proceedi!'.lgs with the Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal would be "suspended pending an Order'' from 
the Supreme Court. 
On December 16, 2015, this District Court scheduled a status conference for December 
17, 2015. At the status conference, the parties came before this District Court and were informed 
that after receiving the Supreme Court's Dismissal Order this District Court contacted the Idaho 
Supreme Court regarding the Dismissal Order and the District Court's Declaratory Judgment and 
Rule 54(b) Ce1iificate. The District Court asked for the parties' input, and the parties discussed 
the matter with the Court. During this discussion, it was made known that the Plaintiffs-
Appellants intended to file a Response Brief with the appellate court The Court also made 
known that it planned to have further communication with the Supreme Court and address 
perceived deficiencies with the Previous Final Judgment. 
On December 22, 2015, this District Court entered its New Final Judgment. The New 
Final Judgment reads in part, "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: Declaratory 
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant, Nield, Inc." Based upon representations made by 
Plaintiff-Appellant to Defendant-Respondents outside of Court, it appears that the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk of the Court is satisfied with the New Final Judgment, and it appears that it 
is the Clerk of the Supreme Court's opinion that the New Final Judgment is an appropriate 
judgment, within the meaning ofLR.C.P. Rule 54(a). 
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Even though the Supreme Court appears satisfied with the District Court's New Final 
Judgment, there is uncertainty on what effect this New Final Judgment has on the Previous Final 
Judgment, and whether or not 1t was this District Court's intention to also address additional 
claims not previously addressed in the Court's Previous Final Judgment. Further it does not 
appear that the New Final Judgment is the most appropriate form of judgment under tJ1e Unifonn 
Declaratory Judgment Act. The Defendant therefore brings this Motion to address these issues. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court should alter or amend the New Final Judgment because it is unclear what 
effect the New Final Judgment has on the Previous Final Judgment and the District Court's New 
Final Judgment is not the most appropriate method of judgment under the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act 
I. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT EFFECT THE NEW FINAL JUDGMENT HAS ON THE 
PREVIOUS FINAL JUDGMENT 
With no other direction from the District Court besides that which was discussed at the 
December 17, 2015, status conference, the pa1'ties are left speculating on what effect the New 
Final Judgment has on the Previous Final Judgment. 
It is unclear whether the New Final Judgment is an amended judgment of the Previous 
Final Judgment as provided under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(a)(2), whether it was the Court's intent to 
enter judgment on claims not previously addressed in the New Final Judgment, and whether the 
Previous Final Judgment has any legitimacy or whether the same is now invalid and void. 
A. The New Final Judgment Does Not Appear to be an Amended Judgment 
It does not appear that the New Final Judgment is an amended judgment of the Previous 
Final Judgment as contemplated by l.R.C.P. Rule 54(a)(2). The first evidence of this is that the 
title of the document is "Judgment'' rather than "Amended Judgment." Also there was no order 
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entered by this Court prior to the entry of the New Final Judgment setting forth that the Court 
would be amending the Previous Final Judgment. Additionally, there is nothing from this court 
setting forth those tenns of the prior judgment that remain in effect. I.R. C.P. Rule 54( a)(2). 
If it was this Court's intention that the New Final Judgment be an amended judgment of 
the Previous Final Judgment then it would appear that no part of the Previous Final Judgment 
remains in effect because this District Court did not set forth any "terms of the prior judgment 
that remain in effect." 
R It Appea:rs that the New Final Judgment Enlarges the Scope of the Pre-vious Final 
Judgment 
In Plaintiffs Complaint. he asks the Court to enter declaratory relief on three (3) separate 
points. The trial, in this case, was held on two (2) of those three (3) points, and the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions oflaw addressed those two (2) points. The Court's Previous 
Final Judgment squarely addressed those two (2) issues which were tried by Plaintiff. However, 
the Court,s New Final Judgment is a simple statement that "Declaratory Judgment is entered in 
favor of Defendant, Nield, Inc." It appears that the Court is just treating the claim for declaratory 
relief as one single cause of action. A blanket judgment on all three items of declaratory relief 
p~ayed for appears improper since one (1) of those three (3) declaratory relief items was resolved 
by stipulation, and Nield, Inc. did not pray for declaratory relief in its favor. As will be more 
fully discussed below, the Court's New Final Judgment is improper because it merely grants 
declaratory judgment in Defendant's favor. 
The District Court's New Final Judgment seems to have complicated the issues on 
appeal. In Plaintiff's Second Amended Notice of Appeal, he has raised for the first time on 
appeal, an issue with the Court's judgment as it relates to the third declaratory judgment issue. 
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An altered or amended judgment will help clarify what impact the New Final Judgment 
h~s on the Previous Final Judgment. 
C. To the Extent that the New Final Judgment is not an Amended Judgment, the 
District Court appears to have exceeded its Authority by Entering the New Final Judgment 
Ordinarily, the Idaho Appellate Rules Rule 13(b) limits that powers that a District Court 
has while a civil appeal is pending. One of those limited powers is to "(4) Rule on any motion to 
amend the judgment." 
I.A.R. Rule 13.2 allows the appellate court to suspend an appeal by order, which order 
''will state the duration and any conditions of such suspension ... " The Dismissal Order appears 
to be, at least in part, mi I.AR. Rule 13.2 Suspension of Appeal Order. The Dismissal Order 
states that "further proceedings in this appeal SHALL BE SUSPENDED pending an Order of 
this Court." The appellate court gave direction to Plaintiff to "obtain a final judgment or order 
from the District Comt" within twenty-one (21) days from the date of the Dismissal Order. It is 
unclear whether the Dismissal Order expanded the limited powers of this District Court under 
lA.R. Rule 13 (b) to allow this District Court the ability to enter a judgment other than an 
amended judgment. 
Because the Dismissal Order does not appear to grmit any express authority for the 
District Court to enter anything other than an amended judgment, allowed under I.AR Rule 
13(b), it appears that the only authority that the District Court would have is th.at which is 
enumerated in I.A.R. Rule 13(b ). As discussed above, it does not appear that this Court was 
simply issuing an amended judgment by its New Final Order. However, if the New Final 
Judgment was an attempt by the Court to render judgments on claims stayed, it would seem that 
the Court did so without jurisdiction. 
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The Court should therefore help settle the uncertainty by granting Defendant's Motion 
and enter an order altering or amended the judgment 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S NEW FINAL JUDGMENT DOES NOT 
ADEQUATELY COMPLY WITH THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT 
Surely, the District Court's New Final Judgment was the result of issues raised by.the 
Dismissal Order. However, the New Final Judgment is not the most appropriate judgment under 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act The Court should issue a Judgment which declares the 
rights, status or other legal relations of the parties, even though a dismissal of the Plaintiffs 
claims may not be a fatal flaw. 
A. This District Court should enter a Judement that Declares the Parties Status under 
the Ag,ent Contract 
The Idaho Supreme Court case of TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. State, 351 P.3d 599 (Idaho 
2015) i.s instructive. In TracFone, the trial court entered a partial judgment merely stating, "It is 
hereby ordered that judgment is GRANTED in favor of defendants/counterclaimants as to the 
declaratory relief claims and counterclaims of the parties." Id. at 602r03. The Supreme Court, in 
a footnote, stated: 
The declaratory judgment does not comply with Rule 54(a) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure because it does not state "the relief to which a party is 
entitled." I.R.C.P. 54(a). "A document does not constitute a judgment merely 
because it states who will prevail in the lawsuit." Harrison v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 149 Idaho 201,205,233 P.3d 132, 136 (2010) .. 
. . Because many trial judges were failing to comply with Rule 54(a), on February 
12, 2015, this Court issued an order .stating that "any judgment, decree or order 
entered before April 15, 2015, that was intended to be final but which.did not 
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) ... shall be treated as a final 
judgment." The judgment in this case was entered on March 19, 2014, before that 
deadline. Therefore, the partial judgment in this ·case is treated as a final 
judgment Id. at fn. 1. 
. In addition to the issues that the Supreme Court had with the partial judgment's failure to comply 
with I.C.R.P. Rule 54(a), the TracFone Court also took issue that the partiaijudgment "'did not 
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set forth any determination of the construction of any applicable statute or declare the rights, 
status, or other legal relations of the parties under any statute.'' Id. at 603. When the Supreme 
. . 
Court ultimately decided whether to affirm or reverse the decision of the District Court, it was 
not the District Court's partialjudgment that the Supreme Court affirmed. Rather, the Supreme 
Court looked to the substance of the information contained in the District Court's memorandum 
decision that declared the parties' rights and statuses under the Idaho statute at issue, and said 
''Assuming that was [the District Court's] intended declaratory judgment, we affirm the 
judgment on appeal." 
This case is distinct from TracFone iri that the District Court has gone beyond just 
ordering which party would prevail in its New Final Judgment and has issued a satisfactory Rule 
54(a) Judgment. However, this case and the perceived deficiencies with the New Final Judgment 
are·very .similar to that addressed in TracFone. The application of the legal reasoning in 
TracFone that a declaratory judgment should actually "declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations" and not merely which side prevails is controlling in this case, so that the Court should 
amend the New Final Judgment with a Judgment that adequately declares the rights of the 
parties. 
Further, the approach of the Idaho Supreme Court to treat a Declaratory Judgment as an 
actual declaration of rights or other legal relations appears in harmony with the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act as well as other persuasive authority. Idaho Code § 10-1201 
Declaratory judgments authorized-Form and effect reads: 
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or 
could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the 
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may 
be either affirmative or negative in form and effect. and such declarations shall 
have the force and effect of a final jydgment or decree. ( emphasis added) 
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The plain reading of the statute reveals that Idaho District Courts have the authority to issue 
negative declarations as well as affirmative declarations, and such declarations have the effect of 
a ":finaljudgment." 
In American Bldg. & LoanAss'n, Inc. v. State of Alaska, 376 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1962), the 
trial court entered negative declaratory relief from that which the Plaintiffs asked for in the 
complaint, even though the Defendants did not ask for any alternative declaratory relief in the 
pleadings. The Plaintiffs on appeal argued that the District Court had two alternative remedies 
which included either granting judgment in Plaintiffs favor or having Plaintiffs complaint 
dismissed. Id. at 373. The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed and said: 
Such is not the law in declaratory judgment actions. In some states, as in 
Oregon and Colorado for example, it is provided by statute that the declaratory 
judgment may be affirmative or negative in form and effect. (Citing Dannells v. 
United States Nat. Bank of Portland, 172 Or. 213, 138 P.2d 220, 232 (1943); 
Bennett's Inc. v. Krogh, 115 Colo. 18, 168 P.2d 554, 64 A.L.R. 1010 (1946)). We 
see no reason why the rule should be any different in the absence of a statute. 
Where upon the merits of the controversy the plaintiff is not entitled to a 
favorable declaration, the court should render a judgment embodying such 
determination and should not merely dismiss the action. (Citing Frazier v. City of 
Chattanooga, 156 Tenn. 346, 1 S.W.2d 786 (1928); Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. 
Freedy, 201 Wis. 51, 227 N.W. 952 (1929)). In this way the purpose of a 
declaratory judgment will be realized, namely to 'serve some practical end in 
quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputedjural relation.' (Citing 1 Anderson, 
Declaratory Judgments§ 3 at 12 (2 ed. 1951)). Id at 373. 
As discussed above, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, which Idaho has adopted, 
states that a "declaratory judgment may be affirmative or negative in form and effect." American 
Building 376 P.2d 370, lends credence to the fact that an Idaho District Court should actually 
enter a declaration of rights rather than merely stating which party proved successful on the 
Declaratory Judgment action. 
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Defendant submits that the proposed Amended Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate 
attached hereto as Exhibit A, would be an appropriate judgment that declares the parties rights 
and status under the contract in dispute.1 
B. Although Less Appropriate, Alternatively, the District Court may Dismiss claims 
for Declaratory Judgment 
A Court's dismissal of a claim for declaratory judgment rather than a negative declaration 
is not a fatal flaw, should the trial court's findings and order clearly define the rights of the 
parties. Brown v, State of Minnesota, 617 N. W.2d 421 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
In Ketterer v. Independent School District No. 1 of Chippewa County, 79 N. W.2d 428 
(1956), the trial court's judgment merely dismissed the plamtiffs complaint which contained a 
claim asking for declaratory relief. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated: 
The judgment in better from (sic) should have declare~ the rights of the 
parties in conformity with findings and conclusions of law. The declaration may 
be either affirmative or negative in fonn and effect. However, since the court's 
.findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgm.ent resulting in a 
dismissal herein operates as an adjudication upon the merits, the failure to declare 
the rights of the parties on the state of the record in this case is, we think, here 
without prejudice and not reversible error. See State, by Burnquist, v. Bollenbach, 
241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278; Wright, Minnesota Rules, pp. 294, 295. Since the 
trial court's findings and order clearly defines the rights of the parties, we 
therefore do not find it necessary upon the particular facts of this case to order a 
modification of the judgment as entered. Id. at 440 
While it may not be in error for this Court to merely dismiss the Declaratory Judgment 
claims contained in Plaintiff's complaint, this Court did not dismiss the declaratory judgments. 
Rather. the New Final Judgment entered declaratory judgment in Defendant's favor . 
• 1 Number 2 of the proposed Amended rudgment and Rule 54(b) proposes that the Court dismiss the Plaintiff's count 
2 claim for declaratoxy re.lief with prejudice. Dismissing count 2, which sought a declara:to1y judgment that the 
amount ofremuneration due for profit sharing; boil.uses, and/or contingent commission W!\S 80%, is appropriate 
whete the Court determined that the contract did not create a duty for paying bonuses, profit sharing, or contingent 
commissions. The dismissal of this count seems mo~ appropriate where count 2 appears to rest in large part on 
count 1 and if the Court were to enter a negative declaratory judgment, it would appear to be in ]arge part a mere 
duplication to that which it is proposed that the Court enter on number 1. 
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This appears to be an error of the Court. The more appropriate route appears to be 
dismissing the claims brought by Plaintiff against Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the New Final Judgment 
in order to help clarify the Court's intended results with issuing the New Final Judgment and to 
bring the New Final Judgment in conformity with law. 
DATED this t/fh.day of January, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6ay of January, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated. 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
Attorney at Law 
1011 Washington St, Suite 101 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown 
159 South Main 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
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Joseph T. Preston 
ECHO HA WK & OLSEN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 6119 
505 Pershing Ave., Suite 100 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-6119 
joseph@echohawk.com 
·Facsimile: (208) 478-1670 
Telephone: (208) 478-1624 
Idaho State Bar # 9082 
Attorneys for Nield, Inc., dba Insurance Designers 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF ID_AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 




NIELD, INC., an Idaho Corporation dba 
INSURANCE DESIGNERS, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-2013-232 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) The agent contract between Plaintiff Bret Kunz ("Bret") and Defendant Nield, Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation dba Insurance Designers ("N.I.") does not include a duty for bonus 
commissions, incentives, or ?."Ofit sharing. 
(2) Count two (2) of Bret's claim for declaratory relief is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this __ day of January, 2016. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
s~ District Judge 
776 of 789 
Jan. 4. 2016 5:29PM Echo hawk Law Office No. 2488 P. 13/14 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may 
issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules 
DATED this __ day ofJanuary, 2016. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
Sixth District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated. 
Steven A Wutlrrich 
Attorney at Law 
lOll Washington St, Suite 101 
Montpelier, ID 83254 · 
Joseph T. Preston 
ECHO HA WK & OLSEN, PLLC 
PO Box 6119 
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STEVEN WUTHRJCH, Esq. 
Attorney at Law, !SB #3316 
IOll Washington St., Suite 101 
Montpelier, Idaho 83254 
Tel: (208) 847-1236 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
BRET D. KUNZ and MARTI KUNZ, 
Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants. 
V. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO AMEND 
NIELD, me., dba INSURANCE 










Supreme Court Docket No. 43724-2015 
Bear Lake County No. CV-2013-000232 
Defendant/Respondent. 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs Bret and Marti Kunz, and hereby object to the Motion to 
Amend the Judgment, inasmuch as any amendment to the Judgment would risk that the 
Judgment will not be deemed as final and the appeal presently paid for and pending would be 
dismissed. 
Pated this~ day ofJanuary, 2016. ~ ..... i ..... ~'--=""-----
S,~, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing was mailed and/or sent by telefax this I Vday of 
January, 2016, to the following: 
Joseph T. Preston 
ECHOHAWKLAW 
PO Box 6119 
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1 THE COURT: Good morning. We'll be on the record 
2 in the matter of Bret Kunz versus Nield Insurance. And 
3 Marti Kunz versus Nield Insurance and Insurance Designers. 
4 This is Bear Lake County case CV-2013-232. 
5 The plaintiffs are present with counsel, Mr. 
6 Steven Wuthrich. Defendant's counsel is present Mr. 
7 Hooste, would you please identify the representative 
8 that's here with you. 
9 MR. HOOSTE: Bryan Nield, B-r-y-a-n. He's the 
10 co-owner of Nield Insurance. 
11 THE COURT: And I know Mr. Wuthrich's clients and 
12 they are the named plaintiffs in this matter, but would 
13 you please identify and introduce your clients as well. 
14 MR. WUTHRICH: Yes, Your Honor. Bret Kunz is to my 
15 left and Marti to my right. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Welcome today. We're on 
17 the first day of a bifurcated trial in this matter. This 
18 matter is bifurcated for a trial today and tomorrow on the 
19 declaratory judgment portions of the complaint filed by 
20 the plaintiff in this matter. 
21 The court has received submissions from the 
22 parties as far as trial briefs and opening statements in 
23 this matter. It is my practice in court trials to 
24 dispense with opening statements and get right to the 
25 evidence. That's what I intend to do in this case, based 
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1 is in the trial brief is the first time that we see the 
2 plaintiffs alleging the issue of an implied in fact 
3 contract. 
5 
4 THE COURT: What page are you on in their trial 
5 brief? 
6 MR. HOOSTE: Page eight, Your Honor, the last full 
7 paragraph. It talks about an implied in fact contract and 
8 talks about performance. Basically I guess I'm reading 
9 this in a pretty open and general way, but the way I read 
10 that it seems to say that we're looking at a course of 
11 performance not so much as interpreting the face of the 
12 contract that we're looking at, but in terms of a 
13 modification of the contract. 
14 Your Honor, I realize thatthis court 
15 went back and reviewed this court's ruling on its motion, 
16 or on the memorandum with regard to the change of venue 
17 and with regard to the bifurcation. I looked at those and 
18 this court cites to the Carello case and the Mortensen 
19 case. These cases that talk about how to interpret Idaho 
20 Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l). What we're really 
21 looking for is a concise statement of the facts and that 
22 someone is not forbidden from raising those. 
23 This court in essence found, in its memorandum 
24 for change of venue, that there was in fact a breach of 
25 contract pied. Well, I think even that is looking at the 
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1 upon the trial briefs that have been submitted. 
2 I should note for the record that in response 
3 to Mr. Wuthrich's trial brief and opening statement, I did 
4 receive a motion in limine to strike the plaintiffs trial 
5 brief and opening statement I have reviewed that. I 
6 also received a memorandum from the plaintiff opposing 
7 that motion in limine. 
8 Mr. Hooste, let's take a briefmomentthis 
9 morning and address that motion in Iimine before we 
10 proceed to evidence. 
11 MR. HOOSTE: I'll try and be as brief as I can. I 
12 realize that the court has a lot of latitude in regard to 
13 an opening statement. And frankly, in regard to the 
14 hearing that we had, I want to say about a week or 10 days 
15 prior to the due date for the opening statement, this 
16 court expected them to be entered simultaneously. To me, 
17 I think that that was appropriate. 
18 Part ofmy concern is that the defendant 
19 submitted a trial brief in this case and then the 
20 plaintiff was able to have that as an advantage. But 
21 that's kind of a side issue, I guess. 
22 As I read the briefs, I think we're pretty 
23 close on the law. I don't know that we disagree, quite 
24 frankly, in terms of what law applies for the most part. 
25 The thing that I think gives me the most trouble, really, 
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1 complaint that was issued in a pretty broad light. There 
2 was never any amendment to the complaint that I saw. As 
3 we stand here today, really we have a declaratory 
4 judgment. And as I look at the complaint, and as this 
5 court noted in its own prior decisions, what it focuses 
6 on, or what you can garner, I guess, from the factual 
7 allegations of what the plaintiff is pleading, is that 
8 there is an 80 /20 commission split and that there's 
9 another functions provision that justifies -- that they 
10 rely upon for their suit. 
11 There isn't anything that I found in the 
12 complaint that says it's not separated into a different 
13 account There was no count three breach of contract, 
14 even though this court found that. But there's no 
15 outline, if you will, for how we get to something like an 
16 implied in fact contract 
17 I'm looking in Rule 8(a)(l) in the Rules of 
18 Civil Procedure and there are cases that still say you 
19 need a clear and concise statement of the facts. But in 
20 the comment regarding Brown versus City of Pocatello, a 
21 2010 case, 148 Idaho 802, in that case the homeowner 
22 alleged that her home was flooded as the result of a road 
23 construction project performed by the city. The complaint 
24 was not separated into a multiple cause of action. The 
25 only theory for recovery identified was negligence. It 
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1 failed to include a statement of claims for nuisance and 
2 adverse condemnation and so they weren't able to bring 
3 those other issues. 
4 I think at some point in time we have to look 
5 at the complaint and say there's a limit to this. As a 
6 defendant we have to be able to say what is it that we're 
7 defending. This court has already expanded it beyond the 
8 declaratory judgment to say, all right, I'm going to read 
9 it broadly enough to say that there's some form of breach 
10 of contract because they plead for damages. But other 
11 than the notice that we're put on as to what it is that 
12 they think we did wrong or that they are owed, the other 
13 items go to the accounting, go to potential damages. I 
14 guess this court's findings in the change of venue haven't 
15 been challenged, yet I don't know that they were certified 
16 under Rule 54( e). 
17 THE COURT: They were not 
18 MR. HOOSTE: So those are unchallengeable at this 
19 point in time. I think that getting into new causes of 
20 action, where there's no amended complaint, where it 
21 hasn't been asked to be amended before, is really my 
22 concern. 
23 So one of two things. I think this court 
24 should limit the evidence today to the allegations that 
25 were pied, or grant me substantial latitude with regard to 
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1 that was dismissed. The counterclaim, the cross claim, 
2 against Marti Kunz seeking damages for the life and 
3 health. We pied that from the beginning, butthat's been 
4 dismissed. That's not part of this. 
5 I believe what I'm talking about there is a 
6 course of performance as relates to the interpretation of 
7 what the parties intended the contract to mean. 
8 THE COURT: So you don't believe you 're asserting 
9 an implied in fact contract? 
10 MR. WUTHRICH: No. I think that case was probably a 
11 U.C.C. case. That's probably why it talked in those 
12 terms. I was just pointing out that a course of 
13 performance is something that the courts look to for 
14 interpretation of contracts. 
15 THE COURT: When there's an ambiguity? 
16 MR. WUTHRICH: Yes. I don't think I've started a 
17 whole new cause of action based on that I just think 
18 that points to what the parties thought the contract meant 
19 from the onset If that's the way they're reading it, I 
20 think that's probably reading it too broadly. 
21 Other than that, I think -- I have not read 
22 tJ1eir trial brief but l don't think we're very far apart 
23 on what the law is, other than just how it applies in 
24 these circumstances. 
25 Oh. And I apologize for it being late, but 
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1 potential defenses. I looked in Rule 12(g) and I think 
2 the one defense that I can see that is clear with regard 
3 to modification, and which, again, hasn't been pied, but 
4 if it's allowed the defense would be the statute of 
5 frauds. 
6 Now, under 12(g), to me that would fit under a 
7 pleading that fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
8 be granted. The relief is going to be denied because you 
9 can't enforce a contract if it can't be completed within a 
10 year and if it's not in writing. If you'll give me a 
11 moment Okay. That's under Idaho Code 9-5051. 
12 I don't believe that the defense has been put 
13 on sufficient notice of a pleading that requests a 
14 modification. If this court expands the allowable 
15 evidence, then I would ask the court to likewise expand 
16 the allowable defense, or disallow it in its entirety. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hooste. Mr. Wuthrich. 
18 MR. WUTHRICH: I'm somewhat confused. We certainly 
19 did have the issue of modification of the contract at 
20 issue with respect to subsection C that's now been 
21 dismissed, or stipulated to be dismissed with prejudice. 
22 So that clearly was raised from the get-go. 
23 THE COURT: Just a minute. What do you mean 
24 subsection C? 
25 MR. WUTHRICH: The part aboutthe life and health 
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1 I've been hampered oflate in trying to keep up with my 
2 calendar. Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. I think that it's 
4 appropriate for Mr. Hooste and the defendant to raise this 
5 issue in light of the reference or citation to the implied 
6 in fact contract and citing to a case Homes by Bell-Hi, 
7 Inc., vs. Wood, which is apparently a case that dealt with 
8 a contract implied in fact in that matter. 
9 As we all know, pursuant to Rule 15 (b) of the 
10 Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party can move to amend 
11 their pleadings to have the pleadings conform to the 
12 evidence. I think what Mr. Hooste is doing here is trying 
13 to prevent there being any argument or suggestion that he 
14 tried -- that the issue of a contract implied in fact was 
15 tried to the court with his consent and therefore afford 
16 the plaintiffs an opportunity to make a motion at the 
17 conclusion of trial to amend their complaint to conform 
18 with the evidence presented in trial and thatthere be 
19 some implicit agreement on the defendant's part that they 
20 did agree to try that contract implied in fact case based 
21 upon the evidence that was submitted in trial. 
22 The court has previously interpreted, as Mr. 
23 Hooste indicated, that the complaint, under a notice 
24 pleading standard in Idaho, does set forth a complaint for 
25 a claim of breach of contract in this matter. The court 
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1 previously found that Mr. Wuthrich previously argued that 
2 despite the headings in the complaint, they certainly 
3 intended to assert a cause of action for breach of 
4 contract. I think, in applying and reading the entirety 
5 of the complaint, that there was a complaint for breach of 
6 contract asserted in the initial complaint. 
7 I haven't reviewed the complaint in detail in 
8 anticipation of an assertion of an implied in fact cause 
9 of action in that contract. Based upon Mr. Wuthrich's 
10 statements here today on the record, it does not sound as 
11 though he's asserting thatthere is an implied in fact 
12 contract or a cause of action that has been asserted by 
13 the plaintiffs for an implied in fact contract in this 
14 matter. Rather, he argues that he cited to those 
15 decisions for the purpose of assisting in his argument 
16 that if there are ambiguities or vagaries in the contract 
17 in question, the court can look to extrinsic or parol 
18 evidence to determine what the parties' intent in 
19 formulating and drafting that contract was. And that the 
20 parties' course of dealings would be one of those factors 
21 the court would look to. 
22 The court is going to state on the record here 
23 today that any -- that the plaintiff has indicated that 
24 there is no intent to assert a cause of action for an 
25 implied in fact contract. The court will consider 
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1 parties meant, I think both ofus, and I hope I'm not 
2 speaking out of turn, but I think both of us expect to 
3 present all of the extrinsic evidence that is potential 
4 today. But I think this court, after hearing all of the 
5 evidence, will need to, in and of itself, the way the 
6 ambiguity law is, determine if there's a patent ambiguity 
7 or latent ambiguity. 
8 If you find that there isn't a patent 
9 ambiguity, or that there's not a latent ambiguity, sorry, 
10 you would look at the four corners and make your decision. 
11 So while I realize that you're going to hear all of the 
12 extrinsic evidence, I don't think that -- I would ask the 
13 court to make it clear that you're not finding that the 
14 extrinsic evidence is automatically, at least at this 
15 point in time, determinative. 
16 I realize that's a pretty--
17 THE COURT: I think I understand what you're 
18 saying. I think that that is an issue that will have to 
19 be sorted out in my findings of fact. 
20 MR. HOOSTE: Okay. I totally expect us to put on 
21 everything rather than a little bit here and a little bit 
22 there. 
23 THE COURT: Understood. Any concern or question 
24 about the court's ruling on that, Mr. Wuthrich? 
25 MR. WUTHRICH: No, Your Honor. 
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1 extrinsic evidence for the purpose of determining what the 
2 parties' intent is, what the course of dealings may have 
3 been to assist with the interpretation and understanding 
4 of that contract as it relates to any ambiguities 
5 associated with that contract. I will not consider the 
6 same in the light of a breach of an implied in fact type 
7 of contract or the establishment of an implied in fact 
8 contract. 
9 I don't know that there needs to be a ruling 
10 on that per se, because Mr. Wuthrich has indicated that 
11 that is not his intent, but the court will construe and 
12 review the evidence in light of a cause of action for 
13 breach of contract and for no other purposes. And the 
14 court is intending to pursue this declaratory judgment 
15 component of these bifurcated proceedings to ascertain and 
16 determine what that contract language is and what those 
17 terms and conditions of the contract are as set forth in 
18 the parties' contract. 
19 That will be the order and ruling of the court 
20 at this time. Mr. Hooste, any questions or concerns about 
21 that? 
22 MR. HOOSTE: Your Honor, I guess my only concern, 
23 and this is almost getting to the point of splitting 
24 hairs, but where you've already indicated that you intend 
25 to look at extrinsic evidence to determine what the 
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1 THE COURT: With that, then, atthis time, Mr. 
2 Wuthrich, you may present your first witness in this 
3 matter. 
4 MR. HOOSTE: May I take up one other matter? 
5 THE COURT: You may. 
6 MR. HOOSTE: We've already kept our witnesses out 
7 of the room at this point in time, but we haven't had any 
8 formal motion to exclude. 
9 THE COURT: Didn't I talk aboutthat at the 
10 pretrial? I normally do, about Idaho Rule of Evidence 615 
11 and my standard order excluding witnesses. 
12 MR. HOOSTE: If you did, I don't recall it. 
13 THE COURT: It may have gotten past me. I do have 
14 a standard order. I don't even require that the parties 
15 make the motion. !fl neglected to -- I usually cover 
16 that in the pretrial conference, but where we did it by 
17 phone, which was a little bit different, I might have 
18 forgotten to do that. 
19 MR. H OOSTE: You may have covered it. We have a 
20 kind of different situation. In the pretrial we talked 
21 about Marti's claim being dismissed as a plaintiff. I 
22 didn't object to that. It seemed to not frankly make a 
23 lot of difference except for right now. Where Marti is a 
24 person of interest only because she's -- has an interest 
25 in Bret's community property, I think was the way it was 




1 decision at that time it remands back to Your Honor, to 
2 this court 
3 THE COURT: If it helps you with that concern, I do 
4 know and can tell you that Chief Justice Jones has been in 
5 discussion with Mr. Kenyon regarding this issue. I have 
6 had that discussion with Mr. Kenyon. So this isn't Mr. 
7 Kenyon making the determination, the Supreme Court is 
8 making these determinations at this point in time, for 
9 whatever that is worth. 
10 MR. PRESTON: So I'm clear, it's not Mr. Kenyon 
11 that kicked it back, it's the Supreme Court that actually 
12 took issue with this court's decision, or this court's 
13 previous final judgment? 
14 THE COURT: What I will tell you, for what it's 
15 worth, when I got the order conditionally dismissing the 
16 appeal, I called the Supreme Court I spoke with Mr. 
17 Kenyon and he said I need to go and talk to ChiefJustice 
18 Jones. He came back to me and we had further discussion. 
19 This is what I was directed to do. So whether or not it 
2 0 was Mr. Kenyon that initially made that determination or 
21 not, I don't know. I do know that he's been acting in 
22 concert, since my telephone conversation, with Chief 
23 Justice Jones. 
24 MR. PRESTON: Your Honor, may I ask, was it 
25 specifically how you entered the judgment, was that the 
16 
1 issued by a court Then obviously I expect I'll hear from 
2 them on the merits of my findings of fact and conclusions 
3 oflaw. 
4 So I'm actually looking forward to this 
5 appellate decision, not only to affirm or overrule my 
6 findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, but to give me, 
7 and hopefully other judges, greater understanding of how 
8 we go forward on a declaratory judgment action such as 
9 this, and such as in Tracfone, and not run afoul of the 
10 rules on final judgments and interlocutory appeals on 
11 54(b) certificate. I think it will be a much needed and 
12 appreciated decision. 
13 MR. PRESTON: Your Honor, I agree with that It 
14 seems to me that there's some inconsistencies from the 
15 Supreme Court 
16 I guess the other portion of our motion is 
17 asking for clarification. What effect the final judgment, 
18 this new final judgment, has on the previous final 
19 judgment. And whether or not it contemplates exceeding 
20 those issues that were addressed at trial and in the 
21 previous final judgment 
22 THE COURT: I hope my previous minute entry and 
23 order and pronouncements are clear. In my mind the only 
24 thing that is being granted permissive appeal on is the 
25 issues that were litigated in trial and my findings of 
18 
1 specific direction on how you were given to enter the 
2 judgment, or was it just a broad parameter on this is how 
3 we suggest you do it 
4 THE COURT: I was given instructions on what to do. 
5 I followed them in part The part I didn't follow was 
6 they told me notto do itas a 54(b) certificate. I can't 
7 see how I can in good faith not enter a 54(b) certificate 
8 in this case where it's clearly not a final adjudication 
9 of all the issues. I followed their instructions to the 
10 best of my understanding and to the best of my ability, 
11 other than disregarding their instruction to not attach a 
12 54(b) certificate, because it clearly wasn't an 
13 adjudication of all of tlie issues in this litigation. 
14 MR. PRESTON: I can see how that is a difficult 
15 position to put the court in. It appears that the court, 
16 and correct me if I'm wrong, but probably agrees with our 
17 position in light of the Tracfone decision and it's 
18 previous judgment that it entered, which is consistent 
19 with the mandatory case law. 
20 THE COURT: I'm certainly in agreement and I am 
21 looking for some direction from the Supreme Court on this. 
22 I expect I'll probably see that in the appeal decision 
23 that comes down. I see this as being an issue that I 
24 certainly invite a discussion from them on how to properly 
25 posture an interlocutory appeal on a declaratory judgment 
17 
1 fact and conclusions oflaw. I understand that there are 
2 other issues unresolved in this case. I understand that 
3 there are other issues that have been dismissed, such as 
4 your counterclaim, such as another element of Mr. 
5 Wuthrich's declaratory relief. None of those were 
6 litigated in that trial. None of those were the subject 
7 of my findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. I expect 
8 the appeal addresses only those limited issues that I 
9 certified for appeal and only those limited issues that 
10 are addressed in my findings of fact and conclusions of 
11 law. That's the way I've always viewed it and always 
12 tried to posture it 
13 MR. PRESTON: Thank you, Your Honor. I expected as 
14 much. However, it was less than clear. 
15 THE COURT: I agree. That is the risk when your 
16 judgment is just a one sentence judgment as opposed to 
17 being able to declare the rights of the parties, which I 
18 attempted to do in the first judgment Hopefully the 
19 Supreme Court, or if it's the Court of Appeals, will give 
20 us the guidance that is necessary on those issues as part 
21 of this. 
22 I'll hear any further argument you have, Mr. 
23 Preston, but at this point in time, I'll be honest, my 
24 inclination is to let this matter run its course. 
25 Hopefully we'll receive instructions from the Supreme 
19 
1 MR. HOOSTE: I would object I don't believe it's 
2 relevant to the declaratory judgment. It doesn't go to 
3 the contract between Nield, Inc. and Mr. Kunz. It's a 
4 separate contract between a party who is not a party here. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Wuthrich. 
1 day, is the book of business like a customer list? 
2 A It would have a customer list along with the 
3 written premium and also the earned premium. 
4 Q. So the written premium is that what is 
5 typically referred to as residuals? 
6 MR. VvUTHRICH: Well, Your Honor, he purchased one 6 A The written premium is the gross premium I 
7 half of the P&C book from Mike's widow, as well as the 7 would collect from a client. The residuals would be what 
8 life and health in its entirety. This is how he 8 the commission would be paid from the insurance company on 
9 the written premium. 9 accomplished that. This is how he became a one-half 
10 owner. The contract at issue talks about the fact that 
11 they are 50/50 owners. This is how he became a 50/50 
12 owner of the P&C. 
13 THE COURT: All right. I think historically and 
14 chronologically it does have some relevance. I'll 
15 overrule the objection and allow the admission of 128. 
16 Q. (BY MR WUTHRICH) While on the subject, what is 
17 a book of business? 
18 A. It would be the evaluation of the commission 
19 paid on the book Probably averaged over -- it's based on 
2 0 a year, but if you were buying a book of business you 
21 would probably take a three to a five year average to make 
22 sure that you were getting a proper representation of what 
23 that book was generating for commission. 
24 Q. And just for the record, assuming we're not 
25 dealing with people who are in the insurance industry each 
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1 Q. Okay. I'd like you to go through the process 
2 that caused you to enter into the new contract that you 
3 entered into with the defendant. 
4 A. After we agreed -- after they suggested that 
5 we purchase the business from Judy, the old contract would 
6 no longer apply that I had signed with them as I didn't 
7 have any ownership clause in that. So we needed a new 
8 contract that would include that ownership clause. 
9 Q. And how did the negotiations take place or 
10 what happened to facilitate the entering into a new 
11 contract? 
12 A. I'm not quite understanding what you mean. 
13 Q. Did you at any point see a draft of what was 
14 going to be the new contract? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Can you say when? 
17 A. It would probably have been in October. 
18 THE COURT: Of what year? 
19 THEWITNESS: Of2008. 
20 Q. (BY MR WUTHRICH) And who reviewed that draft? 
21 A. Well, Bryan brought it down to our office. He 
22 sat it down in front of Marti and I. Marti looked at it 
23 closely. I looked at it closely. And then he said ifwe 
24 were okay with it, he would take it back and put it on his 
25 letterhead. 
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10 Q. Okay. But that's on premiums that have 
11 already been in place, correct? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Is that distinguished in the insurance 
14 industry from new business? 
15 A. No. Once that policy is written it does 
16 become part of the book of business. 
17 Q. Okay. So in addition to purchasing the 
18 business from Judy Kunz, did you do anything else as a 
19 part of taking over Mike's business? 
20 A I then became the owner. Then I proceeded as 
21 the owner of the agency to take care of payroll, setting 
22 hours for the employees. 
23 Q. Did you enter into any new contracts with the 
24 defendant? 
25 A. I did. 
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1 Q. And is that draft what has been referred to 
2 as --what is marked and admitted as exhibit 103? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q. You did read that contract carefully? 
5 A. I did. Originally when we spoke with Bryan he 
6 says we'll just sign the same contract that you had with 
7 Mike. This appeared to us, when we read it, to mirror the 
8 contract that was with Mike. 
9 Q. Okay. And subsequently did you enter into a 
10 written contract that did have their letterhead on it? 
11 A. I did. 
12 Q. And when did that take place? 
13 A. It probably would have taken place the end of 
14 October, into November. I don't know for sure. 
15 Q. The contract doesn't have a date on it, but 
16 says it's effective January 1 of 2009; is that correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And that contract for you is exhibit 105; is 
19 that correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. For your wife, that contract is exhibit 104? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Other than the fact of one for you and one for 
24 your wife, and who are the witnesses, those two contracts 
25 are actually identical; isn'tthat correct? 
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1 A. It's charged back. 
2 Q. All right In your relationship with Nield, 
3 Inc., I believe the contract calls for them to do all the 
4 accounting; is that correct? 
5 A. It does. That would make sense where they do 
6 the contracting with the companies. They are privy to all 
7 of that information. So for them to do the accounting 
8 would be a course of conduct, a logical one. 
9 Q. So you receive your commissions from Nield, 
10 Inc.? 
11 A. I do. 
12 Q. Okay. Let's talk about some other things. 
13 What is a contingent commission? 
14 A. A contingent commission is another level in 
15 the line of commissions, where the company sets up certain 
16 guidelines that you would have to meet How many losses 
17 were paid out, how much was paid out in losses, whether 
18 you had an increase in written premium. So when you meet 
19 those guidelines, you get a contingent payment based on 
20 the written premium. 
21 Q. Okay. Contingent commission is also 
22 predicated on the written premium? 
23 A. It is. It's a factor in how much you're going 
24 to collect on the contingent commission. 
2 5 Q. But you might not qualify with any given 
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1 checks paid? 
2 MR. HOOSTE: I'm going to object at least on 
3 foundation as far as this profit sharing. We don't have 
4 any time frame for that 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Sustained at this time. I'll 
6 require additional foundation. 
7 Q. (BY MR. WUTHRICH) When did that conversation 
8 occur? 
9 A. It would have been probably between November 
10 and February of that year. It was prior to me receiving 
11 my first profit sharing. 
12 THE COURT: November and February would be in 
13 different years. 
14 THE WITNESS: November of 2009 -- 2008, and 
15 February of 2009. 
16 Q. (BY MR. WUTHRICH) Okay. So it was after the 
17 signing of the contract in this case? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. But within a few months? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And that took place in Pocatello? 
22 A. It did. 
23 Q. Was anyone else in the room besides you and 
24 Tom? 
25 A. No. It was Bryan Nield, but it was in Tom's 
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1 company in a given year for that? 
2 A. Yeah. If you have a big loss, like I believe 
3 it was in 2009 with Gem State, I didn't qualify because my 
4 loss ratio was too high. 
5 Q. Okay. And what is a profit sharing payment? 
6 A. A profit sharing and contingent commission 
7 mirror each other. You'll see those terms interchanged 
8 within the same companies. Some companies refer to profit 
9 sharing and some refer to contingent commission. They are 
10 basically the same thing. 
11 Q. Okay. We talked earlier about the profit 
12 sharing payments that were talked about at the time of 
13 signing the contract. Did the defendant's agents have 
14 further conversations with you about profit sharing 
15 payments? 
16 A Yes. There was another time when Marti and I 
17 were down in the Pocatello office. I can't remember 
18 exactly what we were discussing, but Bryan and I went into 
19 his office, that used to be Tom Nield's office, to look 
20 something up. He was trying to motivate me and he made 
21 the comment of how nice the profit sharing checks were. 
22 Q. And did you look forward to those profit 
23 sharing checks? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Okay. Let's talk about how are profit sharing 
December 8, 2014 Volume 1 42 
1 old office. 
2 Q. Bryan. Sorry. 
3 A. But in Tom's old office. 
4 Q. I got that confused. Okay. 
5 THE COURT: So that conversation was with Bryan 
6 Nield, not Tom? 
7 THE WITNESS: It was with Bryan Nield. 
8 Q. (BY MR. WUTHRlCH) So we have that cleared up. 
9 Tom used to own Nield, Inc., correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And Bryan Nield bought out Tom Nield; is that 
12 correct? 
13 A. Yes, as far as I know. 
14 Q. About this same time; isn't that correct? 
15 A. That's what I have been told. 
16 Q. You used to have dealings with Tom Nield, 
17 correct? 
18 A. It would be here and there. It would be 
19 mostly on the accounting issues. 
20 Q. But since you entered·· at the time you 
21 entered into this contract your dealings were solely with 
22 Bryan? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. And from that time forward they've 
25 always been just with Bryan? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Does it bear any relationship to any of the 
3 numbers that you were able to ascertain on the 629? 
4 A. No. There's no mathematical sense to it 
S It's like it's just a random number picked out of the air. 
6 Q. Okay. Did you believe, at the time you 
7 received this, you were receiving your appropriate share 
8 of the profit share? 
9 A. I believed I was. 
10 THE COURT: You said you believed you were. 
11 MR. WUTHRICH: I think I can clear that up. 
12 Q. (BY MR. WUTHRICH) With regard to Gem State, did 
13 you have access to all of the numbers as to what went in 
14 to calculating and paying a profit sharing payment? 
15 A. Yes. The first year I received a memo that 
16 Greg had wrote on it. In the following years Gem State 
17 would mail me the check so I had the numbers in front of 
18 me. I would scan it into my system and then forward that 
19 check to Nield, Inc. and they would split that out and 
20 mail me my share. 
21 Q. Okay. So with regard to Gem State, where you 
22 had access to the numbers and you mailed the check to 
23 Nield, you always received SO percent any year that you 
24 qualified for a profit sharing payment, correct? 
25 A. Except for one year where he did split it 
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1 A. No, I don't 
2 Q. You have enough to ascertain what was paid or 
3 your percentage? 
4 A. What my percentage is. I knew there were 
S payments on it, contingent commission paid with that 
6 company, but I can't ascertain exactly what my share would 
7 be. 
8 Q. Okay. In order to do that you need to know 
9 how much written premium you had compared to Tom Nield? 
10 A. To Bryan. To Nield, Inc. But Allied broke it 
11 out differently. Like Farmers Alliance included both 
12 commercial and personal, where Allied broke that out 
13 separately. So I don't have the written premium 
14 differences on the commercial and I can't make an accurate 
15 calculation. 
16 Q. Okay. But you do know contingent commission 
17 payments were paid? 
18 A. I do. 
19 Q. Okay. Let's move now to exhibit 108. Is this 
20 a letter that you sent to Bryan Nield? 
21 A. It is. 
22 Q. And is it a true and -- we've already admitted 
23 it In that one you were still arguing with him over the 
24 proper way to speculate the profit sharing; is that 
25 correct? 
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1 80/20. 
2 Q. We'll get to that. With respect to the other 
3 companies, and let's identify who they are. Who are the 
4 other companies that made payments of profit sharing or 
5 contingent commissions? 
6 A. Farmers Alliance, Acuity, and Allied. 
7 Q. And with respect to those companies, did you 
8 have access to the information as to how much profit 
9 sharing was paid? 
10 A. No, I did not. 
11 Q. When did you finally gain that access? 
12 A. Not until we subpoenaed it from the companies. 
13 Q. So that would be after this lawsuit was filed? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And so since then you've had an opportunity to 
16 ascertain how much profit sharing was paid in each year or 
17 contingent commission? 
18 A. Yes. I know Acuity and Farmers Alliance. We 
19 didn't subpoena enough information from Allied that I 
20 could make an accurate calculation. 
21 Q. Okay. Have you been paid any contingent 
22 commission on Allied? 
23 A. None. 
24 Q. Okay. So that company you still don't have 
25 enough information to ascertain what was paid? 
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1 A. Yes. I felt like that with the contract 
2 language I should get 80 percent of the contingent 
3 commission. 
4 Q. So you were unaware, until after this lawsuit 





A. The first time I heard that was after that, 
8 yeah. 
9 Q. Let's turn now to what is marked as exhibit 
10 109. What is that exhibit that's been admitted? 
11 A. That is the response to my letter asking for 
12 the 80 /20 split. 
13 Q. And this was paid in 2013, but it's for the 
14 2012 year? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And so ultimately did he in fact pay you 80 
17 percent on Gem State for 2012? 
18 A. He did. 
19 Q. Okay. Just forthe record, contingent 
20 commissions are paid how often? 
21 A. They are collected once each year, at the end 
22 of the year. Being paid will determine on whether you 
23 qualify. 
24 Q. But generally is it at the beginning of the 
25 nextyear? 
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1 today you indicated that you had been 18 years employed in 
2 the insurance field? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q. And you're starting that as of 1996? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. And is Nield, Inc. the only general 
7 agent with whom you've had a subcontractor contract? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And I guess Insure Bear Lake, Inc. is another 
10 company that you are part owner in, correct? And it's not 
11 Nield, Inc.? 
12 A. Insure Bear Lake would be considered our 
13 insurance agency. 
14 Q. Okay. So that's your agency. You have in 
15 essence divided that agency between insurance that Marti 
16 writes, health and life, and you keep your property and 
17 casualty insurance under Nield, Inc., am I correct in 
18 that? 
19 A. Yes. But the payments that come from Nield, 
20 Inc. come to Insure Bear Lake Incorporated. 
21 Q. So accounting wise, within your office that 
22 you have set up, there isn't a bright line or a clear 
23 distinction between Insure Bear Lake, Inc. and Bret Kunz 
24 as an individual; is that what you're saying? 
25 A. I didn't follow the question. 
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1 any new health and life. And if I'm not mistaken, jointly 
2 owns or operates even Mike's old business of health and 
3 life; is that correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. All right. And you don't do any independent 
6 health and life, do you? 
7 A. I do not. 
8 Q. All right. And Marti doesn't do any property 
9 and casualty? 
10 A. She does not. 
11 Q. Okay. Notthatyou couldn't each do one or 
12 the other? 
13 A. She can't do property and casualty. 
14 Q. Currently because of her license? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. But if she were to get licensed there wouldn't 
17 be any prohibition against that? 
18 A. Correct 
19 Q. All right. Real quickly I want you to turn to 
20 exhibit 101. That's Michael's contract with Nield, Inc.; 
21 is that correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And were you present when that contract was 
24 entered into? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. All right. 
2 A. Try one more time. 
3 Q. I think you just testified that in essence 
4 Insure Bear Lake, Inc. is your agency. In other words, 
5 it's the equivalent of your office? 
6 A Okay. 
7 Q. The Montpelier office is Insure Bear Lake, 
8 Inc. doing business as Insurance Designers? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Okay. So ifNield, Inc. sends something to 
11 Insure Bear Lake, Inc., and it's your part of a 
12 commission, that wouldn't be completely abnormal; is that 
13 correct? 
14 A. That would be the standard course of business. 
15 Q. Okay. So yours is limited to property and 
16 casualty policies through Nield, Inc.; is that correct? 
17 A. The policies I write I do receive some 
18 commissions off of a health insurance that's still on the 
19 books from me buying it from Mike's widow. 
20 Q. But that's separate from Nield, Inc.? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. All of the health and life is --you can 
23 almost carve that off? 
24 A. Yes. But it's part of the agency. 
25 Q. And Marti is the one that primarily handles 
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1 Q. Were you present during any of the 
2 negotiations for that contract? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Were you personally aware of any of the 
5 circumstances that were being considered at the time that 
6 such contract was entered? 
7 A. I was aware that Mike had just left Farm 
8 Bureau. And any time you start a new agency the biggest 
9 hurdle you have to get over is that each one of those 
10 companies you write with want a large enough production 
11 number from you to justify doing business with you. When 
12 you first start out that's tough to meet So he did --
13 that's one of the reasons he signed up with Nield, Inc., 
14 was to access more companies. 
15 Q. Okay. And that kind of goes back to one of 
16 the first questions I asked you. That's one of the 
17 reasons of why to go through a general agent like Nield, 
18 Inc., is because they get the deals at all or maybe even a 
19 better deal with some of these insurance carriers; is that 
20 right? 
21 A. Initially it is. 
22 Q. And do you have any firsthand knowledge of 
23 whether there were any oral or written individual 
24 agreements beyond the contract that affected the 
25 compensation scheme between Nield, Inc. and Mike Kunz? 
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1 Q. Okay. Why don't you just keep the deposition 
2 up there in case we need to use it again. 
3 Now going to exhibit 103. This is what we've 
4 kind of all labeled as the draft contract. You claim to 
5 have been provided with that in or around October of 2008; 
6 is that about right? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. You reviewed that draft? 
9 A. I did. 
10 Q. Exhibit 103, how did you obtain it in the 
11 first place? 
12 A. Bryan came down to our office and met with 
13 Marti and I and brought it to us. 
14 Q. Was anyone with him atthattime? 
15 A. I believe he was alone. 
16 Q. Okay. And based on your testimony today and 
17 previously, would you agree with me that you believe that 
18 exhibit 103 represented what you had previously discussed 
19 with Nield, Inc.? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So as you were entering that, you verbally 
22 agreed to this contract, even though it hadn't been 
23 finalized yet; would you agree with me on that? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And is it fair to say that you intended the 
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1 was there. 
2 Q. Was he at all involved, as far as you know, in 
3 any of the communications or negotiations regarding that 
4 2009 contract? 
5 A. I don't remember him being involved with any 
6 ofit 
7 Q. At the time that you met with Bryan and Tom, 
8 did you ask for additional time to review this contract 
9 that you signed? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. And you would agree that it was designed to 
12 replace everything that came before it, correct? In other 
13 words, it took the place of the 1996 contract? 
14 A. It did take the place of the 1996 contract; 
15 and we believed that it was the same contract as the 
16 draft. 
17 Q. Okay. Now l want you to look at your 
18 paragraph seven, the terms of compensation. You indicated 
19 that you thought that it should be the same as Michael's 
20 contract; is that correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. All right. I want you to look at your 
23 paragraph seven and I want you to look at Michael's 
24 paragraph seven in 101. His is in a Roman numeral. Yours 
25 is in Arabic, but I think they're both number seven. 
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1 terms of this draft to be effective in your agent contract 
2 that you actually later signed? 
3 A. The terms in this one I did. 
4 Q. Okay. Let's move forward to 105. 105 is the 
5 contract that you actually signed, correct? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q. And even though it shows as effective January 
8 of 2009, it's your belief that you signed it shortly 
9 before that, maybe a month or two ahead of that? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And on that one you didn't really read it 
12 thoroughly prior to the signing, did you? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. And you glanced at it. I think previously you 
15 indicated that you had it for about 10 minutes or so 
16 before you signed it; do you remember that? 
17 A. Yeah, l could have had it 10 minutes and we 
18 were just doing a casual conversation. 
19 Q. And who was with you at the time you signed 
20 that? 
21 A. Marti was with me. Bryan was there and Tom 
22 was there. 
23 Q. Do you remember if -- he goes by Benjamin and 
24 everyone calls him Benj. Do you call him Benj? 
25 A. I do. I'm not a hundred percent sure ifhe 
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1 Compare those two paragraphs, okay? 
2 A. Okay. 
3 Q. What's the difference? 
4 A. "Agent will receive 80 percent of commissions 
5 received on insurance placed by agent with company." On 
6 my contract and on Mike's it says "Agent will receive 80 
7 percent of the commission received on insurance placed 
8 with the company." 
9 Q. So other than the change in your voice 
10 inflection, aren't the words identical? 
11 A. No. You have -- I would say so. 
12 THE COURT: It adds by agent. That's the 
13 distinction. 
14 MR. WUTHRICH: We would note plural versus 
15 singular, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: It speaks for itself. We can figure 
17 that out. 
18 Q. (BY MR. HOOSTE) Prior to the 2009 contract was 
19 there any oral agreement that you had, or negotiation, 
20 with Nield, Inc. as to what commission meant? In other 
21 words, what it included or did not include? 
22 A. No. Prior to the 2009, no. 
23 Q. Okay. So in the significant, I guess, 
24 addition, if you will, to the 2009 contract, is now that 
25 you had purchased Mike's book of business from Judy and 
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1 the term bonus anywhere? 
2 A The specific word bonus, no. 
3 THE COURT: Is that exhibit 105? 
4 MR. HOOSTE: Right. 
5 Q. (BY MR. HOOSTE) Does exhibit 105 contain the 
6 word contingent commission anywhere? 
7 A Specifically, no. 
8 Q. And even though you used the word contingent 
9 commission, in terms of commission, to mean if someone's 
10 check bounces that's a contingency that is going to affect 
11 my total commission, isn't it used in the industry in a 
12 way that contingent commission has a specific meaning 
13 relating to some kind of an extra compensation? Not just 
14 that it's contingent, like hinged on someone making a 
15 payment, but this contingent commission, as used in the 
16 industry, is specific in terms of some kind of a scheme 
17 for extra compensation; would you agree with me on that? 
18 A I would agree that each company has their own 
19 additional guidelines that need to be met for the 
20 contingent commission. 
21 Q. Is it true that you did not even use the term 
22 contingent commission to describe your claim for profit 
2 3 sharing until you learned of the term after receiving 
24 these documents in your subpoena? 
25 A That's correct. 
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1 it should have been split 80/20 rather than 50/50 back in 
2 2011; is that correct? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Why don't you tum to page 123 of the 
5 deposition. For context, it's probably easier to start at 
6 line number 10. We really get into the questioning more 
7 around line number 15. We're talking about what was in 
8 the deposition as exhibit number 306. If! recall 
9 correctly, that was the same as this letter that is now 
10 admitted as 106. 
11 A. And I made a mistake at that time. The first 
1 Q. Does your 2009 contract, exhibit 105, contain 
2 the word profit share anywhere? 
3 A No. 
4 Q. Does it contain even the word incentive 
5 anywhere? 
6 A Notthatl'm aware of. 
7 Q. Okay. I want to talk for a few minutes about 
8 Gem State. The way I understand it, it is a really 
9 different kind of a situation than all of the other 
10 companies? 
11 A No, it's not. 
12 Q. Okay. You don't believe that Gem State has a 
13 different type of payment scheme than the other companies 
14 with regard to the Montpelier office of Nield, Inc. and 
15 the Pocatello office of Nield, Inc.? 
16 A No. 
17 Q. As far as exhibit 106 goes, that's Bryan's 
18 memo to you indicating some profit sharing paid in 2011 
19 for the earnings in 2010. Do you have that with you? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q. Youdidn'thaveanywrittencorrespondence 
22 with Bryan at that point in time, did you? 
23 A No. 
24 Q. So the correspondence that you claim, if! 
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asked, "Okay. How did he respond to that?" Your answer 
was, "In so many words, quote, no." 
A. And I made a mistake on that timeline. 
Q. So that's the only mistake in terms of that 
conversation that you're alleging today, is that the 
timing of that was different? You're saying that you did 
that two years earlier? 
A I'm saying that that conversation didn't 
happen pertaining to the 2010 year. The conversation 
happened pertaining to the profit sharing check received 
in 2009 for the 2008 year. 
12 profit sharing check that I received from Gem State was 12 Q. Okay. So about two years earlier? 
13 actually in 2009 for the 2008 year. That's when I did 13 A Yes. 
14 call him. 14 Q. And Bryan indicated at thattime that he 
15 Q. Okay. So let's go through this. Maybe this 15 disagreed with you, correct? 
16 is just an issue of timing. I asked, "Did you make any 16 A. He said it should be split based on ownership. 
17 claim to any additional funds regarding those two same 17 Q. And you knew that was different than 80/20 
18 companies, Gem State or Acuity, immediately after that 18 back in 2009; is that right? 
19 memo?" And the memo would have been Bryan's memo to yo ;19 A. Yeah. I know the difference between 50/50 and 
20 right? 20 80/20. 
21 A. Right 21 Q. Okay. And the timing is correct based on what 
22 Q. And you answered, "I did." I asked, "When did 22 you just testified about? 
2 3 you do that?" You said, "Right after I received it I made 23 A. Yes. That first check I phoned him on. 
24 a phone call to Bryan because he'd split the Gem State 24 Q. Okay. But you didn'ttake any other action 
25 50/50 and I thought it should have been split 80/20." I 25 other than to tell him how you thought it should be and he 
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1 that. I'd rather just call him all at once on one great 
2 rebuttal rather than calling him and going through that 
3 again. To that end, subject to trying to lay additional 
4 foundation for exhibit 127, we would rest, but reserve the 
5 right to try and lay the foundation on that exhibit. 
6 THE COURT: Through his rebuttal and whatever --
7 MR. WUTHRICH: Yes. Rather than calling him now. 
8 THE COURT: All right. With that, then, do you 
9 have any objection to proceeding in that way, Mr. Hooste? 
10 MR. HOOSTE: I guess I'm not sure in what way-- I 
11 justwantto be sure I'm clear. He's resting, indicating 
12 that he may need to recall a witness in rebuttal? 
13 THE COURT: And he wants to, in addition to 
14 whatever rebuttal testimony he would do, lay the 
15 foundation and attempt to admit exhibit 127. At a minimum 
16 as a demonstrative exhibit as part of that rebuttal as 
17 opposed to calling him two separate times, one now to try 
18 and lay that foundation and then introduce that exhibit. 
19 MR. HOOSTE: We did have a discussion during the 
20 break. Maybe I'll pose this on the record. 1 think that 
21 in obtaining this Gem State agreement that is marked as 
22 127, I guess I don't have any dispute that it is what it 
23 purports to be. It's a Gem State agreement that it would 
24 have with an agency. This one just happens to be blank. 
25 The person that provided this as part of this 
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1 being a type of agency agreement that would be offered by 
2 Gem State? 
3 MR. HOOSTE: Yes. I don't think there's any sense 
4 in wasting time arguing about that. 
5 THE COURT: It's admitted as a demonstrative 
6 exhibit for the purpose of being an agent-- the type or 
7 form of an agency agreement that would be required by Gem 
8 State. Does that address those issues, Mr. Wuthrich? 
9 MR. WUTHRICH: Yes, Your Honor. That's sufficient. 
10 We can move on. 
11 THE COURT: All right. So you've rested subjectto 
12 any rebuttal testimony you may have? 
13 MR. WUTHRICH: Correct. 
14 THE COURT: At this point in time, then, the 
15 plaintiff has rested its case in chief in this matter on 
16 the bifurcated portion of this trial dealing with the 
17 declaratory judgment action that was initiated by Mr. Bret 
18 Kunz and Marti Kunz as a co-plaintiff. 
19 Mr. H ooste, you may proceed. 
20 MR. HOOSTE: Thank you, Your Honor. I think I'm 
21 bound, in the best interest ofmy client, to at least make 
22 a motion for involuntarf dismissal under Idaho Rules of 
23 Civil Procedure 4l(b) and 50(a). 
24 In this case, where the court is sitting as 
25 the fact finder, there is, unlike a motion for summary 
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1 litigation just said this is what an agent's agreement 
2 would be if they were to have entered into it. It doesn't 
3 have a time frame, so I can't tell if this is the same 
4 exact agreement that Nield, Inc. would have entered into 
5 in the past or not So I'm willing --
6 THE COURT: I assume that's the foundation he wants 
7 to lay. 
8 MR. HOOSTE: I don't know that he can, because it 
9 was not entered by Bret. It would have been entered by 
10 other parties. Maybe at this point in time I don't have 
11 any strong objection because I think it goes to the 
12 weight. I don't know that it will end up with any weight 
13 at the end of the day. But to the extent that it purports 
14 to be what is as a demonstrative exhibit, if the court 
15 will limit it to that at this point in time, I would 
16 stipulate to its limited admission in that it is at least 
17 what an agent would sign if they entered into an agreement 
18 with Gem State presently. 
19 THE COURT: I don't know how it could be offered or 
20 argued for any other purpose than that. It's blank. It 
21 doesn't it's not signed by any parties, it's not filled 
22 out in the blank spaces. 
23 MR. H OOSTE: That's my point. 
24 THE COURT: So based upon that, then, you are 
25 stipulating to its admission as a demonstrative exhibit, 
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1 judgment or anything to that effect, the court has heard 
2 the evidence. You don't have to draw any inference in a 
3 light most favorable to the plaintiff. You're able to 
4 just weigh the evidence and at this point determine 
5 whether or not they have met their burden of proof as the 
6 plaintiff in showing that the declaratory relief is 
7 appropriate. 
8 In that respect, in their complaint they've 
9 alleged that the contract places an obligation on Nield, 
10 Inc. to pay profit sharing or bonuses or other incentive. 
11 I think they use commission, not the word contingent 
12 commission in their complaint. But I think they put any 
13 other type ofremuneration. Suffice it to say thatthey 
14 think the contract means that there should be some kind of 
15 a bonus paid. 
16 Your Honor, they withdrew -- I guess I would 
17 also move to amend my pleading to the proof in some small 
18 degree. I believe that the statute of frauds would apply 
19 with regard to any oral agreement that has been testified 
20 to that goes beyond the contract with regard to any type 
21 of a contingent commission or profit share plan. The 
22 testimony has been that those cannot be completed in less 
23 than a year. They are a look-back for a year in the 
24 property and casualty. 
25 That's going to be consistent with the 
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1 exhibits that have been produced. In particular I believe 
2 it's 201,202,204 and 205. So all of those, Your Honor, 
3 have this kind of separate contingent commission plan, a 
4 profit sharing plan. That goes to two things. It goes 
5 all the way back to, I think, this court's primary 
6 finding. This court has to find that the agency contract 
7 included profit sharing bonuses in order for the plaintiff 
8 to prevail. I don't believe the court can find that based 
9 on the evidence so far. 
10 It's not in the four corners. There's no 
11 profit sharing, no contingent commission, incentives, 
12 bonuses, anything like that. The testimony is that the 
13 parties believed that exhibit 103 was the written form of 
14 what they intended to agree to. The plaintiffs have 
15 testified to that. 
16 Within exhibit 103, Your Honor, and we went 
17 over it just recently with Marti, there's a term in there, 
18 under subsection seven, that any other form of 
19 compensation will be based on individual agreement with 
20 the company. 
21 THE COURT: That's not in 105, though? 
22 MR. HOOSTE: But it goes to the intent of the 
23 plaintiff. 
24 THE COURT: You're telling me in your argument that 
25 I'm not to consider parol evidence because it's not in the 
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1 commission or it means profit sharing. 
2 Your Honor, both of the plaintiffs have 
3 testified that they didn't talk about that with the 
4 defendant at the time that the contract was entered. It 
5 didn't even cross their minds. They learned of the term 
6 contingent commission -- I shouldn't say they. I don't 
7 mean to use the plural. Bret testified that he learned of 
8 the term contingent commission basically through the 
9 course of this litigation. 
10 Your Honor, as you look at Bret's 
11 correspondence, exhibit 108, or --yeah, his 
12 correspondence. He sends in the profit sharing for Gem 
13 State and says, "I feel very strongly this should be split 
14 on the same basis as commission." So even he, in the 
15 context of that, is looking at profit sharing as in 
16 essence a separate term from commission. Otherwise he 
17 would say, hey, I believe my commission of80/20 should 
18 include anything that you get. I think you have to take 
19 him at his word. Before the litigation starts he says, 
20 hey, there's profit sharing in the first sentence, and 
21 then it should be based the same as commission in the 
22 sentence. And in the third sentence, this was never even 
23 addressed in the contract with Mike or me, that the 
24 contract itself doesn't contain a provision for profit 
25 sharing or contingent commission. 
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1 face of the four corners of the document. 
2 MR. HOOSTE: All right 
3 THE COURT: So you have to pick one or the other. 
4 MR. HOOSTE: I think it's sequential rather than 
5 one or the other, but I see what you're saying. So on the 
6 one hand, if you 're looking at the four corners, it's not 
7 there. And the way commission is determined is there. 
8 It's in paragraph five, or pardon me, let me make sure I'm 
9 not misspeaking. Yes, paragraph five. Ittalks about 
10 commission. The agent has the responsibility for all of 
11 the premium and return commission on the business placed. 
12 And then when the collections are not on time deductions 
13 may be made. And when the collection is completed, 
14 deducted commission will be paid. 
15 It's tying, Your Honor, commission -- if you 
16 read it in the whole context of the agreement, it's tying 
17 commission to premiums paid. Commission to premiums paid 
18 is consistentthrough everything that we've seen in the 
19 contracts, whether it be health and life or whether it be 
20 property and casualty. And as well, the intent of the 
21 drafter that commission be based on the written premium. 
22 So I think this court first has to look at, in 
23 terms of the ambiguity question, is the alternative 
24 definition reasonable under the circumstances. Is it 
25 reasonable to say, oh, commission means contingent 
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1 To the extent that there is anything that 
2 Nield, Inc. may have an obligation to pay it would be 
3 outside the contract. Therefore, the declaratory judgment 
4 isn't appropriate. To the extent that this court says, 
5 well, I'm going to find that it's ambiguous and I'll look 
6 outside the four corners and look at the parol evidence, 
7 then I think you're still looking at how does his 
8 definition of commission and how does their understanding 
9 of the term commission at the time that the contract was 
10 entered, is it sensible to say that meant contingent 
11 commission. 
12 Or, now going back to exhibit 03, is there 
13 some expectation that there be a separate contract, or at 
14 least an agreement entered, whereby anything above and 
15 beyond commission be paid. I think exhibit 103, and their 
16 understanding of exhibit 103, which they had plenty of 
17 time to review and indicate, both of them, that that is 
18 what we intended to enter, that it shows that commission 
19 would be separate from any other kind of compensation. In 
20 that context it's difficult to circle back and say, well, 
21 yeah, that's a different kind of compensation, but we 
22 think it should be in commission because otherwise it 
23 would have to be --
24 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a minute. I 
25 probably should have done this at the outset of your 
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1 motion. Are you aware of any authority that would entitle 
2 you or another defendant in a declaratory judgment type 
3 action to move for a motion -- to make the motion you are 
4 making in a declaratory judgment action? It seems to the 
5 court that by it's very nature a declaratory judgment 
6 action, brought pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1201, is 
7 asking for just that, a declaratory judgment of the court 
8 regarding the rights of the parties, vis-a-vis in this 
9 case the contract in question. 
10 Even if Mr. Kunz and Ms. Kunz do not prevail 
11 with the court on their interpretation of this contract, 
12 or their asserted interpretation of the contract, doesn't 
13 the court still have an obligation under 10-1201 to grant 
14 the declaratory relief and identify and determine what the 
15 rights of the parties are vis-a-vis this contract? And if 
16 thatis correct, isn 'tyour motion of no consequence? 
17 MR. HOOSTE: I think that under Rule 41(b ), even 
18 though it's labeled dismissal, and if you have the rules 
19 with you, Your Honor, on the top of page 3 2 7. 
20 THE COURT: I'm familiar with the rule. 
21 MR. HOOSTE: "The court as trier of fact may then 
22 determine them," relating back to the facts, "and render 
23 judgment against the plaintiff; or may decline to render 
24 any judgment until the close of evidence." So I think --
25 THE COURT: I'm not being asked to render 
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1 inadvertently referring to a motion to dismiss under 4l(b) 
2 as a directed verdict type of motion. The Supreme Court 
3 gently reminded me that they are two different motions. A 
4 directed verdict motion is to be brought in a jury trial 
5 context. So the only avenue available for you is under 
6 4 l(b ), and 1 don't think it is applicable in a declaratory 
7 judgment type action. 
8 MR. WUTHRICH: For the record, we don't--we 
9 object to any attempt to amend the pleadings after our 
10 closing. We've not addressed statute of frauds and it 
11 wasn't addressed in their pleadings. 
12 THE COURT: To the extent I need to rule on that, I 
13 ruled and discussed that this morning regarding, I think 
14 it was this morning, regarding the issue of implied in 
15 fact contract It was asserted that there was no attempt 
16 by the plaintiff to assert an implied in fact contract. 
17 So therefore tbere is no statute of defense -- no statute 
18 of frauds defense available. 
19 Again, just briefly, I want to wrap this up. 
20 I don't even want to take the time to hear Mr. Wuthrich's 
21 argument in response to your motion because, unless you 
22 can point me to some authority or some basis for a 
23 declaratory relief type claim, I'm going to deny it as a 
24 matter oflaw. 
25 MR. HOOSTE: I don't have any additional authority, 
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1 affirmative relief in this case as far as a money judgment 
2 or a dismissal. I'm being asked to provide declaratory 
3 judgment and identify and explain the rights as between 
4 the parties. 
5 In my years of practice and my years on the 
6 bench I've never seen this motion brought in this context 
7 in a declaratory judgment hearing. I'm not sure it's 
8 appropriate and I'm not sure how it would work Then I 
9 have not done what I was asked to do in the complaint and 
10 that is to declare the rights of the parties, vis-a-vis 
11 this contract So my question is, yes or no, is this an 
12 appropriate motion under this cause of action? 
13 MR. HOOSTE: I guess, Your Honor --
14 THE COURT: You are effectively asking me to 
15 dismiss their case. A directed verdict is a different 
16 motion under a different rule that is brought before a 
17 jury. This isn't a directed verdict motion either. I'm 
18 not sure it's an appropriate motion. 
19 MR.HOOSTE: Ifollowyou,YourHonor. !don't 
20 have any specific rule that I -- I was looking at 50(a) 
21 and41(b). And with41(b) I understand the court's 
22 interpretation there. 
23 THE COURT: 51(a), is a directed verdict motion. 
24 Unfortunately, although the court was affirmed in this 
25 case, I was taken to task by the Idaho Supreme Court for 
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1 Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: That will be the ruling of the court at 
3 this point in time. You may call your first witness. 
4 MR. HOOSTE: Thank you. The defense calls Stephen 
5 Ahl. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Ahl, please approach my clerk and 
7 raise your right hand and she'll place you under oath, 
8 sir. 
9 STEPHEN AHL, 
10 being first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to 
11 said cause, testified as follows: 
12 THE COURT: Please state and spell your first and 
13 last names. 
14 THE WITNESS: Stephen Ahl. S-t-e-p-h-e-n. A-h-1. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Hooste, you may examine the 
16 witness. 
17 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. HOOSTE: 
19 Q. Mr. Ahl, can you give us a brief description 
20 ofyoureducationalbackground? 
21 A. Sure. I graduated with a bachelor of 
22 psychology from Nebraska Wesleyan University. 
23 Q. And when did you do that? 
24 A. I graduated in, I believe, 2001. 
25 Q. Okay. And how are you currently employed? 
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1 A. I'm employed by Nationwide Insurance Company. 
2 Q. And is Allied a subsidiary of Nationwide, or 
3 how are they related? 
4 A. !tis. Nationwide purchased Allied Insurance 
5 in 1998. We operate under the name Allied Insurance. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Ahl, you're by nature, I can tell, 
7 a very fast talker. We'll have trouble. I want you to be 
8 deliberate in thinking about slowing down. We've got to 
9 keep a record of this and I can tell you'll cause problems 
10 for the court reporter. Be deliberate. I don't wantto 
11 make you nervous or uptight, but be deliberate and try to 
12 slow down. 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
14 Q. (BY MR. HOOSTE) Can you explain to me what some 
15 of your duties and responsibilities are based on your 
16 current employment? 
17 A. Sure. I am a sales manager with Allied 
18 Nationwide Insurance. I'm responsible for southern Idaho 
19 and eastern Oregon. My responsibilities are appointing 
20 new agencies, helping them manage a book of business with 
21 Allied Nationwide. Helping them with their relationship 
22 with underwriting and the company that I work for. 
23 Q. Okay. And can you briefly run through your 
24 work history subsequentto your graduation from college? 
25 A. Sure. I started with Allied in, I believe, 
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1 A. I am. 
2 Q. How are you familiar with those? 
3 A. I've reviewed them. I was not in this 
4 position when the agreements were signed, but I have since 
5 then reviewed them. 
6 Q. Okay. And if Nield,'hc. had a conflict with 
7 that contract now, would you be the person they go to? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Have you entered contracts similar to the 
10 contracts that you reviewed in this case? 
11 A. I have. 
12 Q. Under similar terms? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 MR. HOOSTE: Your Honor, does the witness have the 
15 defendant's book of exhibits? 
16 THE COURT: He does not I'll provide it to him. 
17 MR. HOOSTE: In particular 201 and 202. 
18 THE COURT: I think we have them all here in a 
19 lump. 201 and 202 are there. 
20 Q. (BY MR. HOOSTE) Do you see 201 and 202? 
21 A. I do. 
22 Q. Do you recognize those? 
23 A. I do. 
24 Q. Is that the agreement that is currently in 
25 place between Allied and Nield, Inc.? 
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1 2001, as a claims associate in the Lincoln, Nebraska 
2 office. 1 did that for about five years. Then I was a 
3 claims manager in southern California for approximately 
4 two years. From there I went to Denver, Colorado where I 
5 was an underwriting manager for just under two years. And 
6 then I have been in this role a sales manager for just 
7 over four years now. 
8 Q. And do you have direct contact with general 
9 agents with regard to the contractual relationship that 
10 they have with Allied? 
11 A. Can you say that again? 
12 Q. I'm speaking like a lawyer. Do you help 
13 clients such as Nield, Inc. determine what contractual 
14 relationship they have with your company? 
15 A. Yes. That is one of the things I mentioned 
16 earlier. Part of my job is to appoint new agencies. And 
17 in doing that I go over the contract with the agencies. 
18 Q. And are you familiar with the contract between 
19 insurance carriers generally in addition to yours and 
20 other general agents? 
21 A. Sure. We have to be aware of our competitors, 
22 I guess you can call it. 
23 Q. Okay. And are you familiar with the agency 
24 agreement and the marketing plan contract with Allied and 
25 Nield, Inc.? 
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1 A. It is, yes. 
2 Q. Now, in the original exhibit 201, is there a 
3 provision for profit sharing in the original agreement? 
4 A. I do not believe so. 
5 Q. Does an appointment automatically have profit 
6 sharing go along with it? 
7 A. Meaning? 
8 Q. A new appointment -- is there automatically 
9 profit sharing in an agent contract like that for 
10 appointment? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Is profit sharing calculated different than 
13 standard commission? 
14 A. Yes, it is. Profit sharing is something 
15 separate. You have to qualify for a profit share. 
16 Commission is based upon premium that is paid into the 
17 company that we -- that's how we compensate an agency is 
18 based upon the premium that is written with the company. 
19 Q. Okay. How often is commission paid? 
20 A. Commission is paid monthly. 
21 Q. How often is profit sharing paid? 
22 A. Profit share, when it is paid, and again you 
23 do have to qualify for profit share, and when it is paid 
24 it is paid once a year; so annually. 
25 Q. In terms of the qualifications for profit 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. How are you aware of that? 
3 A. I'm aware of that because that's what I do 
4 every day. I work with agencies to write business, so 
5 that's how they get paid monthly is a percentage of the 
6 premium to the company that gets paid out in commission to 
7 the agency. 
8 Q. Okay. And are you familiar with other 
9 agencies beyond Nationwide and how they use the term 
10 commission? 
11 A. I believe it's the same way. 
12 Q. All right. And what is the basis of that 
13 belief? 
14 A. In talking with other sales reps within the 
15 industry, talking with other agencies within the industry. 
16 Q. Is that part of knowing your competition? 
17 A. Part of knowing the competition and knowing 
18 the job. 
19 Q. So do you believe that there is a distinction 
20 in the insurance industry between the term commission and 
21 profit sharing? 
22 A. I do. 
23 Q. And let me back up a minute here. ls there a 
24 consistent manner in which commission is defined? 
25 Standing alone without any other modifiers, the term 
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1 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
2 Q. (BY MR. HOOSTE) What is the National Association 
3 oflnsurance Commissioners, or NAIC. 
4 A. It's 
5 MR. WUTHRICH: Didn't we already admit this 
6 exhibit, Your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: Are you laying foundation for it or 
8 trying to find out ifhe knows who they are? 
9 MR. HOOSTE: Well, Your Honor, it's foundational at 
10 this point in time. I think it's to determine -- I don't 
11 think that we presented evidence to the court as to the 
12 nature of that authority. 
13 THE COURT: And part of the reason why is because 
14 there's been a big donnybrook about whether or not that's 
15 even relevant to this proceeding. 
16 MR. HOOSTE: I think it's relevant, and I may not 
17 have articulated this very well yesterday. It's relevant 
18 to determine whether or not the alternative proposed 
19 definition of commission by the plaintiff is reasonable. 
20 If there's a standard and people believe --
21 THE COURT: Before you do that, ask him if he's 
22 familiar with the standard as articulated by the NAIC. 
23 Otherwise I'm not going to let you go further. 
24 Q. (BY MR. HOOSTE) Are you familiar with the 
25 standard definition posed by the NAIC with regard to the 
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1 commission that is defined within the insurance industry? 
2 A. Well, going back to what I said before, it 
3 would be a percentage of the premium. A standalone 
4 premium that comes into the carrier for a specific policy. 
5 We pay a percentage of the premium. And then, if the 
6 policy cancels, we would actually take money back away 
7 from the agency if the policy does not sustain the life of 
8 the policy period. 
9 Q. So it's written premiums subject to 
10 corrections? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. And you indicated that there was a 
13 distinction. How would you define profit sharing? 
14 A. Profit sharing in the industry can also be --
15 some folks call it profit share, some folks call it 
16 contingency. So commission is paid regardless. As a 
17 company gets money in we pay a percent.age out. For profit 
18 share or contingency there's certain qualifications that 
19 need to be met in order for that be paid out. Some of 
20 those qualifiers are that there has to be a certain amount 
21 of premium; there has to be certain loss ratio. The book 
22 of business has to perform a certain way in order for an 
23 agency to qualify for that contingency commission or 
24 profit share, which is not the case for commission. 
25 MR. HOOSTE: Give me a moment, Your Honor. 
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1 term commission? 
2 A. I'm not familiar with exactly how that reads. 
3 MR. WUTHRICH: Then I'll object to further 
4 questions on this line. 
5 THE COURT: Well, there hasn't really been any yet. 
6 Let's wait until we get one. 
7 MR. WUTHRICH: I'm just trying to speed it along. 
8 THE COURT: I know, but we need to let him propound 
9 a question before I can rule on an objection. 
10 MR. HOOSTE: I guess, Your Honor, ifit please the 
11 court, may I not ask the witness questions regarding the 
12 authority of the NAIC so that the NAIC's definition stands 
13 on its own? 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Hooste, what you want to do is have 
15 him state that the definition that is in evidence from the 
16 NAIC is different than that asserted by Mr. Kunz. I 
17 already know that. He's already stated what his 
18 definition of commission is. So I've got all of the 
19 relevant evidence I want on that issue. 
20 MR. HOOSTE: I guess, Your Honor, and I'm happy to 
21 move on if this isn't the case, but it's my impression 
22 that in order to determine that the NA! C's definition 
23 means anything, there has to be a belief that the NAIC has 
24 any kind of an influence in the field. That's really what 
25 I'm asking. 
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1 And it spells out what percentage they'll pay on the 
2 different classes of business. 
3 MR. WUTHRICH: Your Honor --
1 meant as you then entered your contracts with your 
2 subcontractors? 
3 A. They were the same. 
4 THE WITNESS: The contingent commission is the sam 4 Q. The intent was the same? 
5 as the profit sharing. 
6 THE COURT: Just a minute. 
7 MR. WUTHRICH: I looked just quickly at the Acuity 
8 contract. It appears to have been signed by Bryan Nield 
9 as president and Tom Nield appears on there only as a 
10 witness. 
11 MR. HOOSTE: He was the owner of the business at 
12 the time, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: I think we're just getting bogged down 
14 in some real minutia that seems to want to argue about a 
15 lot of these issues. He's clearly a signator on 201. 
16 I'll allow him to answer as relates to 201. 
17 THE WITNESS: So what's the question? 
18 Q. (BY MR. HOOSTE) The question is, in essence is 
19 there a distinction between commission and profit sharing 
20 and contingent commission? 
21 A. Yes, there is. It's never intended that 
22 commissions include profit sharing or contingent 
23 commission. 
24 Q. And does that understanding that you have with 
25 those companies affect your own belief of what commission 
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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BYMR. WUTHRICH: 
3 Q. We've talked a little bit about these other 
4 functions. One of the things you talked about that you 
5 may have paid Mike Kunz on was for some advertising? 
6 A. No, we didn't pay him. We did the advertising 
7 out of our own account. We didn't pay him for it, we just 
8 did it. Yellow Pages, newspaper, those kinds of things. 
9 Q. And then you talked about some -- when you 
10 said that there were other function, that wouldn't be in 
11 any way associated with an 80 /20 split? 
12 A. You mean the other function? 
13 Q. Yes. Advertising? 
14 A. No. Wejustdidthat 
15 Q. All right. During the time that you were 
16 paying Bret commissions, did there become a time when 
17 there was some dispute over the accuracy of the 
18 accounting? 
19 A. Yes, there was. 
20 Q. And did the accounting then get sort of moved 
21 to Mike's office so they could track it? 
22 A. No. When Bret came to me he said that we had 
23 missed some commissions on some of his accounts. I went 
24 back about four months and reviewed that. It took a lot 
25 of time. I found that one of the commissions had been 
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5 A. The intent was the same. 
6 Q. Okay. Based on your entire experience and 
7 your education and training in the insurance industry, is 
8 there -- within the insurance field is there a distinction 
9 between commission and contingent commission? 
10 A. Yes, absolutely. 
11 Q. When you were the owner ofNield, Inc., did 
12 Nield, Inc. ever share with any producer profit sharing 
13 that you received from an insurance carrier based on a 
14 subcontractor's rate of commission? 
15 A. No. 
16 MR. WUTHRICH: I believe that was asked and 
17 answered. 
18 THE COURT: I don't recall. If it was I'll -- it 
19 won't hurt. Ifitwasn't, I'll allow it. 
20 THE WITNESS: No. 
21 MR. HOOSTE: Nothing further. 
22 THE COURT: All right Cross-examination, Mr. 
23 Wuthrich. 
24 MR. WUTHRICH: Thank you. 
25 
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1 sent to Mike. Another commission we hadn't received from 
2 the company yet And Bret wasn't considering that if 
3 he -- if the policy canceled there was a return premium to 
4 the company. So I worked that out Basically it came out 
5 to a wash. In other words, maybe they owed me a dollar. 
6 I wasn't worried about that 
7 Q. Justthe one time? 
8 A. Then he came back about a month later. Him 
9 and his wife came to my office. Bret said I have another 
10 thing. I said, Bret, I told you before I'm not going to 
11 do this any more because it's time consuming and 
12 expensive. You can work it out with Mike. He let go at 
13 me with superlatives that I can't repeat 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. So that also helped with encouraging Mike, 
16 look, you need to get direct contact with the Applied 
17 system. 
18 Q. You draw a distinction between commission, as 
19 you call it regular commission, and contingent commission. 
20 They are both predicated to some part on premiums sold, 
21 correct? 
22 A. Okay. No, because the contingent commission 
I 23 was based upon premium in relationship to losses incurred. 
24 Q. I understand that But I'm asking you, both 
25 of them are first contingent upon premium being sold, 
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1 
1 Court on tl1e procedure associated with certificating this 
2 matter for appeal on an interlocutory appeal basis. And 
3 also on the merits of my findings of fact and conclusions 
4 oflaw whether they are supported by the evidence or not 
5 MR PRESTON: Your Honor, the only thing that I 
6 guess I would add is at this point in time I haven't heard 
7 anything from the Kunzes objecting or disagreeing that the 
8 new final judgment that this court issued does not address 
9 any other issues besides that which were addressed at 
10 trial. 
11 And the only other issue I would have for 
12 clarification is just a stylistic issue, whether or not 
13 this new final judgment is intended to be an amended 
14 judgment of the previous final judgment or a whole 
15 separate creature and a whole separate judgment 
16 THE COURT: Let me clarify two issues. I never 
17 viewed this as a final judgment I recognize that if you 
18 certify a judgment as appealable under 54(b ), then it 
19 becomes an appealable issue and final for purposes of 
20 appeal. But, again, I don't want there to be any 
21 confusion or misunderstanding, I've never viewed this 
22 judgment as a final judgment There are and continue to 
23 be unresolved claims. That's point number one. 
24 Number two, I'm the one, as the presiding 
25 judge, who certifies issues for appeal interlocutory. So 
20 
1 judgment can be consolidated with a breach of contract and 
2 other requests for relief. So, yeah, I guess those are 
3 issues you guys will have to sort out with the Supreme 
4 Court 
5 At this point in time the court is going to 
6 deny the defendant, Nield, Inc.'s, motion to alter or 
7 amend the judgment in this matter. I guess I'm willing to 
8 go forward and for better or worse let the Supreme Court 
9 help in identifying the procedure that is necessary to do 
10 what we've done. If I've done it incorrectly, then they 
11 can address that and I'll learn from that moving forward. 
12 If I've done it correctly, then great 
13 Then we'll also in more efficient order get to 
14 the merits of the appeal, which I'm sure both Mr. Kunz and 
15 Mr. Nield would like to do at this point in time as well. 
16 I'm going to deny the request at this time and 
17 will allow this matter to continue forward on appeal. 
18 Thank you, Mr. Preston. Thank you, Mr. 
19 Wuthrich. If there's nothing else, we'll be in recess. 








I 1 the basis for the appeal, I think, is not what Mr. 
2 Wuthrich may raise on appeal, ifhe wanted to raise 
3 something else, but in line with what I've certified to 
4 take up on appeal. And what I've certified to take up on 
5 appeal is the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
6 following the court trial wherein I reached the findings 
7 of fact and conclusions oflawwhich gave rise to the 
8 attempt at a Rule 54(b) declaratory judgment 
9 I don't know if Mr. Wuthrich wants to add more 
10 to that or what you want to address. 
11 MR WUTHRICH: I'm still where I was. I want to 
12 leave it alone. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Preston, anything else before I 
14 finally rule? 
15 MR PRESTON: Just, Your Honor, that I think it's 
16 interesting, and I don't know the answer to this, it just 
17 came to my mind, that the use of the statute, 10-1201, 
18 contemplates that a declaratory judgment is a final 
19 judgment It's interesting to me that the term final 
20 judgment is used in that setting, which is separate from 
21 the setting that it's used in the Rules of Civil Procedure 
22 54. What effect that has I don't know. That issue just 
23 popped into my mind. 
24 THE COURT: Certainly the Rules of Civil Procedure 
25 allow parties to consolidate claims. And a declaratory 
21 
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110 Memo from Bret Kunz to Nield, Inc, Re: Reply to 109, 4-5-13 Y 
111 Email from Bret to Nield, Inc, Re: what company the $424 Y 
came from 4-17-13, and Marti's note 
112 Email from Marti to Nield, Inc, 6-4-13 Y 
113 Farmer's Alliance Contingency worksheets, 2013-2009 Y 
114 Acuity Contingency worksheet 2013-2009 Y 
115 Gem State Profit Sharing, 2008 Paid in 2009 Y 
116 Gem State no Profit Sharing 2009 Y 
117 Gem State Profit Sharing 2010 Y 
118 Gem State Profit Sharing 2012 Y 
119 E&O Declaration Pages showing Name and changes Y 
120 E&O Dec. Pages, 2008-2009 Y 
121 E&O Dec. Pages, 2009-2010 Y 
122 E&O Dec. Pages, 2010-2011 Y 
123 E&O Dec. Pages, 2011-2012 Y 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 1 
124 E&O Dec. Pages, 2012-2013 Y 
125 E&O Dec. Pages, 2013-2014 Y 
127 Gem State Blank Agency Agreement (demonstrative purposes only)Y 
128 Purchase Contract from Judy Kunz Y 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS: 
NO: DESCRIPTION: SENT/RETAINED 
201 Allied Insurance Agency Agreement with Nield, Inc y 
entered December 2, 2002 
202 Allied Insurance Agency Marketing Plan agreement y 
entered Dec 29, 2004 with Nield Inc including addendums 
203 Allied Insurance Agency Cover Letter dated Dec 30, 2011 y 
and contact addenda reflecting the processing of the name 
change from Michael Knuz to Nield Inc, dba Insurance Designers 
204 Acuity Insurance Co Agency Agreement between Acuity y 
and Nield Inc signed Dec 17, 2007 
205 Contract between Fanners Alliance and Nield Inc dated y 
Jan I, 2009, and including Addendum A,B and C 
206 Letter dated 01/16/13 from Bret Kunz to Bryan Nield y 
Re: Gem State profit sharing bonus 
207 Letter dated 01/22/13 from Bryan Nield to Bret in response y 
To Bret's letter dated 01/16/13 
208 Letter dated 04/05/13 from Bret Kunz to Bryan Nield y 
Re: profit sharing 
209 National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Glossaiy y 
Of Insurance Terms 
210 State of Idaho Department of Insurance Bulletin No 140-03 y 
212 Affidavit of Bryan Benishek y 
213 Agent Agreement Insured Bear Lake & Life Map y 
214 Agent Agreement Insured Bear Lake & Pacific Source y 
215 Agent Agreement Insured Bear Lake & Select Health y 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court this 
cA <f'1aay of February, 2016. 
CINDY GARNER, 
(SEAL) Clerk of the District Coutt 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 2 
( 
I 
Serv~ig Southeast Idaho Sine~ 1968 




lll) DDRA1JON OF REL:A':{'IONSHIP: . 
lV) RELA TIONS~IP: 
V) RES~ONSXBILITIES OF AGENT: 
lnsudesl@axxess.net 
www.worldwebarchttects.com/insurancedesl.gners 
·-----·-\ \B /( 
Nield, Inc. DBA: Insurance Design~rs 
Bret D .. Kunz 
Indefinite or as iong as a.uthorized by 
Boatd of Directors o'r company and 
Michael 0. Kunz . . 
The association existing between the 
Company and the Agent: This 
Association exists because of 
. Michael O. Kunz and .does not revise 
: that rel~tionship but is subject to the 
· Company contnict with Michael ·o. 
· .' Kunz. This association is not an 
. Employer/Employee reliitionship. 
· The Agent is a sub-contractor ?Jld 
the Company provides markets 
through which the Agent can place 
Insurance BusineS$. 
Th.e Age·nt is a\ub-contractor 3:11d as· su~~ 
has full responsibility f qr all expen·ses 
i·elated.fo his business.· This · includes but is · 
· not limited to Federal, State, FICA; 
unemploy~ent and local taxes_. The 
Company will provide to the Agent a 1099 . . 
Fo1in ·showing annual earnings. The Agent 
. is responsible for Workers Compensation · 
for self and all employees.' Agent ls to place 
. Insurance Bu~iness through Company 
.. except for health and life policies that are 
· · individual ~~mpany appqintments. Agent is 
. · . responsjble to be famili ar witb and follow 
the underwriting, binding authority and 
9 ther guidelines of all insurance carriers 
represented by-the Company. Company has 
final" 1:nderwriting authority for all business 






Serving Southeast Idaho Since 1968 
P.O. Box 570- ·+ 2755Pole Ll~e Road.+ PocaJeilo, IP 83204 (208) 23S·4100 + Fax (208) 233-4113 
'VI) RESPONSIBHJTYOF COMPANY: . . . ' 
. . . . ., 
.VII) TERMS OF·COMPENSATION: 
. . 
VUI) ERRORS·& O~ISSIONS: 
insudesl@axx~ss.net . . • . 
. www.worldwe~archltects.com/insurancedeslgners. 
.. 
premiu'm and return commissions on 
business placed. When collections are not 
. on time) deduction may be made from 
payment of commissions due. When the 
· . collection is completed the deducted 
commission will he paid. Agent h~ . 
responsibility for own health, life and other 
personal insurances· for self and.all 
employees. 
The responsibility of the Company is to 
. · m~iritain contracts with.Insurance 
Companies for placing insurance. Do all 
billing 'and accounting functions ( f?Xcept 
collections): Agent Js.personally responsible 
for the collection of premiums and return eel· .. 
commiss1ons on ~usiness·placed. Provide . 
Agent witl1 an ea}'ned commission statement· 
. and a·commission check based on ,the agreed 
percentage on the 15th of tach ·month. Other·· 
· functions based o; comrru"ssion split and· 
individual agryei;nent. Provide Form 1099 
for each calendar year by-the 30t11. of January 
· · · · of the following year. · · 
.· Agent will receive 80% percent of 
commission rec~ived on insurance pl_aced 
with Company. Company will receive 20 %' 
· percent of commis~kms placed by Agent 
through Company ... 
. . 
.Agent must keep in force at all times Errors 
& Omissions Ii:;i.suranc~-onAgent and ~11 . · 
employees for limits qf at least $1,000,000 
per accident and $3,'000,000 aggregate.". · 
This coverage may be.purchased, af agent's 
expense1 :as pa.rt .of the Errors·& Omissions . 
policy maintained by tJ1e Company. The · 
Errors & Omissions policy maintained by 
Tom Nfeld 
· Bryan Nield. 
Benjamin Nield 
Page 8 of 310 
.· I 
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Serving Squthiast Idaho Since ~968' 
P.O. Box 578 + 2755 Pola Line Road + Pocatello, ID 83204 (208) ~3-4100 . -+ . Fax (208} 233·41 i 3 ... 
the Company cqvers insurance policies 
placed through. Company and health and !if~ 
policies that are individual company 
appointments. The agent is responsible for · 
any/all deductibles related to such coverage 
desired on.Company insurance policies. . . . 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CONTRACT: .. January 1, 1982 
bq )J?)-/~ 
B;ret D. Kunz • 
!nsudes!@axxess.net 
www.worldwebarchltects.comfinsurancedeslgtiers 
COMPANY: NIELD, INC . 
. DBA: INSURANCE DESlGNE 
.WITrm'ss COMP ANY. 
¢!fi ~ ·:~-l4·/·~ 
~-;;t~···.· 
. . . . .I .. 
. . . . 
. Tom Nield 
Bryan ·Nle!d 
Benjamin Nield 
Page 9 of 310 
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3) Duration of Relationship: 
4) Relationship: 
5) Responsibilities of Agent: 
6) Responsibilities of Company: 
Nield, Inc. dba: Insurance Designers 
Bret D. Kunz 
lndefinite, or as long as authorized by Board of 
Directors. 
The Rssociation existing between Company and 
Agent. This associntiOJ1 is not an 
Employer/Employee relationship. The agent is a 
sub-contractor and the compall)' provides markets 
through which an agent can place insurance 
business. 
The agent is a sub-contractor and as such has 
responsibility for all expenses related to his or her 
business. This includes, but is not limited to, 
federal, state, FICA, unemployment, nnd local 
taxes. The Company will prov·1de to the Agent n 
I 099 Form showing annual earnings. The c1gent is 
responsible for Workers Compensation Insurance 
on self and employees. Agent is to place al I 
insurnnce business through company. Company has 
final underwriting authority for all business placed. 
Agent lrns responsibility for own h~alth, life and 
other personal insurances. Agent may not place 
insurance business through another company. 
Agent is responsible for afl premium and return 
commissions on business placed. When collections 
are not on time, deduction may be made from 
payment of commissions due. When the collection 
is completed the deducted commission will be p.iid. 
Company will maintain contracts with companies 
for placing of insurances. Company will do all 
billing and accounting functions (except 
collections). Agenl is personally responsible for the 
collection of premi\llnS and returned commissions 
on business placed. The company will provide to 






-------111··,~~itiS!l}BW' J+.\+l.1,J:;'-\--~-----------Pa-ge_1_8_01_31_0 __ 
;,; 
Company will provide agii'1trvi-ctg a~Rtsfriaho Since 1968 
2755 Pole Line Road + Pocatello, ID 83201 l'lgrfid ~rc~s(~$!)le?j;j:~oooa~ nTQl){h{208) 233·4113 
Other functions based on commission split and 
7) Terms of Compensation: 
8) Ownership: 
8) Errors and Omissions: 
Effective Date of Contract: 
Agent: Bret D. K~ _ 
{3~(} / ::;- . 




Agent will receive 80 percent of commissions 
received on insurance placed by agent with 
company. Company will receive 20 percent of 
commissions placed by agent with cornpnny. 
This is subject to change, but only as agreed 
between Company and Agent. The agent will own 
50% of the book of business and the company will 
own 50% of the book of business. If agent decides 
to sell his percent of ownership, the compnny has 
first right of refusal al a price delennined at the lime 
of sale. lf company refuses to purchase, the agent 
may sell bis percenwge of ownership to a licensed 
and qualified agent for the State of Idaho and must 
be approved by the company. A covenant not to 
compete will be included in the contract of sale. 
Agent will keep in force Errors and Omissions 
insurance on agent und employees. This coverage 
wi 11 be purchased as a pa rt of the Errors and 
Omissions policy maintnined by company. The 
agent is responsible for all premiums and 
deductibles assessed by the policy. Jt is understood 
that the Errors and Omissions policy mnintained by 
the company is only for insurance placed through 
the company. 
January l, 2009. 
Company: Nield, Inc. DBA: Insurance Dcsigllcrs 
' President: Bryan Nield 
~7--~ 
Vice r'lcsident: Benjamin Nield 
~ ~,-:,--.., -:Z-c-~ 
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STATE/ AGENCY CODE: ID 23726 ---- --- ----------
AGENCY NAME: 1NSURANCE DESIGNERS 






D OTHER ADDENDUMS 
D GROUP FILE 
DATE: 12/04 - ------
BY; CP (INITT AT c\AIIJed Group, Inc:. 
---- --- ~ur.inca Company 
A!fied Property and Casualty Insurance Company 
Depositors in,1u,Mco Company 
AIDCO 
MARKETING PLAN 
consideration of th¢ mutual obligatioflS herein, this Marl::eting Plan dated this~ .Q 9 day of 
=~=""""""--'...J'l~:+.· ls hllertded 10 S11pplcmc1ll tho agrecmell!s of the parties set forth in !heir Agency 
Agreement dated :loo .'.l , It shall conslit\ltc ~ guhl~ fot the devclopmi:nt of a continufng 
business relationship pursuant to i;aid Agi:tnoy Agreement. The !emu of tlie M~;lc~ing Plan which nre agrrnl upon 
and duty atknowiedged !J.y Company, as (h)fined in the Agency Ag~ment, and Agctll, ns d¢flI'lcd in the Agency 
Agreement,= hereby inc-0rpura!ed Into said Agency Aguement. 
J, Purposr, 
The joint effort of Company 1tnd Agent under this M1nketing Plan shall be to marlcet, sell,. nnd service personal line!I 
property-casun[ty insurance-products. The structurn of their relationship, as s<:t forth in tbi! Mtirkcting Plan and the 
Agency Agreement fnto which it is in\:OipO~lcd, is inu:nde<I to create mutual operational effidenc!11&, Attt1iilnten1 
oftuch <i!!¢mt!ng effioirnde1 will be facil!l!lt.ed by the pl!.11fos' reciproClll commltmenll!. Agent will ltlll18fer its 
outstllnd!ug book of perro!llll lincs propl:rty-casua!ty business to Company within eighteen (18) months of the date 
oflhls Marketlng Plan. During tho 1erm oflh!s Marketing Pinn, Agent will pfoce with Compll!ly all new personal 
lines property.J:asualiy business it writes, When any such business is una~ptablo to Complllly, Agent shall give 
preference fa the placement thereof to Company's bro!mnge, Complllly shall htve the right nnd authority to 
periodically nudit Agent'~ r«ords to confinn i:ompUBnce with th!$ and 11ny oilier provision ofthfa Marketing Plan, 
Tho partic.1! irtitnd that th,>:ir.business logc!her should continually expand and they sJtell agree during ¢;.ch talendw 
year upon a petcent:ageincnmsi, in lhAI year's net pmnium volume which they will CS{a blish as 1helr goal for the 
succeeding rnlcndat year. Should the parti~ bl! unabfo 10 reach agrew11mt cone<;ming such goal fur percnntaga 
increase, 1hcir goal shllll be derermint>d accim!lng to the industry stn1istfos produced by insurnuce industry financiel 
reporting scrvk1:, fot 1he yellf pre-:cding the current ca1endnr year, accord1ng to the following fonnula: 
The ioat for percentage increas¢ In net written premlums shall equal a pcrccn!Hgc, whfch !s the 
average growth in thll homeowntn;, privato auto physical damage, and prlvale auto liahili!y lines 
oflhc prop,;rty,c;uualty insuranell t11dus1TY in tho Agent's slate ofdomfoire, multiplied hy l.5. 
U, Termln.tlo11, 
A. Tttll'.lination at Compwy's optlott, Company mny uailatemlly elect to immediately ccnninotc this 
Mnrkcllng Plan upon the occurrcnco of any of the following evcnrM 
I. Agent has no officer or employCll who i~ a duly Hocnscd ilL'!unmC<.l agent; 
2, Agent is unable to pay ita debt.!~ lhlly matute; makes an Msignmc111 for the benefit of cr.:di!ors; 
is dissolved; has a =lvcr or liquidator appoimed for all or a 5UbstB11tial pnrt of its property; or 
has insolvi:noy, banlcntplcy, ~tganlzatfon, or similarproeeedlng! instituted hy oragainal ii; 
J. Ag~nt or any of its ernp!oyccS mlsllppropriates any ofComp~ny's fum!s or property; or 
4, Ag~I fails to meet any goal forproduci!on lncren~ which is set pu:rsutmt to or es!ablbhcd by tht1 
Marketing Plan. 
E. T,rmimition for ~u!e. If either Party shall vfola!t any of I.he covenants undertaken herein or lilly ofthr; 
dulie;; irupo~ tlpon it by tbls Mmeting Pl!lll, such violation shall entitle the other party to terminate this 
Mnrkeliug Plan; provided that the Pruty d~iring lo ierm!nate for such c,mse shall give !he off coding Party 
al least 30 days wtl(1en no lice oftlu: particulars wherein it i, claimed that there htlll bc~n 11 violation bcrwf 
IUld that, ifnt the end of such time tlio Partynotilled htts no1 removed !he caul!t> ofthc ci:lmplnint or 
rernedied the purjlorted violation, th~ termination of this MaIXe!ing Pl!lll shall be deemed complete. 
C. Termination by mumal ll&t«:ment. Agent and Compnny may tenninate this Marketing Plan on nny 
rnut1.111lly ncceptable tenns. 
D. Termination wilhl'lut cause. Company or Ag~nt may 1crm!na1e the Agency Agr¢emcnt and thl~ Man:et!ng 
Plan wilhout C\ll.lSO upon Written notlco 10 the othtr at leim 36S days prior to tb.c date ofsuch lc1T11lna1ion, 
A.IDCOPhi.t. AE!,l«:mllll (03-04) All S11t;i lh;<Jll CA 
I. 
CJ 




0., 1w ;W,"' 
023726 
III. Producft, 
Company shall provide Agent with the following invmtory of)ler.onal lines ptoperty-casualty in~uran<Xl produola 








Pc~onal Inland Marine 
IV. M11tkeUng SyJtcms and Support, 
fn otde-r w mount llll efficient and economical S41es effort, Cor»J)llllY and Agent will utilize \IMOUS marketing 
tcehniques which may includa dir¢¢1 respon~, telemarketing> dil"Cllt mllil, and e.comomce, All policies will Ix: sold 
on~ direct bill basis ulll~ing Compa11y'$ Kflex-Pny" and/or ·Fle;,:..Cb'ek" payment options. Company wm provide 





Company will pay 11te cost of ux·datlng" 1200 names per year through ifs affiliated tckmatkcling service, 
Agent must provide Comp~ny with WI appmptlaie list of nan1e.<1, phono numbers, l!lld other required 
infotn1alion at 11 time or lim~ ngrcc<l upon by the parties. The cxpiraliom lists obtaif1l!d thereby shall be 
Agent's exclusive property. 
Company will pay all t¢!1SOnab!e cxpcns1;3, excluding salroy and o1llor compensalio11, incurmd by reason of 
the nttcndance of two of Agent'~ li~nsed producers at a Company sales school. 
Company ;>1hall ,upply Agimt with the markeling support services provided through sptillllc Company 
progl'J\rns mill.zed from time to 1ime, 





M~terlals. Company shlil! provide and Agent shill u1lliul salcis brochure$ nrtd other printed mMcrfols 
beruing Company's trad!'illtark which are of the type and quality customarily employed in att imuser--agency 
r1:lationship. , 
Adverti!lng Support - Company shall roimburse Agent in nn arnoont eq\llll to SO% of Agent's cxpepditur,,s 
for ~eligibte ~dvettisingH fn any cakndlll' year, provided, !hat Company's rnaximurn r,xpcnditure therefor 
shall no1 exceed $2,500.00 for the firol ,;,alt:1Jdar Y= hereohnd that for any !Uhsqucnt year ~hall no 1 
exi:ced ~ pf I% oflhal net premium volume produced by Agent for O:impany In the preceding cnkm:lilt 
year. 
In addition, but pursuant to the llmitntion imposed by the maximum oxpenditurc cons1rnint set ou! above1 Company 
sh.all i11creiue ll.ll -percentage reimbursement from .50% many calendll! year by one percentage (1%) for each SJ ,000 
of net premium increase in excess ,;ifS7.'i,QOO duripg !hat calendar year. The Complt!ly shall never provide 
pcrcemage r¢imburscmmt in excess of I 00%. "IlligiblP ndvertis!ng" $hall mean advertise.men~ prepared by 
Company for publication in newspapers oron radfo, nnd the rdmbur,;nblr: cosls thcrrofsh.811 not include ruiy urvice 
charges ofadverthing agencies. Ag¢nt must comply with Company's written roimbu!\$ement procedures. 
V1, l>rocuslng. 
Company will provide irntomatfon to p~ss pirn1011al lines business with Company in H "papcrlcsg• environmc11t, 
Company shllll provide Agent w!lh direct ~sslsllln~ ln pro~ssing the convetslon of It$ exbt!ng book of pi:rsonal 
lines prop<:rty-casua!ty busines$ t.o Company, 
Vll, Remlttao~ of Prtmlums. 
Premiums will bc paid by ln;mre<ls dire.::tly to Company. Hownvcr, ll!ly monies for premiums owed 10 Company 
which rue .:ol!Cilttd by Agtnl shttll be the property of Company and shall be immediately forwarded to Company 
and, while in Agent's posscssiotl, shall bo held in tru.!t for and o» bchJlfofCompany as n fiduciaty tnul. 
AIDC0Plu1 Ait<«n<d! (OJ-i>l) All Sta(tt Ex«pl CA 2 
( 
- - - ----~------·-
Alfled 
Insurance 023726 
vm. Pi:o!ll Shue. 
Pon1o!U\l lin¢_1 ll.!ld e-0mm<::roia! llncs profit share agrtemeo!8 for the bustncS$ placed by Agent with Company are 
attach¢d hereto !IS Addendum A and Addendum B. 
ll 
H l'I 










IX. Control. 4 i 
Where the ltnnS of the Mark~tlag Plan oonflittwith tho rermJJ of the Agency Mrr«roenf, the tcnns of tho Marl:etingl. · 
Plan control, · 
Comprul)' 
AIOCOl'm Ap<entcnt (O:l-¢.1) All S1i!to$ lixetpt CA 




ADDSNJHJM "A" TO MARKETING PLAN 










As con5idernrion for the oxcoulion on evc.n daii: he~wfth ortM Marketing Plan lx,twe.in Agent und ·~;upnny, said 
parties hereby ~nter this Personal Line~ Profit Sharing Agrumenl to he dfo:live January !, ;'). ()p ':L., I :: 
> 1· 
I. Profit Sbanug, 
To cornpeosat¢ Agent for cxercismg sldll, caution, and dliigcnct in the sde~!ion of risks insured by Company, ,1 
Company will pay A~ent a "Profit Share"(!!! beitin define.I) ba!ed on ~Gross Pro11!K (~ hereinafter defined) ( 
rta!Jztd by Company on pcrsonaf l!nC$ business written by Agent under Sll(d Agency Ag~~mmt rf}feraiced in the 
Mrukt)ting Plan, Profil Share ~hnll h<:l cafcu!a!cd using Ille following formula for each "Profit Sharing Year" (as 
herei!lafler defined). 
A, Method and formula, A ~Profit S!rnring Yearn (PSY) i, the .ac~ounting period extending from J(ltl\JBJ}' I 
through D.ccctnb<:lr 31. The fonnule is designed to reflect the profhnbility nf lhci business wrinen by Agent for 
Company on a three ytar avet.1gc which shall Include lho current PSY (tho PSY for which the c11lculntion of 
profll ihJ11111g is being made) and the two PS\''! immediately preceding it (If Agent had no eiisling ag¢r1cy 
relatio11$hip with Comp!ll1y at Iha tim~ oflhe execution oflho Ag¢ncy Agreement, the first PSY calculation of 
Pm fit Shst¢ &holl be made 11Ccoroing co the same Fonnuta, but "Eme<l Premiums" and "Incurred Losses" 
tbereof .shall reflect only the figures for that PSY, and similarly, !he calculation for th~ second PSY ,hall be 
mude using tb1l to111l of the fl&urcs for ll!UTled Premiums and lncurn:d Loss~ rw me first and sc,;:ond PSY. 
Thus:, fonhc stcond PSY only, the calculation thall e!lllst!\Ull'I ;i two yeanwerage.) 
Prom Shim, Formula 
I) Earned Prtmlums (tow! ofcum::nt a.ud two preceding P,'>Y's) ............ ,. .......... -.................. , ... ,,. $ ____ _ 
2) Tow) 7ncuned LOSSC! 
a) fncnrrw Losses (totnl of current uml two pn!ccding PS Y's) (No less thlln zero) ......... ,,...,,$ ____ _ 
b) Stop loM credit ordcbil (current and two prior PSY's) ..................................................... $ ____ _ 
;;) Tollll Incum:<l Losses .................... , ................................................ .,.., ................................ $~----
:S) Incurred Losses Perccn!.!g(! (#2/#1 x !00) .......... .., .................... ., ..... ..,....................................... % 
4) Adjusted Permissible Jncuned Loss Perci;nlllge......................................................................... % 
5) (i'mss Profit Pcrci:ntagc (1/.d -#3) ............................................................................................... % 
6) Current Year Ranted Premium .. -···-................. ............ , ............. ............... , .............................. S:-~---
7) Gross Profit (/IS x #6) .............. u .... ,.,,,,.,,, ...................................... ... .............. . .......................... s.~----
8) Agent's Profit Share Pcroentega .. , .............................................................................. ,................ % 
9) .Proliminuy Agent's Profit Sharo (117 i: 118) ............. ,. ................. , ..... ,.. ....................................... $ ____ _ 
10) Rwuctiou for Delinquencies ............... ,., .......... ,. .................. , ..................................................... $ __ _ 
I l) Preliminl!J)' Agent's Profit Sb.rue Afler Delinquencies (/19. //IO) .............................................. ~·-----
12} Firu,I Agent's Proflt Share (Orcaterof/11 f, 3 year OR 
One year Personal Lfnes J>rofit Shatc Ca!culatlon~) ....................................... ,. ............... ,, S.-~~--
B, Fannulll derI11[1lom (numbm refer lo nl1.tllb¢red i!tma li,1ted under Section A). 
1) Earned Pn:mium~ an:: the wrl1ten pre!lliums on bust11cs.s produced dutlng the PSY minllll tho unearned 
premiums llS of the end oflhe same year p!us !be uncal'lle-O premiums as of the end of\he prior yenr. 
2) Tncum,d Losses 
a) Incurred Losse!! ~ the ntt los,-es paid during the PSY plu9 ttserves for unpaid losses M of the end of !he 
5al!lll year 11nd mlo.us fe1iervcs forunpa[d lo$Se$ as nfthe end oftl!e priot year. Ifa ncgativ~ total resul1s, n 
toro rota! will be used. 
b) lncinrcd Los:!¢S paid or 1'¢mved during n PSY shall l\Ol, for thr; PU!JlOSe of thb Profit Sharing Agreement 
oaly, Include rnorn lhan lhe stop loss limitation ill effect fJ;ir lhnt PSY !l.'l ll result of a si11glo event or i111y ono 
occurnnce, With m~I to any loss which oxcc«fs such stop !os1 limitation a11d which hns not boon paid 
or closed <1! tho end of Ute current PSY, If BnY adjmtrncnl of resorvo or other ctcdil shall tc(lucc the loss to 
M amount below 511fd stop loss fimitalion ia tho PSY, Agent's lnO\lrred Loss05 shpll be reduced only by a 
sum equal to the djlf~n~between said ilop loss llmlt.ation 11I1d the amount of the loss at the end of the 
cun:ent PSY. No reduction in Tncurred Loms ~hBII be 11llowcd in the 11mouot of that port.ion ofsny reserve 
adjustment ot othc-r m:dil by which o.ny loss exceeds ssid s!op loM I Imitation, fn addi1ion, when rncurnd 
Losses arc cnlculsted for any PSY In which II loss Is paid or closed, such lncurred Los.ses shall be iacr~d 
AIDCOPhiJ Ac,«ffl•nl(OJ.o.l) All S111cs 1!:«c;ptCA 4 






by that por1ion of any tcduclion in reserve or othetcrcdil which exceeds the stop foss limilation 1nd for 
which Ag~t rC'lleived credit in My prior PSY. In each year, the stop !oss lirnitntion shall increase or :J 
d«!~ by n percentage equnl to the perc.entage increascur decrease in lbe direct written premiums of the '1 
property and casualty indus1cy in the United S1ntcs cxcludh1g the ind1.1S!r)' toials for the fidelity and surety l ~· 
lines as pul>llshed by imurancc industry financial reporting service for the caltndar yeMtwo years prior to • ,{ 
such Profit Sh~ring Year ("Industry Allmml Adjustment FMtor''). Each year Company shA!I notify tho 1 !1 
Agent ofthe ptre<lnlago increuc or decrease as :roon a~ pfl!ctlcablc nftet1ho Company ri:~ivcs summary :j \ 
&ta. This pcrcentngc incrl:ast or decrease wlll bi, cumul61ivc. However, the amount of the stop [0~3 · • 1 
Hmitl\!ion shsl! never be less !han that which is in effo:l for 1he first PSY h~rcunoor. Company wHl, at its ' 
dimclioll, cs1.ab!ish the dollar amount of the stop ross llm!tatiou as is provided for her®nder and advise 
Agenl on rm annual bMi! of such nmount. The foregoing notwitl!sW!ding. in the CMc; ohrty Loss iJr lo= 
which ace incurml during nny PSY .u a result of wy singfo "catastrophe", r,s dc1c:rrnlnoo by Company, th1, 
stop loss limi!afion to be applied will equal !he~ twenty-five pm:ent (25%) of Earned Pftnliums 
for such PSY orthe 1U110Unt of !ho single occurrence &!op tol! limita!ion M it shall be calculated for such 
l'SY acoording to the tenns of lhls paragniph. 
c} Tct~I fncurrw l&sses is tho 5um oflncutrcd Losses and thoitop loss crtdit or debil, if any. 
3} fncuf(C-0 LosSe$ Pcrccntl1gt;l is cafoulntcd by dividing elte Total Incurred Losse:i by the Earned Premiums and 
multlplyl11g by 100. 
4) Adjus1ed P,:rmissibfa Incurrtd Loss f'«centago is n pere.:mtago figure bctweM S8% and 65% which i, 
dttem1ined based on Agent's i:tct\llll commissfon dC>!lars pa!d in tbe PSY. Businm written at lower tommis.sion 
levels will cause the permissibfo loss mlio 10 be adju51e-O upward 11nd businf!s written at higher commission · 
levels will cause tha pcnnJ~slble loss I11lio lo Ix; adjusted ~ow award. 
$) Gross Profit Pucentegc is calculated by m1btracting the Joourred Losses Pcrecntage from the Adjusted 
Pctmisslblc !n(lllrn:d Lo~s Pei-ctt1!Jlge. lftha diffcrcntc Iii mro or ncgntive, no further Profil Slturo oalcu!Mion 
will be made. 
6} Current Year Earned Pamlum fi Earned Preoiiuni for tho calendar year ln which !he Profit Share calculation is 
being inadc. 
1) GroM l'Nfit i9 calculated by mul\iplyin.s Current Year EHrn~d Premiums by the Gross Profit Percentage. 
8) Age111 'a Profit Sbnn, t'erce!Jls.gc. 
Current PSY Writt11n Premium• 
0 t<;> 399,999 
400,000 lo 474,999 
475,000 10 549,999 
550,000 to 649,999 
650,000 to Over 
I 6-scn L's Profit Share Percen\ng~ 
lVw u 2 Year O 3 Year++ 
Pnyout % Pnyout % Pnyout o/o 
IS% W'~ 30"/o 
20% 25% 35% 
1S% 30% 40% 
30% 35% 45% 
3S% 42% SO% 
•Written Ptcm!um ls .{Krsonal !ine:1 premium written hy Agent in Company except !hose applic11b!c to flood, 
umbtenn~, assigned risk insurance polleies, earthquake, fidelity and su~ty bonds and f'cc:a appl!cab!c to !he 
Michigan C4tas1rophic Claim:! AllsociaiiMs eMCCA''). Writkn Premium is suhje¢l to nnnual changes bascd 
on tho Industry AnnUBl Adjuslmc:nl Ft11otor as determined by Company, !iaoh year Company shall notify the 
Agent of the percentage increas¢ or decrease 115 $OOn as practicable !lfler Company rc;e.civcs summruy data. 
Thfs ps1r,:emage increase or deart.aSe will Ix; cumulativ¢, · 
• •11tc "Yu r Payout" column U$¢d corresponds to the mimber of years ei;pcrlcnce utillud in calculating lh; 
Profit Share fo rmula o.s explained In Section l(A). 






9) Prdltnlnary Agent's Profit Share ti determined by multiplying Gross Profit by the applkab!e A gen l's Profit 
Share p<:r-c¢ntagc. 
10} Reduction for Dolinqutncies ls calculated as a re<luclion of Preliminary Ager1t\1c f:'rofit Share by 8% fo, (:j\Ch 
lllOllth during the PSY Ulllt Agent's account(a) with Co1rtp1my is(are) delinquent pursu1U1t to tho ten:ns of tho 
Agtncy Ag.re=cnl. 
11) Preliminary Agent's Profit Sbaro Alier Delinquencies ;hall be calculat,;d by subtracting ,my Rcduelion for 
Delinqucndes from Pr<:!iminary Agent's Profit Sh~rc. 
12) Fi111l1 Ageut'J! Profit Sharo is tho i,l'CUlerof Prcliminirry Agent's Profit S!Jlll'O After Delinquencies calculation& 
under this Agr«ment or Agent'll on<1y¢arprofit share c;ilcul~ted \lfider Al!etnativc Addclldum A. 
II, Other Provl!lom. 
A, Tho fori:golug calculations shall be made awually by Company for !he cl.l!Tcnl PSY !IS t,aon 11fur ,December 31 
thereof~ i! rcasonablypractiC<Jblc. 
B, Company rc<:ords thall bo con!ldered bind!ng and 1;-0nclusive ns to n!I infonnntion pertaining to this /\g1c:cmc11t. 
C. Profit Shan:, !f any, i! not payable unles:; Agent hns complied with all the terms oflhc Agency Agreement and 
Mark~!inB Agreement. Agent smill nefthor deduct from its account(s) nor in lllly other manner anticipate Profit 
Share. 
D, Thi!! Agrcelll¢nt shall e-0ntinuc until terru.innted (l) by either Party upon written notice ro the other, (2) by 
pgretment of the PartiM,or (3) by tctnlination ofllte Marketing Plan or Agency Agreement. in th,HVCDI 11f 
termination of this Agn:emcnt, n ft!lBl Prem Sham calmilaliOll shall be made and a fioal P(ofi1 Sham ,ball be 
paid (ihpplichbltt) for tM PSY in which tenninatioll 1101iC!l is given bu1 nol prior to tho timn such final Pwfit 
Share would have o1hecwise been ca[culal«I-Orpaid hnd !hfaAg;ri:;;!l:ient not terminated, The foregoing 
ootwHhsronding, if thb Agrc:emen! teTJl'linst~s and Agent retairtS or has put ln place f\llO!her Company profit 
sharo ugr«ment whlch i.nolu de$ pc!'llon~ line!! blll!inc11, vrofit sfmre wlll only bl, paid pursuant lo the rotained 
or new profit thate agn:ement nnd no profit elmc wlll ho paid under this Agreement. 
E. This Agreement or rigbt.s hcn;:undcr m not asslgnnb!o without Compmy'a written pcrm1s$ioo. 
F, This Agreomont may be a!!cR:d or =raided by CompB.lly, unilatcnilly and at any time, hy maillng written notice 
then:of to Agent. Any such notkc riilllt be malled nt least 90 .days prior to lhe beginning of the PSY during 
which the change i! to oo effective, ex~epl that annua! changes ba~d on the fndustry Annual Adjustmcnl Factor 
will bl, cornll\Un!catcd to A.gent as won M prectiaable. 
G. The ca!culntfon of Agont's Profit Share he~under shall include nil pen;onal lines premiums, loss¢$, nnd loss 
ro!crves chargeable to Agent by Compl!ll}' except !hose applicable to flood, nonstandm aulo, umbrolla policies, 
!lSSi,&ncd risk policies, earthquake, flde!il)' and surcly bonds, and Michigtn Catastrophic C!o1rn1 Association . 
















As consideralion for the execution on <:)Ven dale herewith oflhe Marketing Plan bi:tWCj)n Agent at1d C<ml_]cJ; s:r ' J 
pa,ties hereby cnter this Ahtma1ive PersoMI LiMs Profit Sharing Agr~ment to be effecrive January l, , ·, L. 
One Year Personal Llllt$ Profit Sbatlng Agri,emtnt 
r, Profit Sharlng. ; l 
1'0 compensate Agent for ~emlsing skill, Clliillon, and diligence in the sele;;tion of risks inillmi by Company, .j [; 
Company will pay lo Agent a nprofit Share" (l!S heNin11fterdefuied and Clllculated) based on naruH Profitrt (nt. ,·1 
hereinafter defined) r~alizcd by Company on business written by Agent umler said Agtncy Agre¢menl rtferwccd In 
the Marketing Plan. Th\l Profit Share ~hall bo C11!culs~d using the followlng fomm1a for each "Profit Sharing Ye11r" 
(e! hcreinafttt defined), 
A, Methoo and fonl1ula. A "ProfH Sharing Year' (PSY) shall be defined as me nccoUJ1tl11g pc:nod ~tending from 
January l through De~mbcr 31 <>f each ca lend.Ir ye11r during whlcb !his Agn:erncni i! !n effe(;t, The calcula1ion 
Qf .my Pro flt Share earned by Age!\! pursuant lo tllls Agreement for any PSY shall be ma.de acwrding to Ihe 
following Pro flt Shnrc Formula. · 
Proflt Sb11rt Formula 
1) Earned Ptcmiu[l!S (current y¢i!t),.,., .......................... .,..,,,,., ............................ ,., ............ S ___ _ 
Z) focurn:d L,mes 
a) Incurri;d Losses (no less llrnn Z!;l'Q) .. ,,,., ............................. $. ____ _ 
b) Stop Lo:is Credit or D~bit ...................................... , ............ s. ____ _ 
c) Total Incurn:<l Losses ........... ,,.,,. ............. ., ... , .... ,. ........ ,. ....................................... ,.$ ____ _ 
3) JnClll1«l Losset1 Percentage 
n) Incurred Losses P~rc¢ntage (1121111 x I 00) ......................... % 
b) Unifonn Loss Development Pmectag~ ............ .,,.............. % 
o) Total Incurred Los.Ills Per<:entagc, ...................... , ............................... , .. ,,, .. ,,, ......... __ ~ __ % 
4) Gros.s Profit Pcree)l!Jlgc (.56.0% • #J) ............................................. ,,............................. % 
.'i) Oro!! Profit(fil x #4) .......... ,. ........ , ..................................................................... ,,,,,,, .. $. ____ _ 
6) Agent's Profit Shere ( ___ ,;Y. x #:$) .............................................................. : ................ s._~---
7) Reductfou forDelinquencies, ......... , ......... , .................... , ... , ..... ,,,,;,..,, .... , .. ,,, .................. S _____ _ 
8) P~liminmy Agent's Profit Share Al\er Delinqu¢ncies (#6 -117) ................................... S. ____ _ 
9) Final Agent's Profit Share ............ , .. , ........... ,., ............................................. , ......... , ....... S._~---
D. Formui.a d,;finillons (nummrs refer to rwmbered items llsttd under Section A}. 
J) Ean\t<l Premiums an: delin.cd es th(I wrirtcn prcm ium$ on bu,ini:.ss produced by Aa¢nl during the Profil Sharing 
Year mlnra the untamed prcmiuiru as of th~ t:nd of the same year plu~ tlu: untnmcd premiums M .of the end of 
the prior year, 
2} Incurred lo!!CS 
(a) Incurred Lo~es arc defined M the net losses pAid during the Profit Sharing Year plus rcscrv(-5 for unpaid 
Jo$$¢~ Moffue end oflhe 5flm<I year lll1d minus !"Q&ef\'e.'i for unpaid losse~ as of1he end ofilui prior yesr. 1f 
/l ncg§liYq total rgjul(& 3 Uto tota\ will l;o \l~. 
{b) Incurr«i l.<w;e!I paid ot reserv«l during a Profit Sharing Yt:M. shall not. fi!I the pumo,,;e of\J)is PtQfi! 
Sharing Agw:mcnt only, mclude morn than \he stop loss lltnitntlon in offect fonhe Profil Sharing Year as a 
result nf11 ~ingle cvm1 or lll1Y one occumuoo. Whh rc~p<:&! to any !on which oxce~ds i;uch stop lo~ 
limi~tion and which has not been paid ot clo!td al tho end of the lltl.ll'<:lll P$Y, if any sdjustmentofreserv.:i 
oror:herm:<lit sha!I n;dlllle lhe loss to an amount Mfow sa!dstop lo,s !imitation in the PSY, Agent's 
rnouncd Losses shall bc reduced only l>y a sum equal to the diffcrenco between said atop 11)1S limitation 
and the amount of the loss al the end of the cutrcnt PSY. No m{uotloo l11 lnournd Louos shall be allowed 
In tht omo\lrtt of that portion of 1my r<:SIIIYC acljustmcot or other credil by which any loss exceeds said stop 
r~ Hmi!alion. TII addition, when lncurrtd Loam arQ calou!Bled for ~ny PSY in which a loss ls paid or 
., 
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which exceeds tho stop los., llml!atlou ~11d for which Agent received credit in any prior PSY, lri l!Jlclt yeM, :/ 
!ho slop toss Umilacion shall lncrcnse or decrea11e by a petcentage ~uul to the pe~¢ntage increasa or -1 
rl!."lrease ln the direct wrillen pitrnlums of the property and ca.~u•lty industry in lhe Unittd S1ar.s (group l J :: 
and Z) excluding !ht: iudusu:y total tot fidelity l!lld ~uroty Jines Rs published by in5urallec indusrry firnmcial .1 
reportiag servico for 1h11 ctlfcndar year two years prior to such Profit Sharmg Year("lndustry Annual '., r. 
Adjusrmenl ractor'1, Eacb yell.I' the Company &ltn!I notify Agent of the pnri;cauige incrc= or decrease llS ', ( 
~on as practicable Afu:r the CQmpl!lly reccivd summary data. However, the amouul oflhe stop loss H 1 
lim!tn1iun shall never be less thM that which is in eff~ for the firs! PSY hmundcr. This percemngc · 
incrcaso or de~ will be cumulative. Company shall, at its discretion tstab!ish lhe dollar amount of the 
~10Jl loss limitation llS Is provided for hereunder. Compimy will ~dvlse Agenl on Ill\ annu11l b~~is of such 
amount. tn add!llon, !he: foregoing notwlths1anding, io the ca.'lll of any loss or losses whi¢h MO Incurred 
during nny PSY a:s n result of any ainglc "catastrophe", as defined by Company, lhc s-top Ills~ limimlon co 
b<: llJlplied ~hall equnl 1he m,tler oftwenty•five percent (:25%) of Earned f>rtmiurns for such PSY or tho 
JUTiount of the single occurrence stop 10!.S llmitalion as it shall be ca(culalc<l for such PSY according 10 the 
terms oflhis pmgraph. 
c) To!AI Jncumd Losses shall be the sum ofrncurtcd LQsses and the stop loss cttdl! or debit, if 11ny. 
3) rncurred Losse~ Percentage 
a) Jucum:d Losses P<:rcentllge is calculated by dividing th~ Total Jnqirn:i;f Losses by !he Earned Pr.niiums 
o.nd rnulliplying by 1()0. 
b) Uniform Loss Development Perc~tiigc is a pcrc~nlRge def med by Company and is upd11tcd anrtuaH'y. 
c) Tollll lncutred LoS$cs Pcrcc11ragc Is lhc ~um of the Irt~urrcd Lossa Pm:entage and Unlfann Loss 
Development Percentage .. If such Percentago is ~ler than 56.0%, no furthtr e-0lculntion wlll be made. 
4) Gron Profit Pcrccnt!lge is caloulattd by subtracting the Toial Incurred Losses Pen:cntoge from 56.0%. 
!i) Gnm Profit is t'<llculntcd t,y multiplying Smned Premiums by the Gro!S Profit Pcn:cntsgc. 
6) Agtnt's Pi:ofit Sha.re shall be cafculattd by multiplying the Gross Profit by that percentage ut forth on Ex!tibit 
A. herelo. Wnt~n premium for 1he pufPOSC of this Cfflcula!ion step includes all pcnonal and commm:ial lines 
j)renilum written by Agenl in Company and Its affilintt fosunmce companies excqit those app!icablo to flood, 
umbrel!a.1:, assigned risk insunince policies, c:arthquako fidelity and surety bonds and lho Michigan Cainslrophic 
Cfai1J1s Aa&oolatlon. The wrilten premium range will increase ordccressi: annufllly bal,ed on the pcreenlagc 
iaoN:= or decrwS¢ ln 1he rndusrry Allllual AdjustmMt Factor. Each year Compwy will notify Agent of th¢ 
pcrcenlagc inm:nse or d~rcasc 8.!I soon as pl'llcticiible, The pm:entngc increase or dccrnnse will be cumulative, 
7) Reduction for Delinquencies is calculated as a Il:ducrioo of Ag~nt's Profit Shll!e by 8% for each month during 
the PSY 1hnt Agtnt's 11ccount(s) with Company ls(ttr<i) delinquent punlunnt to the tem1g of the Agency 
Ag~¢rmnt. 
8) P~limlucy Agent'u Profit Share Afler Delinquencies sh~ll be calculated by subt:racliug ony Reduction for 
Delinciurnci«:.'I ftom Agent'! Profit Sh.are. 
9) Final Agerll't Profit Share is the greater of Pceliminary Age11t'a Profit Shijrc Aflcr DcltnqueMies c~lcul111ions 






rr, Olher Provh!otu. 
:i 
A, The 1orcgoing elllcu!e1!ons ahell bo made annm!ly by Company tor the cumntProfil Sh:nring Year as soon after 1 
Deeemb~r 3 l therwf as Is I1!SSOI1Jlbly pn1c1icab!c, 1 · 1 
B. Company records sru.11 ht Mnsldered binding and wnclusive M tn all fnformaUon pertaining to this Agn:e:Iilcnl, J ·: 
C. The Profil Share, if any, i~ not payable unless Agent has compiled wltha!!lhc tcnns of the Markcling Plan and· ~ t, 
ii$ Agtncy Agreement. Agenl mall neither deduct from it& acMunt{s) nor In any other mimnor antfolpate Profil ', ·,: 
D. ~t:Agrn;m~nl shell continue until terroln~tcd (I) by either Party U!)l:)n written notice to tho othet, (2) hy ] 
agceemrnt of!he Parties, vt(~) by temiinatlon of the Marketing l'Ja11 or Agency Agreement. In the eviml of 
l¢tn1!nation of this Agrumcnt, a final Profit Share Clllculalfon shall be mado and a flnnl Profit Shlll'll sbsl! be 
paid {Jfappli®ble) for the PSY In which tennlnatlon notice is given but not prior to the lime mi.b fiual Ptofit 
Shure would have, otherwist ~ll catcula!cd or paid had this Agre¢mcnt not terminated, The foregoing 
notwil115tnndiug. if thi! Agreement terminate, artd Ageni retairu or has put in pfacc Mother Compnny profit 
~han: agmcmeut which include~ pertollll! !ines busim:55, profit shim, will only be paid punruant to tho retained 
or new profltsharo ag~mcnl and no profil share will be paid under !his Agreement. 
fl, This Agreement ot rights hereunder shall no! be osslsnable without Company's expr~~s pennis:sion. 
11. This Agrc<;ment may b¢ nttered or run.ended by Company, uni!atcntlly tind D-l any time, by mailing wrlm:n notke 
thcrtaf!o Agent stating when thcrtafkr such alti;rntion or lll!lendment shall be effective. Any such nolli:t: must 
bu malled at l¢ast 90 days prior to 1bi:: lx:girmi!lg of the PSY during wblclt the alten1tion or amendment is lo be 
effective, except that annual o1rnnges bl!Svd on the Jrnlusi!)' Annual Adjuatmr;nl Factor will be communicated to 
Agent 11.1 soon as practlc~hfo. 
G. The enlculation of Agent's Profit Share hereunder shall fricludc 1111 personal linos premiums, losses, Md !os5 
rcserv(S chargeable to Agent by Company except those appllcabk to flood, nonstimdiml auto, umbr.::lla )Xlliole5, 
aMi&Jled rlsk polfcil;l!, earthqllllkc, fidelity a!lll surety bonrus, and Michigan Cutastrophic Chim3 A.ssooln!ion. 
H, Pn:,nt Share ca!cu!nted punluant to thi! Addendum A. OM Year Alt<'!Illllivc ~hall M due 11nd payable lo Agenl 
only when ii exceeds !ho profit abaro Cl!!culatcd JlUl1lUWl to Adrleudum A (thr<:e--yi:l\Halcufation) ofth~ 
Mllrkirtiug Phm, Ill such a i:a.sc, no prol'it ~hM~ will then bo due and payable p\WlUant to Addendum A (thtec-
yu.r calcutat1011) of tho Mnrxeling P!rui, 
9 




ADDENDUM "B" TO MARKETlNG PLAN 
Commetcbl Lines Pront Sh1.rlng Agr~ment 
As considmtfon for the c;,;ecutioo on even duce herewith of the Mnketing Plan between Agent and Company, sald 
pnrties hereby en~r this Commercial Linc3 Ptofit Sharing Agrtement effective Janulll)' I -0f llilY ytar !o which 
Agent mccu that rcspcdive ytar'{) minirnuOl !hrcshold ("Commercial Li11es 'fhresbofd") ofpmonal line! direct 
Millen premium placed wi1h Company, excluding flood, nonstandard auto, umbre!JM, assigned riil: insu,ance, 
earthquake and th11 Michigan Catastrophic Cfllim~ Association. 
I. Profit Shining. 
To compensate Agent for excr<;i!ing siciU, caution, Md diligence in the sde.ct(on of commcrcial lii1cs risks Insured 
by Company, Company will pay lo Agent a "Profit Shnre" (M hcn:inafter defined) ba~d on ~Gross Profit" (a! 
hereinafter defmed) roalizcd by Company ou i;ommcrcial llrtes business written by Ag.;:n! under said Agency 
Agrt<imer1trefcrtnced in the Marketing Pltill. Th,;; Profit Share 5hall be calculated usiog the following fonnuta for 
CllCh ~Profit Sharing Year' (as hcrt;inaftcr defined). 
A. Method nnd formula. A "Profit Shmhig Year' (PSY) i11 tho nccol}ntlng period citcnding fron1 January I 
through December 31. The formula is dcsigntd 10 reflect the profitability of the buslnc6!1 writ1ct1 by Agent 
for Company on a three year average which shall include lhc current PSY (the PSY for which the 
oaloulnt1on ofptoflt sharing is being made) and lhc two PSY's iml'l\c<llaiely preceding it. (Jf Agent had no 
existing agCJ1cy relationship with Company al the time of the txc-oution of the Agency Aarocmcnt, the fir&I 
PSY calcu!atfon of Profit Shnrc shall bo madl' iccording to ·the SMlC Fonnuta, but ''Comm~rofal Llncs 
Enmed Prerrti~lM" nnd "Commercial Lines lncurrro L()$st5" !hereof shall reflect only the figures for !hat 
PSY, and similarly, the calculnlion for the se(ond l'SY shall be rnsde using the total of lhe fig,m:s for 
Commercial Lines Earrttd l'romiums !llld Comme1vlal Lines lu~um:tl LoSSCil for the fir.st and second PSY. 
Thus, for the S¢cond PSY only, the ca!culatio11 shall constitute n two yelll'aYi\fllgO.) Agent'$ ~O!llnleroial 
lines: buslm:,i.s for Compnny shall be detel'.!'llfned from tho ComJ)llny's product!on tte-Ords. 
Profit Shnro Formula 
(l) CornmcroiaJ Lines Eamed Premiums (for current sod two prior PSY't} ............... S---~--
(i) Commercial L!ac! lncp trcl tosses 
(n) Commar.:ial Line1 fncurnd L-Oss~ 
(forcurrtnt and two priorPSY's) ........................................ $ ___ _ 
(b) Stop Loss Credit or Pe bit (current and two prlor PSY's) ... S.~ ---
(c} Total Commercial Lines !ncum:d Losses ........................ ............................... s _____ CC' 
(J) lncuttc-d Lo~ses Percllnt.agc (1!21/H X 100) ........................... .,.......................... ..... % 
(4) Gross. Profit Ptrcen111gc (4:!.0% -1/J)................................ .. .................................. o/. 
(5) Oros~ Profit (Sci:: l.B.5., cu!Tllnt PSY only) ........................................................ s ____ _ 
{6) Adjusted Agrnt's Balanc~ Charged Off ............... , ..... .. .... ... ........................... , ..... s ____ _ 
(7) Net Pro flt (#S -116) .................. ,. .... "' ................................. ......... ......................... .,, S~---
(8) Agent's Profit Sb~tll (50% x #Tj .............. ,, ............................ : ............................... $ ___ ~ 
(9) Reduction (or De:lirtqu.enciea .......................... , ........ ......... . - ........................ , ... ,;,,. .. $ _____ _ 
( I 0) Fi1111l Agent'~ Profit Share (/18 -119).: ........................... .......................................... Se-- --
B, Fo!Tllula. Dcfinil!o!\S, (Numbe1'! refer to numbered Items !ist<:d un.det Si;etfon A). 
I. Commercial Lines Earned Premiuim 111'.c defined eu1 !.he commcroial lines written ~111iums on 
busincs~ produced du.ring tba PSY mirtus tho commercial lino~ unearned premiums as of the ond of tho 
BB me year plu1 the commercial lines unGamcd pruoiums u of the end of the prior year. 
'2. Commcrc!til lncum:d Losses 
a) Commercfel Lrnes Incurred L<lS3c! arc defined S.!l the net ]Mses paid d1tring tho PSY plus reserYi:s 
for unpaid losses~ of the end of the same year IUld minus reserves forunjlaid loss~ as of tho ertd 
or the prforyur. 1f11 negatiV!l total resull$, I\ zero tot.al will be vsw. 
b) Such Incurred Lusscs paid orremved duriag II PSY sbRll no!, for the pul'jlosc of this Commercial 
Linc~ Profit Sha.ring Agreement only, include more lhun the stop loss limitation in effect for that 
PSY l!.11 llft&Ult ofn &Ingle event or llllY ooe ocourrcnce,. Whh rcspecl to nny (oss which c:,,;ctcd~ 
such ~tQp lol! Hrnitacion nnd which bas 001 beta pnid or closed at the end oftl]e current PSY, if 
any ndjusunont of re.serve or other crwil shall red Uc¢ the Ios.s to an amount below uld stop loss 
!imiflltioo lo tho PSY, Agent's Incurred Losses shall be reduced only by a sum cqUl!I to 1he 
AIDCOPhls Airctmtnt (03,!>l) A!l St.tu l?ll'tpt CA 10 
I .'. 
I I' . ·' 
' n 
\l 





diffc~nce between iraid stop loss lirnirarion and the amount of the loss ot 1hr, end of thecummt J 
PSY. No reduction in Tncumd Losses sholl be oHowi:d rn the smount of that portion -0f nny . 
re~rve a.djus1men1 or olber cm:dil by which sny los, exceeds sal(l stop loss limitalion. la additloo, :J . 
whea Incurred Loss~nrc <:fllculau:d,for any PSY in which a lo" is paid or closed, such fncurrnd .! 
Loss~s shall be Increased by thnl portion of any redvcrion in reserve or other credit which exe¢«ls J ·J 
thti ~top loss !lmilfllion and for which Agenl f'OC{ived credit in any prior PSY, In each ye~r, the . f 
i!Wp loss limitation .,ball inctease or dccR'<15C by a percentage equal to tltc p01'¢Cn!nge lncrcnso or • .i 
decrea$0 in tbc direct written prem[ums of the property Md casualty indus!l')' in the United Sto~ ' ' l 
excluding the Industry total for Fidelity rutd Sun;ty lines as publishe<l by insunum: industry 
financial ~por1iug servie(S for the two c.1le!ldnt years prior 10 such PSY ("fndllstry Annual 
Adjustment Factor"). Each ye11r Complllly aha I! 1101ify Agent of the pncetllage incl'lln.se or 
decrclllle as soon us plllclic.\lbb ancr the Company receives !Ummary data, Howev~. ihe amount 
of the stop loss1!mharion shall never bo Im than that which Is In cffcci far the first PSY 
hereunder. Thi~ perocnt~ge inmiise or dccmiso will be cumulativo. Com patty shall nt its 
discrcl!ol) establish lhn dolla.rftil'IO\lJlt oflhe stop lo~3 fimi1ation as is provided for hctcuttdcr. 
Company will a.dvis¢ Agent on nn lll)nual basis of such amount. In addition, the foregoing 
notwithstanding, in the c~c: o( imy loss or losses which nre incurred during any !'SY ll5 11 result of 
any single ffcanl!ltrophtt, as ddintd by Com puny, the stop los1 limitation to be 11pplic<l shall equal 
tho ~twcnty-Jlve pe~nt (25%) of~d Prem[ull\S for such PSY or the am<JU/1! oft ho 
single cx:i:urrence stop los.s lirnitalion B.!I ii shall be calculated for such PSY aci;ording lo tho terms 
of this paragraph. 
c) Total Commercial Lines lncutred Losses is tho sum of Commercial Lines Incurred Lo~cs and the 
stop fosg credit or debit, If any. 
3. Incurred Losie! l'crcenl.ogo i! calcu!ntcd by dividing Tota! rnc11rn::d Losgcs by Earned Pmnh,nis and 
mul1iplying by JOO. Jfsuch Pem:n~gc i, greater than 45.0"/o, no furthcrca!cularion will be made. 
4. Gross l'tofit Perccotnge is calculated by subtracting Incurred LOSSC3 Percentage Jrom 45.0%. 
5. Gros., Pi:ofil is ca..lculated by multlplying Earned Piemiums, forlhe cu.rrcnt PSY only, by the Gross 
Profit Pcrccntalj;e. 
6. Adjusted Agent's Ba Jene¢., Charged Off shall be the amount ofcomn1ercfol lines premium from 
Agent's Insureds which Company write; offll.'l uncoll~ctibll' during tho PSY multiplied by 0,4~. 
7. Net Ptol11 sh nil~ ~!cu lated by tnhtracling tho Adjmted Agent's Bn!nncea Ch.atgtd Off from Gross 
Profit 
8. Agent's Profit Sh~ siJ,,.!I be calcul ated by mult!plylng tho Net l'rofil by 50.0%. 
9. Recu~tion for D0-linq11t11clcs is calculated ns a reduction of Agent's Profil Share by 8% for eaeh month 
during the PSY that Agent's acrount{a) with Company i,{are) delinquent putsum11 to the terms of the 
Agenoy Agreement. 
10, final Agent's Profit Shttrc sb.all be calculated by imbttactfng any Reduction for Delinquenoies from 
Agent's Pro flt Share. 
H, Other ProYbion,. 
A. The foregoing calculations shall be made oun\lally by Company tor the C\111ellt PSY as soon after 
December 31 thereof os is muonably prnctioab(e. 
B. · Company records !hllll be considered binding BJ1d conclusive as lo a.II fuf<mnation pcrtnintng to Ibis 
Agreement, 
C. The Profit Shatt, if any, i, not payable unle!$ the Agent bas oompli~d with All the terms oflbe Mnrkeling 
Plan SJJd !he Agency Agrumcnt. Agent wall neither deduct from ii~ l!Cc<Junt(s) nor in nny other mmner 
anlicipnte Proflt Share. 
D. This Agrcemc:nt aha!! continue Ulltil wminoted (I) by either Party up-0n written notice to the other, (2) by 
agrccmetlt of tho Patties, or (3) by tcrm!nntion oft he Mnrket!ng Pinn or Agency Agreement. [n tho event 
oftem1ill.lltlon of this Agreement, n fioal Profit Shim, calculation srnill be made and II lilllll Profit Share 
!hall be pai4 (if applicablo) for the PSY in which temiination t101ice ls g!vco bul no! prior to the time such 
final Profit Shate would havo otlmwisc been cs.Icutat~d or paid had tliis Agreement not tenninat<:d, 'rhc 
foregoing notwilhst.anding, if this Agrmntnt ltrmlnates and Agent retains orhns put in pince Mother 
Company profit ghm agreement which lnoludes e-0mmetclal l[nes. b11~iness, profit w are wlll only be paid 
pursuant to the retained or MW profit sbare a~ment and no profit shm: w!U be po.id 11nder this 
Agrccmcnl. 
II 








E. This Agn:<::ment or rights bercimder shall not be as!lgnab!e without Company's eKpre$S pcnnission. 1 ,: 
F. 'rhla Agreement may be 111leri::d Qr lllllended by Company, vnilaterally rutd at any fimi,, by maiting wriu~n :1 
no!iC11 thorcof to the Agent 6tllting when 1herel'lftcr such aicerttion or ammdment shall be effective. Any ,I 
,uch notice must be mailed al lcJISt 90 dayg prforto the begl1111lng oflhe PSY during which the alteration or l ·; 
mimdmcn1 is to b<re!fcctive, except that ru,nl.litl chnnges biised on !he Jndustry Annual Adjustmet11 Fuctor - · · 
will bc1:ommunicated tn AgenlM soon 113 practi~b!e. '.: h 
G. The talculalian of Agenl's Profit Share h~,::under shall include all commercial lines premiums, losses, and ' l:J 
los! n:$Cl'V~ ch9!8e.able to Agent by Company except tno~ app!k11ble to flood, nons!lUldard auto, umbrel!a.1 
po lid~. asdgned rlsk po!icfos, l!llrthqunke, fidelity ~nd surciy bonds, and Michiga!l Cauistrophic Clal!llS 
Aswciaiion. 
H. Each yer,r Agent mus! meet the Comme-roial Lin011 Threshold (Qr n profit share calculation to be made 
pursuanl to this Addendum B. Thi.' Commercial Liu~ ThrtsMld is subject to l!llnual ch1111ge bastd on !he 
Industry Annun! Adjustment Factor as determined by C,mipany. Each year Company thall notify Agent of 
the percentage increase or de.crease ns soon as p111c1icablt, This pe-rc~n!!l.gec increase or deer~= will be 
cumulalivc. Addendum I, Agency Profit Sbarin,$- fropcrty/Casu111ly, $all be suspended for the PSY 
~ffc;::tivc Jan\.UlCY I of nny ye!ll" in which Ag~nt meets the Commtroial Lines Threshold. ff the Comrnercial 
Lines Threshold is not met, profit srnue for wmm~lal lints wm be cakulatcd un1kr A\ldendum I. When 
caku!nting profit share iiurauant to Addendum r any PS\I it i, in foroe, the bu$itle!s Included in Addendum 
A and Altema1ive Addendum A Personal Linc~ profit ihnre calculations shall not be Included in the 
Addendum I profit sharti Clllcufation, thereby limiting the calcuh11ion ti,) oommeroial Jin~. but the annual 
written premium runounls set forth in tlie 111.ble In Exb.ibil A to Addendum r shnll he those gros5 commetdal 
lines nnd pcrsonal liMs prcmlu= on polfoics written by Asen1, (;l'~p! those applicable to flood, \lnlbre1ln 
po!ici~, assigned risk polidcs, earthquake, fidelity Md !llrety bond,, and Mkbigatt CMalitrophia Claims 
Aswcl11tion, in Company d11ring the profit sharing year Its$ premiums on jlolicies that nrc cnnce!ed filld/or 
retumtd. 
I. Provlsion lI.H, above notwilfuilanding, In the event Addendum A lo !he MMketing Pfon {!ho !'crwnal Lfoeg 
Profit Shruing Agreement) h83 no! been made cffetlive the same y,;ar a~ the year tho Marketitlg Pl!lll i! 
tlattd, cn!ou!ations of commercial lines prnftt diare will be maifo nnly pursuant to Addendum r, Agency 
Profit Sharing~ Property/Casualty until such PSY in which. Addendum A to tho Matka:ling Plan (the 
Pcr&0rta! Llnes Profit Sharing Agwement) h effootivc. 
ll 




OPTION TO PUl<CHASE AGREEMENT 
rn e-0nsidcro1fon of their cxcculion on even date he~with -0f their Agency Agreement and/or Markc!fng Plan, 
Company, as defined w 1h11 Agency Agreement Md/or Marketlng Plllll (hereinafter "Com_pany•) nnjl,...---
----------~-~~-~-(hereindler "Agent") hereby agrten~ follows: 
WITNESSll.TH: 
!. Agent gronls to CQ ny a first right ofrefusn! oplion to purch~c (a) the b of business Agent Wrilca in 
Comp~ny nrtd its affilin d insul'llnce i:ompanies ("the Option DQ{)k") and Agent's inmmnee ~gency 
businc,s as a goin8 conce ("lhc Agtncy"), !n the event Agtnt desim sell the Option Book or the Agi:ncy 
and meiveJ,. bona fide w n off<:r frorn a third party lo pun;hiuo o Option Book or the Agoncy. Age,11 
shall present the writt¢n offer Compnny, and Compnny ,hall ha 14 days to nolffy Agent ot'Comp!llly'S 
decision wnccroing, whelhcr or 01 l{l pu~hasc the Option Boo r llte Agency for a prl0¢ t4ual 10 tho bona 
fide offer from the third pany, If ompany declines in writin o pul'Chll-lie the Option Book or the Ag~ncy or 
if Company rails to mpond to Ag wi1hin the 14 day peri , Agent mlly ~l! tl1t1 Option Book or the 
A$ency to the thitd party. 
2. ConcuITTnt will; the l'iXctefse ofCompan of eitl!erop n ro purchase pun,uant to the first right ofrtfusal B¢l 
forth in Pllt!l.!lrilPh 1 above, an,! !lt materfa onsid ton for the gtant and cxerciseoftllirnptlon, A.gent will 
no! rlittctly or indiri:ctly for a pgiO\I of thll ears i) In the case oftl1e lll!le of the Option Boole, J10liniL or 
disclose 10 any oth~r penon. fum, buslnvSJ en · or coiporollon ~ny !nfonnation l'l!latc;d 10 ll1IY of the 
Insureds whfoh conslltutc the Option Book oft r insurance polioic,1 or (ii) In the Dl!SC ortht sale oflhc 
Agency, 50licft or disclose to any other !X-r$O , :fl , business entity, or insuroncc by the Agency or any 
fnforn'!Ulon ctlated to said insureds orthtir · mn policies. 
3. Company may as!ign lu dghls md obli tions und~r Iii Option To PurchMo Agreement w any of' 
Company's affiliate~ al its sole: dlscref n. 
•L This Option To Purchase .Agrecmc t wil11¢rminatc 60 day~ ll r tho termination of the Agency Agreement 
and Mruxc1ing Plan ref11rrc<l to a vc. 













a member of Nationwide Insurance CORPORA TE AGENCY SUPPLEMENT 
) 
I Consideration of Company appointing ~ , c.fuc. lJ\St}- cfi~'dK~ 
uu_,J I as Agent, and as inducemen~' for 
Comp y to do so, the undersigned hereby jointly and severally and for their heirs, executors, 
admini rators, successors, and assignees guarantee and bind ourselves to the faithful 
performance of all obligations, by Agent, to pay any sum due Company by virtue of agency 





Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
Nationwide Insurance Company of America 
NaHonwlde Mutual Fire Insurance Company 
Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company 
AMCO Insurance Company 
Depositors Insurance Company 
Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company 
CalFarm Insurance Company 









a member of Nationwide Insurance 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 
~~Ju~ 








This notice is to inform you that in connection with your appointment as an agent for any or all of the 
companies of the A1lfed Insurance an invesligative report from a consumer reporting agency may be 
obtained. This lnvestlgation may include informatlon as to character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics and mode of IIVing. Additional information as to the nature and scope of any investigation, 
if one is made. will be furnished to you upon written request 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
By,~ .CC:: ~~ 
(Agent and Ag~ncy) 
Date: __ \_l_,\.-u:,_-i-\ 2-Dl> __-z.._ 
\ ,. -~~~~~~ 
, , A.220 (02-00) 00 
I 
. ) 
~-- -·- . 
"-'' &lll .;s>.J!l,-~ ........ ,. ~ ACUITY, A MUTUAL~~SURANCE COMPANY AGENCY AGREEMENT' • 
•. ,, 1 
'I 
Agre.ement made and entered Into this 20th day· of No· 
vamber, 2007, by and between ACUITY, A Mutual Insur-
ance, Company, Sheboygan, Wisconsln, hereinafter ra~ 
ferred to a~ "Illa Company" and Nield, Inc. of Pocatello. 
Idaho, hereinafter referred to as "the Agent." 
WIT('JESSETH: 
WHE:REAS, the Company appoints Nield, Inc.. as an 
agent, aod -
WHEREAS, !he Agent accepts said appointment; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Company and Agent agree as 
follows: 
A. Authority of Agent 
1 . The Agent is an independent contractor, not an 
employee of the Company and, subject to re· 
. quiremenls Imposed by law, tha terms of this 
agreement and the underwritin~ rules and ragula· 
tions of the Co.mpany, is authonzed to: 
a. Sollcil, receive and transmit to the Company 
· propbSals for insurance contracts, all at the 
Agent's expanse, for which a commission is 
.specified In Exhibit A: 
b. Bind and execute Insurance contracts per 
Company guidelines; . . . 
c. Exercise his/Mr authority personally or 
through authorized employees; . . · 
d. Represent other companies; and . 
a. . Exercrse exclusive and independent control of 
his/her time and the conduct of his/her agancy. 
2. The Agent is not authorized to: 
a. Waive or. change any of the terms, rates or 
condilions of any Company policy or contract; 
b. Use anything other than the Company's regu-
larly furnished advertising malerlal without ob· 
faining the written consent of the Company; or 
c. Admit !labiffty or authorize repairs, unless oth· 
omlse authorized by_ !he Company in wri!lng. 
a. Responsibility of Agent 
1. Collect and receipt for premiums and, as full 
compensation, to receive commission out of pre-
mjums S? collected .as specffied, To refund return. 
commissions on polrcy cancellations or reductions 
al t~e same rate at which thay ware originaHy 
retamed. · 
2, Hold all premiums c9llected by the Agent In trust 
for the Company and set aside solely for the 
Company and not use !hose premiums rn any 
way except for commissions due as provided for 
in this Agreement. 
3. Pay tho Company not later than 45 days from the 
end of the month fn which the business was 
written the premium amount due on non-direct 
billed business. Differences of opinion over bal-
ances due shall not const[tute a "failure to pay." 
4. Forward to the Company copies .of all binders. 
policies and endorsements issued by the Agency 
!lot lat.er than flve (5) business days following the 
mceptmn data of coverage. · 
5. provide tile usual and customary servlces of an 
insurance agent to policyholders insured with the 
Company and promP.tly notify tha Company of afi 
claims or potential cra1ms of which the Agent has 
knowledge. · 
6. Coopl?rat~ .fully wit~ the Company to facilitate 
invest1gat1on and ad1ustment of any claim when 
requested to do so. · 
7. Promptly ~otlfy the Company when the Agent re· 
cefves notice of the commencement of any legal 
action against the Company; al)d, unless previously 
authorized by the Company, refrain from admitting 
or denying liabillty on the part of the Company in 
connection with any claim or loss. 
8. Secure · and maintain an errors and omissions. 
professional liab!lity policy wiU1 a reputable In~ 
surer carrying a llabil!ty limit of not less than 
$500,000 and furnish a copy of the declarations 
page of such policy to the Company upon re-
quast. Provide written notice to tna Company of 
tho cance!Jation, lapse or nonrenowal of its errors 
and omissions professional liability insurance and, 
in ·such avant, agree to immediate termination of 
this agr~amant. . 
9, Comply with tha applicable $tale privacy laws 
which are funotionafly regula!ing the minimum pr!· 
vacy standards set out in such laws, including the 
Gramm-Laach·Bliley Ac1i and any amendments 
and revistons thereto. 
10, Keep books of account on records pertaining to 
Company business which shall ba open for inspec· 
lion oy the Company upon reasonable nolice. 
11. Represent the Company by complying with all 
applicable Jaws and regulaltons, including legally 
required disclosure of compensation from the 
Company, and· empfoylng business practices 
which are of tho highest ethical standards. 
C. Responstblllty of Company 
1. Provlda -the usual and customaf)'. services of an 
Insurance company on behalf of 11s policyholders, 
agents and the general public. 
2. Direct the Investigation, se11lement and defense of 
any claim or action. 
D. Bllllng and Collectlon of Premiums and Payment 
of Commissions · . 
1. Commfssioos on premiums shall be the only com· 
pensatlon the Agent shall accept from any party for 
the f !acemont of insurance with the Company and 
shal be paid to the Agent by the Company within 
30 days after the end of !he month in which such 
_premiums are racefvad and recorded by the Com~ 
pany. The Company may offset the commissions 
owed the Agent by return commissions owed by 
the Agent to the Company on unearned premium, 
on cancelled or nonrenewed policies, and on premi-
ums due the Company that are either uncollectlble 
or referred to a collection agency, whether or not 
such premiums are coHacted by the collection_ 
agency, The commissions to be paid are sat forth in 
Exhibit A hereto which may be amended from time 
to time upon notice as set forth in seo.1.1 of General 
Provisions. 
2. If any additional premiums developed by audit 
cannot be collected by the A~ent, Iha Company 
shall undertake direct collection and UJe Agent 
shall not be responslble for such premium provld· 
ing the Agent notifies· the Company within 45 
days of the Company's initial date of b!Hing. No 
commission shall be paid to the Agent on such 
premiums collected by the Company. 
3. At Its election, the Company may assume respon· 
slbility for billing and collecting the Initial premium 
when the existing business of the Agent Is lrans· 
tarred to a dfrect·bl!fad program. In that event, the 
Company shall ba responsible for all other pre-
mium b!lflng and collection directly related to the 
curtent policy, term, unless 0U1erwise mu!uf;ll!y 
agreed by the parties. ·, 
4. At Its election, the Company may apply un· 
dfstributeo commissions as an oifset against any 
monies due the Company by the Agent. 
5. If the Agent is In arrears on its monthly statement 
balance, the Company shall have the option to 
im,mediatefy convert any or all pollcles to dlrect bl!l. 
8. The omission of any item(s) from a monthly state· 
men\ shall not affect the repoMiblllty of either 





party to account for and pay all amounts due the 
other, nor shan it prejudice the rights of either 
party to collect all such amounts from ihe o!her. 
Indamhlflcatlon 
1 .. The Company shall Indemnify and hold the Agent 
harmless frqm all civil Habill!y, .including· attorney 
reas and ~osts of irwpsligation and c;lofonse, ark,;: 
1ng as a direct result of: · · ·· '· · 
a.· A Company error, act or omission, except to 
the extent the Agent lias caused such error, 
act or omissfon;. 
b. Failure of an Insured.to rBce!1.:a notice of'can" 
cellalion, non renewal or any other notice:affoct· 
ing cover.age where such- notices are sent di-
rectly to the insured.by the Company; and 
Q. Any action or in·action of the Agent based 
upon the Agent's use of forms supplied by 
the Company, or following instructions or pr-0· 
cedures established by the Company, except 
· to 1ha extent the· .Agent has caused such 
failure .. The Agent shall promptly nqtify the 
Company·upon receiving notice of the com" 
rnencamant of. any acflon related to such 
!!abilities and lhe Company shalf' be entitled to 
participate in, or to assume the 'defense of, 
such action. If tho .company assumes the 
defense, It shall not be liable to the Agent for 
any legal or other expense subsequently in· 
curred by the Agent m connection with such 
action without 1he Company's approval. 
2. The Agent shall Indemnify and hOld the Company 
harmh,ss from an liability arising out of the Agent'$ 
error, act or omission except to ths extent !he 
Company has caused such error, act or omission. 
F. Termrnatfon .. , 
This Agreement may ha terminated at any time upon 
the mutual agreem1:1nt of the parties .or as folfows: 
1. By the Company, immediately, if (i)' tho ·Agent's 
license to solicit insurance ls suspended or rn· 
voked by any povernrnent authority having com-
petent jurisdiction; (ii} the Agent fails to comply 
with the laws of any state in which the Agent.is 
ncansed to solicit Insurance; (iii) the Agent be- . 
comes Insolvent, Is· adjudged bankrupt, files or 
has fifed against it any petition under any Federal 
bankruptcy law or state Insolvency · faw, has a 
receiver appointed for its business· or property, 
makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, 
br fails ·to pay tha Company promptly for any 
indebtedness due !t, provided the Agent has·been 
g!van written notice of such Indebtedness. 
2. By the Company; upon fifteen (15) days written 
notice to the Agent, If tha Ager:1t: 
a, transfers or assigns· this Agreement without 
1ha prior written consent of the Company; or 
b. Makes a change in !he ownership, control or 
full-time active management of the Agent with· 
out the prior wtittarr consent of the Company. . 
3. By either party, for any reason, upon 90· days 
written notice or as otherwise required by . ap· 
pllcable state law. . 
G. Rights and Raspooslblllties Upon Nonce of Ter· 
mlnatlon 
1. The Agent's authority· to solicit, bind or execute· 
contracts of insurance for any new busfnass on 
behalf ot the Company will cease on the date 
. notice of termination of 1his Agr.eamant Is given. 
2. The Company ag~ees Jo continue unexpired poli· 
oles In force until expiration, subJeot to earlier 
termination in. accordance with the Company's 
underwriting and other 5fandards. . 
3. The Agent is authorized to service unexpired insur-
ance pollcles and to bind pol!cy endorsements 
grantrng additional coverage only if they meat with 
.. i ··"·- ···;,1. 
· the Company's normal underwrl!lng requirements, 
and a!so arrange for appropriate underwriting 
claim, engineering, premium auoit and other neces~ 
sary Company services on such policies. 
4. The Agent having promp!!y .accounted for and 
·paid over premiums for which it may be !ia.ble, 
tha Agent's records, ·Use and .control of expira-
tions shalJ .ramafn the .property of iha Agent aod 
be left in '!Jis/tler uh disputed p.oss'essjon;· -other-
wise the amount. of indetitedn'ess shall constitute 
a lien against the value of !he expirations. If in· 
disposing • of such records and . expirations the 
Company does hot repJizo sufficient ·money to 
discharge in full the Agent's indebtedness to the 
Company, th'e Agent shall remain flable for. the 
balance of sucli indebtedness. Any amount re-
alized In excess of indeb!edness, less. expense of 
disposing of such records and expiratrons, shall 
be returned to. the Agent . 
5. In any case where the Company, with permission 
of the Agent, renews a policy with !ha agent after 
termfnatlon of tb!s agre(;)ment, the r~gular and . 
usual commissions will he paid on thls busine$s 
except !hat no contingency commission wm be 
appllcable to the same, . . . 
6. The Agent shall promptly-return any unused ap-
pficaUons, Company supplies or other lnd!cia of 
agency authority fumlshap by the Company to 
the Agent l(llmed!ataly upon termination. 
H. Changes In Ownership, Management or Control 
of Agent 
1. This Agreemont Is entered Into by the Company 
with the Agent because the person(s) identified as 
the owners, managers and those who have signed 
this Agreement are especia!!y suited to carry out 
its terms and conditions. The Agent may not 
change the ownership, management or control of 
the Agent without the Company's express written 
consent thereto. . · 
2. The Agent may not transfer qr assign this Agree-
ment without the Company's express written con-
sent thereto. 
I, General Provisions 
1. This Agreement may be rBvisod by t.he Company 
after lt gives ihe Agent at least 90 days notlce 
~ettlng forth the proposed revision and it$ effec-
tive date. · 
2, Whenever written notice is required by this 
Agreement, it sf)all ba mailed in, an envalopa 
addressed to the Agent or the Company (as ap-
propriate) and be separate and apart from any 
other unrelated notice or correspondence. 
3: No failure to insist on strict complian'ce· with any 
term of this Agreement shall constitute a waiver 
or relinquishment of the right to Insist upon such 
compliance at any other time. 
4. No waiver by either party of ariy breach by the 
other of the provisions of this Agrearnent shall be 
considered a waiver of any other or subsequent 
breach. · · 
5. If a confl!ct exists as to which of two or more duly 
appointed agents are authorized to represent an 
existing or prospective pollcyho!der, a written 
statement signed by the pollcyhOlder deslgnaling 
the agent may be relfed upon by the Company to 
determine Iha servicing· agent. The Company, at 
Its sole discretion: shan determine which agent ,Is 
en~tled to receive commisslons with respect to 
such confllc1. · 
6. This Agreement replaces and supersedes all 
agency agreements, written or oral, which may 
have exlsted between the Agent and the Com-
pany and constitutes the full agreement between 
Itta parties. 
7. This Agreement sha·u ba Interpreted and con· 







strued under the laws of the State of Wisconsin. 
8. Exclusive Jurisdiction over any llllgatfon arising 
out of any dispute under this Agreement or re-
garding the performance of lhis Agreement bY. 
either party shall be conferred upon the Circuit 
Court of Sheboygan Counly, Wisconsin. 
. . . 
This agreement"shall-be binding upon the heirs, executors, successors and assigns of !ha parties. In witness whereof, the 
partles·hiwe signed this agreement on the date set forth above. 
WITNESSES: ACUITY, A MUTUAL JNSURA 
!he Company 
By: -----,~~~'?H,~rL!/..~~~-
NIELD, ING .• tha Agent 
ri:-~ a__ 
· y Bry~mld, Prnsiden't 
ro BE EXECU'rED lF AGENCY IS INCORPORATED 
In consideration of the Company appointing Nield, Inc., <1s Agent, and as an inducement to it so !o do, Bry,m A Nield 
jointly and severally guarantee the faithful performance of the obligations assumed by the above named Agent and agree 
jointly and severally to pay any sum to which said Agent may become liable to !lie Company by virtue of an agency 
created by this agreement. 
In witp~s whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals this day of 
~ -;;;JZ)· ,_:('.:~ 0, =-~ 
, e!d 
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Exhibit A 
Schedule of ACUITY Commissions 
Commercial Lines Personal Lines 
Commission Commission 
Bis-Pak® 17%% Road and Residence® 
Property 17% Auto and Homeowners 
New business 25 % 
General Liability 17% Renewal business 12% 
Umbrella 15 
Auto 15 Recreational Vehicle 15 
ACUITY Edge 12% Auto 
Garage 15 New business 25 
Renewal business 10 
Crime & Fidelity 17% 
Homeowners 
lnland Marine 17% 
Package 15 




Commission on retrospectively 
rated policies is based on standard Umbrella 15 
premium, not on the retrospective 
premium. Liability Policies 15 
Dwelling Fire 15 
Boatowners 15 
Effective February 1, 2008 ID 
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ACUITY Contingent Commission Plan 
The following are the terms and conditions of participation in the ACUITY Contingent 
Commission Plan (hereinafter referred to as "this Plan") sponsored by ACUITY, A Mutual Insurance 
Company, (hereinafter referred to as "the Company"): 
A. Eligibility 
This plan is only applicable to a current ACUITY agency whose net written premiums on business 
included within the plan equals or exceeds $300,000 during !he twelve months prior to the end of 
the contingent year. 
B. Definitions 
i. Agency IBNR tosses means the agency's specific charge for future loss and allocated 
loss development costs related to that contingent year. 
2. Contingent Year means the completed calendar year upon which contingent 
commissions are calculated according to the provisions of this Plan. 
3. Earned Premiums are defined as that part of the net written premiums applicable to the 
expired part of the policy period, as calculated by the Company. 
4. Net Losses and Allocated Loss Adjustments Incurred are defined as losses and allocated 
loss expenses paid plus outstanding loss and allocated loss expense reserves at the end 
of the contingent year, minus the sum of the outstanding loss and allocated loss expense 
reserves at the end of the preceding year. These losses are further limited by any 
applicable loss !imitation. 
5. Net Written Premiums are defined as the agency's written premiums on the Company's 
records, less reductions for business which is not included within this plan. 
C, General Conditions 
1. The Company shall not be liable for any contingent commission payable hereunder if 
there is any breach by the agency of the ACUITY Agency Agreement 
2. The agency shall make no deduction from the agency's account(s) with Company and 
shall not otherwise anticipate any contingent commission payable hereunder. 
3. When any notice of termination of the agent's ACUITY Agency Agreement occurs during 
the contingent year, the affected agency is no longer eligible for contingent commission 
ln either the current or subsequent contingent years. 
4. The agency may not assign any or all interest in this Plan without the Company's 
express, written consent thereto. 
Effective Januaiy 1, 2007 
M-150(1-07) 
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5. The Company may amend or terminate this Plan at any time upon mailing to the agency 
written notice thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of such amendment or 
termination. 
6. The Company's records shall be the conclusive basis for determining the contingent 
commission payable hereunder. 
7. Contingent commission payable under this Plan shall be computed by the Company and 
remitted to the agency as soon as practicable after the close of the calendar yeaL 
8. If the Company has given its express written consent to a change in the ownership, 
management or control of the agency and the business of the agency is acquired by, 
merged into, or consolidated with the business of a successor agency prlor to July 1 of 
the contingent year, the predecessor agency's results shatl be included with the 
successor agency's business and a contingent commission payable shall be determined 
upon the basis of the combined results and payable to !he successor organization. 
Agencies that merge after July 1 of the contingent year will be treated as separate 
agencies under this Plan until the following contingent year. 
9. The failure of the Company to enforce or apply at any time any of the provisions of this 
Plan shall in no way be construed to be a waiver of such provisions, nor shall it in any 
way affect the right of the Company thereafter to enforce or to apply each and every such 
provision. 
10. Contingent commission earned under this Plan shall be paid only if all agency monthly 
account balances due have been paid to the Company. 
11. The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan does not include the following 
business: 
a. Retrospectively Rated Accounts 
b. Assigned Risk 
c. Association or Safety Group Plans 
The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan includes Greatway. However, 
the agency may exclude Greatway from this Plan. The option to do so must be received 
by the Company in writing. This exclusion wiil remain in effect unless subsequently 
rescinded in writing. Any such notification received in the current year will be effective for 
the following contingent year calculations. 
D. Contingent Commission Calculation 
The contingent commission sha[l be based upon the percentage of net profit from applicable 
business produced by the agency during the contingent year. The contingent commission shall 
be computed as of December 31 as follows: 
Effeclive January 1, 2007 
M-150(1-07) 
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1. Calculation of Agency Net Profit 
Income 
Earned premiums for contingent year $ ____ _ 
Amounts charged for agency IBNR 
lossBs in lhe preceding year 
Total Income 
Expenses 
All commissions {excluding contingent 
commissions) incurred on net 
written premiums 
Net losses and allocated loss adjustment 
expenses incurred (subject to a minimum 
which equals 25% of earned premium) 
Agency !BNR losses for contingent year 
Administrative expense (21% of agency 
net earned premiums) 
Workers' Compensation dividends paid 




2. Percentage of Profit Calculation 
$ ___ _ 
$==== 




Over$ 300,000 3% 
Over$ 500,000 3% 
Over$ 1,000,000 4% 
Over$ 2,000,000 5% 
Over$ 3,000,000 6% 
Over$ 4,000,000 7% 
Over $ 5,000,000 9% 
Over$ 6,000,000 10% 
Over$ 7,000,000 12% 
Over $ 8,000,000 13% 
Over$ 9,000,000 14% 
Over $10,000,000 15% 
Effective January 1, 2007 
M-150(1-07) 
-14.9% to -9.9% to 
-10.0% -5.0% -0.1% 
5% 7% 9% 
5% 7% 10% 
6% 8% 12% 
7% 9% 13% 
9% 11% 15% 
10% 12% 17% 
12% 14% 19% 
14% 16% 21% 
16% 18% 23% 
17% 20% 25% 
19% 22% 27% 
20% 23% 28% 
10.0% to 15.0% to 20.0% and 
4.9% 9.9% 14.9% 19.9% hi her 
11% 13% 15% 17% 19% 
12% 14% 16% 19% 21% 
14% 16% 18% 21% 23% 
16% 18% 20% 23% 25% 
18% 20% 22% 25% 27% 
20% 22% 24% 27% 29% 
22% 25% 27% 29% 31% 
24% 27% 29% 31% 33% 
26% 29% 31% 34% 36% 
28% 31% 33% 36% 38% 
30% 33% 35% 38% 41% 
32% 35% 37% 41% 45% 
3 
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3. Penalty Provision 
The contingent commission otherwise payable under this Plan shall be reduced by 
one-twelfth for each month during the contingent year in which the agency has a past 
due balance with the Company. 
4. Loss Limitation 
Each loss, including allocated loss adjustment expenses, wiH be subject to a limitation of 
$350,000 in any one occurrence. If the salvage or subrogation recovery or adjustment of 
a reserve reduces the loss to below the loss limitation a credit shall be allowed equal to 
!he difference between the loss limitation and the loss recorded on the Company records 
at the end of the contingent year in which salvage or subrogation was recovered or 
adjustment of a reserve was made. Multiple losses from any one event or occurrence, 
including a weather-related event or occurrence, is not aggregated as a single loss 
subject to the loss limitation. 
5. Loss Ratio Lock-In Provision 
The agency may elect to lock in the loss ratio as of September 30 of the contingent year. 
The request must be in writing and be received by the Company no later than October 8 
of the contingent year. If this option is elected, the agency's net losses as a percentage 
of earned premium as of September 30 will remain fixed until December 31 of the 
contingent year. The net losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses incurred will 
remain subject to a minimum which equals 25% of the earned premium. Should the 
agency choose this option, the Company will pay 80% of the contingent commission 
otherwise earned in this Plan. 
Effective January 1, 2007 
M-150(1-07) 
4 
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ACUITY Contingent Commission Plan 
The following are the terms and conditions of participation Jn the ACUITY Contingent Commission 
Plan (hereinafter referred to as "this Plan") sponsored by ACUITY, A Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Company"): 
A. Eligibility 
This plan is only applicable to a current ACUITY agency whose net written premiums on business 
included within the plan equals or exceeds $300,000 during the twelve months prior to the end of 
the contingent year. 
B. Definitions 
1. Agency /BNR losses means the agency's specific charge for future loss and allocated 
loss development costs related to that contingent year. 
2. Contingent Year means the completed calendar year upon which contingent 
commissions are calculated according to the provisions of this Plan. 
3. Earned Premiums are defined as that part of the net written premiums applicable to the 
expired part of the policy period, as calculated by the Company. 
4. · Net Losses and Allocated Loss Adjustments Incurred are defined as losses and allocated 
loss expenses paid plus outstanding loss and allocated loss expense reserves at the end 
of the contingent year, minus the sum of the outstanding loss and aUocated loss expense 
reserves at the end of the preceding year. These losses are further Hmited by any 
applicable loss limitation. 
5. Net Written Premiums are defined as the agency's written premiums on the Company's 
records, less reductions for business which is not included within this plan. 
C. General Conditions 
1. The Company shall not be liable for any contingent commission payable hereunder if 
there is any breach by the agency of the ACUITY Agency Agreement. 
2. The agency shall make no deduction from the agency's account(s) with Company and 
shaH not otherwise anticipate any contingent commission payable hereunder. 
3. When any notice of termination of the agent's ACUITY Agency Agreement occurs during 
the contingent year, the affected agency is no longer eligible for contingent commission in 
efther the current or subsequent contingent years. 
4. The agency may not assign any or all interest in this Plan without the Company's 
express, written consent thereto. 
Effective January 1, 2009 
M-150(1-09) 
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5. The Company may amend or terminate this Plan at any time upon mailing to the agency 
written notice thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of such amendment or 
termination. 
6. The Company's records shall be the conclusive basis for determining the contingen! 
commission payable hereunder. 
7. Contingent commission payable under this Plan shall be computed by the Company and 
remitted to the agency as soon as practicable after the close of the calendar year. 
8. If the Company has given its express written consent to a change in the ownership, 
management or control of the agency and the business of the agency is acquired by, 
merged into, or consolidated with the business of a successor agency prior to July 1 of 
the contingent year, the predecessor agency's results shall be included with !he 
successor agency's business and a contingent commission payable shall be determined 
upon the basis of the combined results and payable to the successor organization. 
Agencies that merge after July 1 of the contingent year will be treated as separate 
agencies under this.Plan until the following contingent year. 
9. The failure of the Company to enforce or apply at any time any of the provisions of this 
Plan shall in no way be construed to be a waiver of such provisions, nor shall it in any 
way affect !he right of the Company thereafter to enforce or to apply each and every such 
provision. 
10. Contingent commission earned under this Plan shall be paid only if all agency monthly 
account balances due have been paid to the Company. 
11. The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan does not include the following 
business: 
a. Restrospectively Rated Accounts 
b. Assigned Risk 
c. Association or Safety Group Plans 
The calculatron of contingent commission under this Plan inctudes Greatway. However, 
the agency may exclude Greatway from this Plan. The option to do so must be received 
by the Company in writing. This exclusion will remain in effect unless subsequently 
rescinded in writing. Any such notification received in the current year will be effective for 
the following contingent year calculations. 
D. Contingent Commission Calculation 
The contingent commission shall be based upon the percentage of net profit from appllcable 
business produced by the agency during the contingent year. The contingent commission shall 
be computed as of December 31 as follows: 
Effective January 1, 2009 
M-150(1-09) 
2 
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1 Calculation of Agency Net Profit 
Income 
Earned premiums for contingent year $ 
Amounts charged for agency IBNR 
losses in the preceding year 
Total Income $ 
Expenses 
All commissions (excluding contingent 
commissions) incurred on net 
written premiums 
Net losses and allocated [ass adjustment 
expenses incurred (subject to a minimum 
which equals 25% of earned premium) 
Agency IBNR losses for contingent year 
Administrative expense (21 % of agency 
net earned premiums) 
Workers' Compensation dividends paid 
out by the Company during contingent 
year 
Total expenses 
Net profit $ 
2. Percentage of Profit Calculation 













































-4.9%10 0.0% to 5.0%to 10.0% to 
-0.1% 4.9% 9.9% 14.9% 
9% 11% 13% 15% 
10% 12% 14% 16% 
12% 14% 16% 18% 
13% 16% 18% 20% 
15% 18% 20% 22% 
17% 20% 22% 24% 
19% 22% 25% 27% 
21% 23% 26% 28% 
22% 24% 27% 29% 
23% 26% 29% 31% 
24% 28% 31% 33% 
25% 30% 33% 35% 
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3. Penalty Provision 
The contingent commission otherwise payable under this Plan shall be reduced by one· 
twelflh for each month during the contingent year in which the agency has a past due 
balance with the Company. 
4. Loss Limitation 
Each loss, including allocated loss adjustment expenses, will be subject to a limitation of 
$350,000 in any one occurrence. lf the salvage or subrogation recovery or adjustment of 
a reserve reduces the Joss to below the loss limitation a credit shall be aHowed equal to 
the difference between the loss limitation and the loss recorded on the Company records 
at the end of the contingent year in which salvage or subrogation was recovered or 
adjustment of a reseNe was made. Multiple losses from any one event or occurrence, 
including a weather-related event or occurrence, is not aggregated as a single loss 
subject to the loss limitation. 
5. Loss Ratlo Lock-In Provision 
The agency may elect to lock in the loss ratio as of September 30 of the contingent year. 
The request must be in writing and be received by the Company no later than October 8 
of the contingent year. !f this option is elected, the agency's net losses as a percentage 
of earned premium as of September 30 wlll remain fixed until December 31 of the 
contingent year. The net losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses incurred will 
remain subject to a minimum which equals 25% of the earned premium. Should the 
agency choose this option, the Company will pay 80% of the contingent commission 
otherwise earned in this Plan. 
Effective January 1, 2009 
M-150(1-09) 
4 
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ACUITY Contingent Commission Plan 
The following are the terms and conditions of participation In the ACUITY Contingent Commission 
Plan (hereinafter referred to as "this Plan") sponsored by ACUITY, A Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Company"): 
A. Eligibility 
This plan is only applicable to a current ACUITY agency whose net written premiums on business 
included within the plan equals or exceeds $300,000 during the twelve months prior to the end of 
the contingent year. 
B. Definitions 
1. Agency IBNR losses means the agency's specific charge for future loss and allocated 
Joss development costs related to that contingent year. 
2. Contingent Year means the completed calendar year upon which contingent 
commissions are calculated according to the provisions of this Plan. 
3. Earned Premiums are defined as that part of the net wrftten premiums applicable to the 
expired part of the policy period, as calculated by the Company. 
4, Net Losses and Allocated Loss Adjustments Incurred are defined as losses and allocated 
loss expenses paid plus outstanding loss and allocated loss expense reserves at the end 
of the contingent year, minus the sum of the outstanding loss and a!located Joss expense 
reserves at the end of the preceding year. These losses are further limited by any 
applicable Joss limitation. 
5. Net Written Premiums are defined as the agency's written premiums on the Company's 
records, less reductions for business which is not included within this plan. 
C. General Conditions 
1. The Company shall not be liable for any contingent commission payable hereunder if 
there is any breach by the agency of the ACUITY Agency Agreement. 
2. The agency shall make no deduction from the agency's account{s) with the Company 
and shall not otherwise anticipate any contingent commission payable hereunder. 
3. When any notice of termination of the agent's ACUITY Agency Agreement occurs during 
the contingent year, the affected agency is no longer eligible for contingent commission in 
either the current or subsequent contingent years. 
4. The agency may not assign any or all interest in this Plan without the Company's 
express, written consent thereto. 
Effective January 1, 2011 
M-150(1-11) 
1 
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5, The Company may amend or terminate this Plan at any time upon mailing to the agency 
written notice thirty (30) days prior lo the effective date of such amendment or 
termination. 
6. The Company's records shall be the conclusive basis for determining the contingent 
commission payable hereunder. 
7. Contingent commission payable under this Plan shall be computed by the Company and 
remitted to the agency as soon as practicable after the ciose of the calendar year. 
8. If the Company has given its express written consent to a change in the ownership, 
management or control of the agency and the business of the agency is acquired by, 
merged into, or consolidated with the business of a successor agency prior to July 1 of 
the contingent year, the predecessor agency's results shall be included with the 
successor agency's business and a contingent commission payable shall be determined 
upon the basis of the combined results and payable to the successor organization. 
Agencies that merge after July 1 of the contingent year will be treated as separate 
agencies under this Plan until the following contingent year. 
9. The failure of the Company to enforce or apply at any time any of the provisions of this 
Plan shall in no way be construed to be a waiver of such provisions, nor sha!I it in any 
way affect the right of the Company thereafter to enforce or to apply each and every such 
provision. 
10. Contingent commission earned under this Plan shall be paid only if all agency monthly 
account balances due have been paid to the Company. 
11. The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan does not include the following 
business: 
a. Restrospectively Rated Accounts 
b. Assigned Risk 
c. Association or Safety Group Plans 
The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan includes Grealway. However, 
the agency may exclude Greatway from this Plan. The option to do so must be received 
by the Company in writing. This exclusion will remain in effect unless subsequently 
rescinded in writing. Any such notification received in the current year will be effective for 
the foHowing contingent year calculations. 
D. Contingent Commission Calculation 
The contingent commission shall be based upon the percentage of net profit from applicable 
business produced by the agency during the contingent year. The contingent commission sha!l 
be computed as of December 31 as follows: 
Effective January 1, 2011 
M-150(1-11} 
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1. Calculation of Agency Net Profit 
Income 
Earned premiums for contingent year $ 
Amounts charged for agency IBNR 
losses in the preceding year 
Total Income $ 
Expenses 
All commissions (excluding contingent 
commissions) incurred on net 
written premiums 
Net losses and allocated loss adjustment 
expenses incurred (subject to a minimum 
which equals 25% of earned premium} 
Agency IBNR losses for contingent year 
Administrative expense (21 % of agency 
net earned premiums) · 
Workers' Compensation dividends paid 
out by the Company during contingent 
year 
Total expenses 
Net profit $ 
2. Percentage of Profit Calculation 













































-4.9% lo 0.0%!o 5.0% to 10.0%to 
-0.1% 4.9% 9.9% 14.9% 
9% 11% 13% 15% 
10% 12% 14% 16% 
11% 13% 15% 17% 
11% 14% 16% 18% 
12% 14% 16% 18% 
13% 15% 17% 18% 
14%' 17% 19% 20% 
16% 17% 20% 21% 
17% 18% 21% 22% 
17% 20% 22% 23% 
18% 21% 23% 25% 
19% 23% 25% 26% 
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ACUITY Contingent Commission Plan 
The following are the terms and conditions of participation in the ACUITY Contingent Commission 
Plan (hereinafter referred to as "this Plan") sponsored by ACUITY, A Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Company"): 
A. Eligibility 
This Plan is only applicable to a current ACUITY agency whose net written premiums on business 
included within the Plan equals or exceeds $300,000 during !he twelve months prior to the end of 
the contingent year. 
B. Definitions 
1. Agency /BNR losses means the agency's specific charge for future loss and allocated 
loss development costs related to that contingent year. 
2. Contingent Year means the completed calendar year upon which contingent 
commissions are calculated according to the provisions of this Plan. 
3. Earned Premiums are defined as that part of the net written premiums applicable to the 
expired part of the poHcy period, as calculated by the Company. 
4. Net Losses and Allocated Loss Adjustments Incurred are defined as losses and allocated 
loss expenses paid plus outstanding loss and allocated loss expense reserves at the end 
of the contingent year, minus the sum of the outstanding loss and allocated loss expense 
reseNes at the end of the preceding year. These losses are further limited by any 
applicable loss limitation. 
5. Net Written Premiums are defined as the agency's written premiums on the Company's 
records, less reductions for business which is not included within this Plan. 
C. General Conditions 
1. The Company shall not be liable for any contingent commission payable hereunder if 
!here is any breach by the agency of the ACUITY Agency Agreement. 
2. The agency shall make no deduction from the agency's account(s) with the Company 
and shall not otheiwise anticipate any contingent commission payable hereunder. 
3. When any notice of termination of the agent's ACUITY Agency Agreement occurs during 
the contingent year, the affected agency is no longer eligible for contingent commission in 
either the current or subsequent contingent years. 
4. The agency may not assign any or all interest in this Plan without the Company's 
express, written consent thereto. 
Effective Janual)' 1, 2012 
M-150(1-12) 
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5. The Company may amend or terminate this Plan at any time upon mailing to the agency 
written notice thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of such amendment or 
termination. 
6. The Company's records shall be the conclusive basis for determining the contingent 
commission payable hereunder. 
7. Contingent commission payable under this Plan shall be computed by the Company and 
remitted to the agency as soon as practicable after the close of the calendar year. 
8. If the Company has given its express written consent to a change in the ownership, 
management, or control of the agency and the business of the agency is acquired by, 
merged into, or consolidated with the business of a successor agency prior to July 1 of 
the contingent year, the predecessor agency's results shall be included wilh the 
successor agency's business, and a contingent commission payable shall be determined 
upon the basis of the combined results and payable to the successor organization. 
Agencies that merge after July 1 of the contingent year will be treated as separate 
agencies under this Plan until the following contingent year. 
9. The failure of the Company to enforce or apply at any time any of the provisions of this 
Plan shall in no way be construed to be a waiver of such provisions, nor shafl it in any 
way affect the right of the Company thereafter to enforce or to apply each and every such 
provision. 
10. Contingent commission earned under this Plan shall be paid only if all agency monthly 
account balances due have been paid to the Company. 
11. The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan does not include the following 
business: 
a. Retrospectively Rated Accounts 
b. Assigned Risk 
c. Association or Safety Group Plans 
The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan includes Greatway. However, 
the agency may exclude Greatway from this Plan. The option to do so must be received 
by the Company in writing. This exclusion will remain in effect unless subsequently 
rescinded in writing. Any such notification received in the current year will be effective for 
the following contingent year calculations. 
D. Contingent Commission Calculation 
The contingent commission shall be based upon the percentage of net profit from applicable 
business produced by the agency during the contingent year. The contingent commission shall 
be computed as of December 31 as follows: 
Effective January 1, 2012 
M-150(1-12} 
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i. Calculation of Agency Net Profit 
Income 
Earned premiums for contingent year $ 
Amounts charged for agency IBNR 
losses in the preceding year 
Total Income $ 
Expenses 
All commissions (excluding contingent 
commissions) incurred on net 
written premiums 
Net losses and allocated loss adjustment 
expenses incurred (subject to a minimum 
which equals 25% of earned premium) 
Agency IBNR losses for contingent year 
Administratlve expense (21% of agency 
net earned premiums) 
Workers' Compensation dividends paid 
out by the Company during contingent 
year 
Total expenses 
Net prom $ 
2. Percentage of Profit Calculation 













































-4.9%!0 0.0%to 5.0% to 10.0% to 
-0.1% 4.9% 9.9% 14.9% 
8% 10% 12% 14% 
9% 11% 13% 15% 
9% 11% 14% 16% 
9% 12% 15% 17% 
10% 13% 15% 17% 
11% 14% 16% 17% 
12% 16% 18% 19% 
13% 16% 19% 20% 
. 14% 17% 20% 21% 
14% 19% 21% 22% 
15% 20% 22% 24% 
16% 22% 24% 25% 
















3. Penalty Provision 
The conllngent commission otherwise payable under this Plan shall be reduced by one-
twelfth for each month during the contingent year in which the agency has a past due 
balance with the Company, 
4. Loss Limitation 
Each loss, including al!ocated loss adjustment expenses, will be subject to a limitation of 
$400,000 in any one occurrence. If the salvage or subrogation recovery or adjustment of 
a reserve reduces the loss to below the loss limitation, a credit shall be allowed equal to 
the difference between the !oss limitation and the loss recorded on the Company records 
at the end of the contingent year in which salvage or subrogation was recovered or 
adjustment of a reserve was made. Multiple losses from any one event or occurrence, 
including a weather-related event or occurrence, is not aggregated as a single loss 
subject to the loss limitation. 
5. Loss Ratio Lock-In Provision 
The agency may elect to lock in the loss ratio as of September 30 of the contingent year. 
The request must be in writing and be received by the Company no later than October 8 
of the contingent year. If this option is elected, the agency's net losses as a percentage 
of earned premium as of September 30 will remain fixed until December 31 of the 
contingent year. The net losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses incurred will 
remain subject to a minimum which equals 25% of the earned premium. Should the 
agency choose this option, the Company will pay 80% of the contingent commission 
otherwise earned in this Plan. 
Effective January 1, 2012 
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ACUITY Contingent Commission Plan 
The following are the terms and conditions of participation in the ACUITY Contingent Commission 
Plan (hereinafter referred to as "this Plan") sponsored by ACUITY, A Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Company"): 
A. Eligibility 
This Plan is only appl!cable to a current ACUITY agency whose net written premiums on business 
included within the Plan equals or exceeds $350,000 during the twelve months prior to the end of 
the contingent year. 
B. Definitions 
1. Agency IBNR losses means the agency's specific charge for future loss and allocated 
loss development costs related to that contingent year. 
2. Contingent Year means the completed calendar year upon which contingent 
commissions are calculated according to the provisions of this Plan. 
3. Earned Premiums are defined as that part of the net written premiums applicable to the 
expired part of the policy period, as calculated by the Company. 
4. Net Losses and Allocated Loss Adjustments Incurred are defined as losses and allocated 
loss expenses paid plus outstanding loss and allocated loss expense reserves at the end 
of the contingent year, minus the sum of the outstanding loss and allocated loss expense 
reserves at the end of the preceding year. These losses are further limited by any 
applicable loss limitation. 
5. Net Wlitten Premiums are defined as the agency's written premiums on the Company's 
records, less reductions for business which is not included within this Plan. 
C. General Conditions 
1. The Company shall not be liable for any contingent commission payable hereunder if 
there is any breach by the agency of the ACUITY Agency Agreement 
2. The agency shall make no deduction from the agency's account(s) with the Company 
and shall not otherwise anticipate any contingent commission payable hereunder. 
3. When any notice of termination of the agent's ACUITY Agency Agreement occurs during 
the contingent year, the affected agency is no longer eligible for contingent commission In 
either the current or subsequent contingent years. 
4. The agency may nol assign any or all interest in this Plan without the Company's 
express, written consent thereto. 
Effective January 1, 2013 
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5. The Company may amend or terminate this Plan at any time upon marling to the agency 
written notice thirty {30) days prior to the effective date of such amendment or 
tennination. 
6. The Company's records shall be the conclusive basis for determining the contingent 
commission payable hereunder. 
7. Contingent commission payable under this Plan shall be computed by the Company and 
remitted to the agency as soon as practicable after the close of the calendar year. 
8. If the Company has given its express written consent to a change in the ownership, 
management, or control of the agency and the business of the agency is acquired by, 
merged into, or consolidated with the business of a successor agency prior to July 1 of 
the contingent year, the predecessor agency's results shall be included with the 
successor agency's business, and a contingent commission payable shall be detennined 
upon the basis of the combined results and payable to the successor organization. 
Agencies that merge after July 1 of the contingent year will be treated as separate 
agencies under this Plan until the following contingent year. 
9. The failure of the Company to enforce or apply at any time any of the provlsions of this 
Plan shall in no way be construed to be a waiver of such provisions, nor shall it in any 
way affect the right of the Company thereafter to enforce or to apply each and every such 
provision. 
10. Contingent commission earned under this Plan shaH be paid only if all agency monthly 
account balances due have been paid to the Company. 
11. The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan does not include the following 
business: 
a. Retrospectively Rated Accounts 
b. Assigned Risk 
c. Association or Safety Group Plans 
The calculation of contingent commission under this Plan includes Greatway. However, 
the agency may exclude Greatway from this Plan. The option to do so must be received 
by the Company in writing. This exclusion will remain in effect unless subsequently 
rescinded in writing. Any such notification received in the current year will be effective for 
the following contingent year calculations. 
D. Contingent Commission Calculation 
The contingent commission shall be based upon the percentage of net profit from applicable 
business produced by the agency during the contingent year. The contingent commission shall 
be computed as of December 31 as follows: 
Effective January 1. 2013 
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1. Calculation of Agency Net Profit 
Income 
Earned premiums for contingent year $ ____ 
Amounts charged for agency IBNR 
losses in !he preceding year 
Total Income $ 
Expenses 
All commissions (excluding contingent 
commissions) incurred on net 
written premiums 
Net losses and allocated loss adjustment 
expenses incurred (subject to a minimum 
which equals 25% of earned premium) 
Agency I BNR losses for contingent year 
Administrative expense (21 % of agency 
net earned premiums) 
Workers' Compensation dividends paid 
out by the Company during contingent 
year 
Total expenses 
Net profit $ 
2. Percentage of Profit Calculation 













































-4.9%10 0.0%to 5.0%10 10.0% to 
-0.1% 4.9% 9.9% 14.9% 
6.0% 7.5% 9.0% 10.5% 
6.8% 8.3% 9.8% 11.3% 
7.0% 8.5% 10.5% i2.0% 
7.2% 9.0% 11.3% 12.8% 
7.5% 9.8% 11.5% 13.0% 
8.3% 10.5% 12.0% 13.2% 
9.0% 11.8% 13.5% 14.3% 
9.8% 12.2% 14.3% 15.0% 
10.5% 12.8% 15.0% 15.8% 
10.7% 14.3% 15.8% 16.5% 
11.3% 15.0% 16.6% 18.0% 
12.0% 16.3% 18.0% 18.8% 
















3. Penalty Provision 
The contingent commission otherwise payable under this Plan shall be reduced by one" 
twelfth for each month during the contingent year in which the agency has a past due 
balance with the Company. 
4. Loss Limitation 
Each loss, including allocated loss adjustment expenses, will be subject to a limitation of 
$400,000 in any one occurrence. If the salvage or subrogation recovery or adjustment of 
a reserve reduces the loss to below the loss limitation, a credit shall be anowed equal to 
the difference between the loss limitation and the loss recorded on the Company records 
at the end of the contingent year in which salvage or subrogation was recovered or 
adjustment of a reserve was made. Multiple losses from any one event or occurrence, 
including a weather-related event or occurrence, is not aggregated as a single loss 
subject to the loss limitation. 
5. Loss Ratio Lock-In Provision 
The agency may elect to lock in the loss ratio as of September 30 of the contingent year. 
The request must be in writing and be received by the Company no later than October 8 
of the contingent year. If this option is elected, the agency's net losses as a percentage 
of earned premium as of September 30 will remain fixed until December 31 of the 
contingent year. The net losses and allocated !oss adjustment expenses incurred will 
remain subject to a minimum which equals 25% of the earned premium. Should the 
agency choose this option, the Company will pay 80% of the contingent commission 
otherwise earned in this Plan. 
Effective January 1, 2013 
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~ Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company 
~ Alliance Insurance Company, Inc. 
O Alliance Indemnity Company 
This Agreement is between the above Companies ("we," "our" and "us0) and the Agency ("you," "your") named 
,below. 
Agency Name Nield Inc OBA: Insurance Designers 
Street Address 4751 S Afton Pl Ste B 
City, State, Zip Chubbuck, ID 83202 
County ___ B=an:.::n~o:.:c::.:.k::__ _______________________ --:---
When this Agreement is signed by all parties, you become our Agent and both you and we agree to all the 
terms of the Agreement, including any Addendum to lt. By becoming our Agent, you do not become our 
employee. You remain an independent contractor with the right to conduct your business while properly 
licensed to so act. You shall not have the exclusive right to act on our behalf fn your area. This Agreement 
sha!I not go into force until signed by the Agent and a duly authorized officer of the Company, and duly 
recorded at the Company's home office located at 1122 North Main Street, McPherson, Kansas. The terms 
of this Agreement are strictly confident/al. The Agent agrees that he will not exhibit this Agreement or 
mention its terms to any person or entity. 
1. Agent's Authority 
While this Agreement ls in effect, yolj have authority to do the following on our behalf: 
A Receive.Proposals. You may receive and blnd proposals for insurance or bonds. But you may 
do so only for those types that we have speclflcally authorized you for, either in writing or as 
stated in our Company manual. 
B. Bind Insurance. You may bind renewals of or changes to policies written and In force with us 
through you unless this authority is restricted by us in writing. 
Within seven (7) calendar days after you do bind Insurance and coverage starts, you will send us 
written evidence of the coverage. 
C. Cancel Insurance or Bonds. You may request cancellation of insurance or bonds written under 
this Agreement subject to any statute, rule or regulation concerning noncancelable policies. 
D. Solicitation. You agree not to solicit any lines of Insurance, or recerve an~ bind proposals for 
insurance or bonds unless you have the required current license or licenses authorizing you 
to do so. 
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2. Agent's Duty to Collect and Pay Premiums 
You have the responsibility for collectlng all premiums on Insurance or bonds that you write or that are 
written by us for business you produced. After you collect the premiums, you have to pay them to us 
within the time specified In Section 3, Agency Billing. You must pay the premiums yourself if you do not 
collect them. 
A. When You Do Not Have to Collect or Pay Premiums. There are only two situations in which 
you may be excused from your obHgation to collect premiums and pay them to us. 
1, Direct BiHina. If we blU an insured directly, you do not have to collect the premiums. 
However, if an insured pays you on our behalf for premiums that we billed the insured for 
directly, you are required to send those monies to us no later than the end of the next 
business day. On any premiums we return to you that are payable to the insured, you are 
required to make contact with the insured no later than the end of the next business day. 
2. Additional Premiums. In the event that addit!onal premiums are due as the result of a final 
audit of a policy, not Interim audits, you must make all reasonable efforts to collect the 
premiums. However, !f you cannot collect them, we wlll not require you to pay the premiums 
yourself if you notify us in writing that you cannot collect them. This written notice must be 
received in our home office within forty-five (46) days after you receive notice that additlonal 
premiums are due as the result of a final audit. 
Failure to notify us in writing within the above forty-five (45) days' time limit means that you 
will have to pay the uncolfec!ed premium yourself. 
B. When We May Try To Collect. If you do fall to collect any premiums or if you are relieved of 
your duty to pay premiums, we may try to collect them. We are free to choose the method of 
collection. If we do collect the premiums, we will not pay you a commission on them. !f we 
cannot collect the premiums, you stlll have an obligation to pay them unless you were relieved 
of that obligation by this Agreement (A.1. and 2. above). 
c. Monies Are Held In Trust. You shall hold all monies and securities received on behalf of us in 
the capacity of a fiduciary as provided by law or regulation. You wHI, under no circumstances, 
make any personal or other use of such funds nor commlngle any such funds with your personal 
funds. The fact that you may retain your commissions out of what you collect does not change 
your status as a trustee. 
D. Disputes over Payment. Should there be a dispute over payment of premiums, any part of 
them not in dispute must be paid to us as provided in this Agreement. Only this disputed amount 
may remain unpaid by you until the matter is resolved, but in no event longer than 120 days. 
3. Agency Billing 
All premiums are due, and must be received In our home office within forty-five (45) days after the last 
day of the month In which the applicable coverage is effective or is issued by us. Alf premiums due as 
the result of an audit are due, and must be received in our home office within forty-five (45) days after 
the last day of the month in which you receive the bifl for the audit premiums. 
A. If You Prepare Own Account. If you prepare your own account, you must send us your 
monthly account of the premiums you owe us. This account must reach our home office no later 
than the 10th day of the month fol!owlng the month covered by the account. 
Your monthty account must list all premium transactions which took place during that month. It 
must also show the balance due·for that month. 
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B. If You Oo Not Prepare Own Account. If you do not prepare your own account, we will send 
you our monthly statement of the premiums you owe us. You agree to pay the baiance shown 
by the Due Date on the statement, and we wlll pay any balance that we owe you by the same 
date. 
We may pay the balance either directly to you or by giving you credit against any outstanding 
balance you owe us. 
c. Omitted Items. The fact that any item fs omitted from a monthly statement or account does not 
.. relieve either you or us from the obligation to pay the item when otherwise due; 
o affect your right or our right to collect on the Item; or · 
" affect our right to offset against your account. 
4. Direct Bltling 
Some of the business you place with us may be on our direct bill system under which we, rather than 
you, bill the insured for the premium. For direct bill business the following rules apply. 
A. Your Name Will Appear. When we send your client any bill or other material related to a policy 
produced by you, we will put your name on it Your name will be at feast as large as the computer-
generated type we use to print the insured's name on the document. 
B. You Will Get Copies. We wl!I send you copies of cancellation notices, nonrenewal notices and other 
insurance documents we send to your clients. You will not receive copies of all invoices we send to 
your client. 
C. You Will Receive Records. When this Agreement ends we will give you a policyholder list if you ask 
for it and if you are not In default for failure to pay premium balances under this Agreement. 
The list will: 
( " idenUfy all of your clients insured by us; 
.. Identify the months in which insurance expires; or 
" contain those details of coverage that normally appear when we prfnt out a policyholder list. 
5. Commissions 
You wHJ receive commissions for business placed with us under this Agreement. You agree that these 
Commissions wm be full compensation for placing the business with us. The rate of your Commissions 
wlll be found In our 
Schedule of Commissions and will be a part of the Agreement as Addendum A Any such Commissions 
due to you will be retained by us to offset any Commissions or Premiums which you owe to us and which 
are not paid to us In a timely manner as outlined in this Agreement. 
6. When Commissions Must Be Returned 
You agree to return the following to us: 
" commissions on insurance or bonds that are cancelled; or 
0 commissions on the part of any premium that is reduced for any reason, and if we for any reason 
refund any premium or any part thereof on which you are entitled to a commission under this 
Agreement. 
You shall lose all right to commission on such premium or part thereof and shall pay to us on demand the 
full amount or part thereof earned by you on such premiums or we may offset against your account. 
Commissions must be returned tp us at the same rate as they were or!ginally paid by us. 
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7. Accounting Differences . 
Under certain circumstances, if you do not account for and pay premiums, this Agreement gives us the 
right to take specific actions involving: 
., supplying policyholder lists to you (Section 4, Direct Billing); 
o the use of expirations (Section 9, Rights Involving Ownership of Expirations); or 
" termination of this Agreement (Section 12, Suspending Authority or Terminating Agreement). 
We will not consider that you have failed to account for or pay premiums if the failure involves minor 
amounts, is caused by routine differences between your accounting records and ours, and is not willful. 
However, if you do not pay undisputed premiums, we will have the right to take any action permitted 
under this Agreement. 
8. Overpayment of Compensation 
Any compensation paid to you for premiums lat(lr returned or credited to any customer, or any other 
overpayment of compensation shall be a debt due us from you. In addition to all other rights available to 
us as a creditor, we shall have the right to deduct such compensation of overpayment from any future 
compensation due you. We may also balance accounts between our subsidiaries or associate 
companies. We may apply any agent balance due In one such Company to any other Company of ours 
at the termination of this Agreement. 
9. Rights f nvolvlng Ownership of Expirations 
This part of the Agreement sets forth the rules governing ownership of expirations. 
A. While Agreement Remains In Effect. While this Agreement is In effect, you own all your 
expirations (whether Agency billed or direct bllled) and all your records of them. We may not use, or 
authorize anyone else to use, our records of your expirations in order to sell, service or renew any 
policy we offer unless permitted by this Agreement. 
B. Designation of Agent by Policyholder. The policyholder must submit to us in writing who will be 
his Agent. This new Agent will not be responsible for collection of premiums, return premiums, or 
return commissfons, or entitled to commissions until we have processed the change. 
C. After' Agreement Is Terminated. If this agreement Is terminated, and you have not properly: 
• Accounted for and paid us all premiums for which you are responsible; or 
"' Given us additional collateral, the value of whlch is at least equal to, or more fhan, any 
premiums you shoµld have paid but have not, 
your rights of ownership, use and control of the expirations wm pass to us. 
We have the right to sell the expirations and records in order to collect what you owe us. We must use 
reasonable business Judgment In the sale. If we sell the items for more than you owe us, we must pay the 
difference less our expenses to you. On the other hand, If we sell your expirations and records for less 
than what you owe us, you must pay the difference, plus our expenses in selling these expirations within 
forty-five (45) days, Including Interest lf appllcable. 
10. Indemnification 
You shall indemnify and hold us harmless agalnst alt civil llabilily to the extent you are legally liable to us 
by statute or common taw which Is as a direct result of acts or omissions of the agent. And we shall 
indemnify and hold you harmless against all civll lrabll!ty, to the extent we are legally If able to you by 
statute or common law, which are as a direct result of acts or omissions of the companies. 
A. You Must Give Notice_. In order for us to defend a_nd Indemnify you, you must give us prompt 
notice of any action against you Involving the situations spelled out above. Our defense and 
Indemnification ls strictly conditioned on you giving us prompt and Immediate notice of any action 
against you Involving the situation spelled out above, 
B. Control or Defense. We have the right to Investigate, defend or settle any such actlon.·ttwe do 
assume the defense, we·wifl not be required to pay you 
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11. Litigation 
You will not take any legal or administrative action in our name or your name ln connection wlth any 
matter pertaining to our business without the written consent of an executive officer of our Company. 
12. Suspending Authority or Terminating Agreement 
Under certain conditions, your authority under this Agreement itself may be terminated ent1rely. 
A. Suspension of Authority. If you fail to account for premiums or pay them when due. we may 
suspend your authority to bind coverage, write new or renewal business, and/or change any . 
insurance. Before we take this step we will give you written notice, 
B. Termination of Agreement. This Agreement wlll terminate: 
,. automatically if any public authority cancels or does not renew any required license or certific~te 
of authority; 
" automatically on the effective date of the sale, transfer or merger of your business unless we 
appoint the successor as Agent; 
• automatically If there is an abandonment of the agency; 
• if either party gives the other ninety (90) days' written notice of termination, orfor any longer 
period required by law; 
• immediately when either party gives the other written notice of termination because .of fraud, 
insolvency, willful or gross misconduct or as the !aw requires on bankruptcy; 
,. immed!ately, or as Jaw requires, for failure to pay balances; 
• immediately with written consent of both partiesj or 
o immediately upon the improper use of our policy forms or materials. 
13. The Effects of Termination 
Should this Agreement be terminated, the foffowing rules will apply. 
Limited Agency Agreement In Effect. At termination based on ninety (90) days' written notice, or for 
any longer period required by !aw, our Limited Agency Agreement will go into effect. Under this 
Agreement, all putstanding and unexpired insurance and bonds will continue In force, subject to our 
underwriting standards. 
You shafl not issue binders, accept new policies, or increase the amounts of insurance or !iabllity on 
existing policies. 
You may collect renewal insurance premiums and countersign annual extension endorsements on 
policies previously accepted by us. 
If insurance you write comes up for renewal during this ninety (90) days or longer period required by 
law, we will renew it for one more term. However, we do not have to renew any individual policy if: 
0 premfums have not been paid; or 
• in our opinion the insured is not a risk we would cover under our under.vriting standards In effect 
at that time. 
And we do not have to renew any Insurance at all during the ninety (90) days or any longer period 
required by law followlng termination If you have not: 
., during that period given us the opportunity fo renew any of our Insurance or bonds that expired 
during that period; or 
o promptly accounted for any premiums due us and paid to us. 
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14. Effect Of Sale or Transfer 
This agreement Is not transferable. No rights or Interests arising therefrom, including otir first and prior 
security Interest, shall be subject to assignment by you except with the written consent of the Company. 
You agree to give us at least a thirty (30) day advance written notice of any sale or transfer of your 
business, or merger of it with another business. 
When any of these take place, we may choose to: 
" sign an Agency Agreement with your successor; or 
., enter into a Umlted Agency Agreement with your successor, which will govern servicing until 
expiration of the insurance written under this Agreement. 
15. Waiver 
Neglect on the part of us to enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement shail not be construed as 
a waiver of any of its rights hereunder unless a written memorandum specifically expressing such 
waiver is sent to you. 
No waiver of rights arising from any failure of performance by you shall modify this Agreement or 
affect the rights of us arising from any subsequent failure of performance. 
16. Arbitration 
[f there Is a disagreement over the interpretation or app!fcation of any provision of this Agreement, the 
matter will be submitted to arbitration according to the latest Commerolaf Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. 
In the absence of any arbitration laws in your state, atbitratlon under the above provisions shall be 
( governed by the laws of the state of Kansas and its Uniform Arbitration Act. 
17. Validity 
!f any part of this Agreement shall be declared or held invalid for any reason, then such Invalidity shall 
not affect any other part of this Agreement and the parts thereof not invafid shall remain in full force 
and effect. 
18. General 
A. The insurance business being subject to regulation and changing raws, rules and regulations, it is 
understood that we will prescribe rules, regulations, prices and terms under which it will insure risks, 
and we retain the right to change, alter or amend such rules, regulations, prices, manuals and terms 
including the right to limit, restrict or discontinue entering the acceptance or writing of any policies, 
coverages, lines or kinds of insurance at any time it deems advisable to so do, and without notice to 
or consent of you, and any such change, alteration, amendment or limitation subject to the existing 
!aw shall become effective on the date specified by us. 
B. You will maintain a good reputation In the community served and will direct all efforts in the field of 
insurance toward advancing the business and interest of us to the best of your ablllly. In the 
conduct of your business, you will comply with all applicable insurance, consumer and other raws 
and regulations applicable to your business. 
C, The follow1ng rules apply whife this Agreement remains in effect. 
1. Agency Expenses. We wilt not pay any expenses you incur on your behalf or ours unfess they 
have been previously authorized by us in writ!ng. As an independent contractor, Agent is liable 
for and will pay all expenses In connection with its business and its Insurance agency, 
includlng insurance policies or coverages such as the following: Agency Errors and Omissions 
Coverage, General Uabllity, Automobile Liability, and Workers' Compensation (when required 
by iaw). Agency agrees to submit evidence of this coverage to the Company upon request. 
Age.nt will not incur any indebtedness on behalf of the Company represented herein, nor 
represent that the company is Hable directly or indirectly for any such expenses. 
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2. Supplies. From time to time we will supply you with policies, forms, appUcations and/or 
other supplies. Any of fhem that you do not use remain our property and must be returned 
to us if we ask. Unauthorized use of these materials is prohibited. 
3. Inspection. We have the right to inspect and audit your records on business you do wlth. 
us. We may do ihls at any reasonable time at your agency. 
4. Loss Payments. Unless we give you specific written authority to do so, you do not have 
authority to commit us to pay for any loss occurring under any policy or bond. 
5. Old Agreements. This Agreement replaces any prior Agency Agreements between you 
and us. . 
6. Changing This Agreement. The only way this Agreement may be changed is in writing with 
at least sixty (60) days notice to you or any longer period required by law or by mutual 
written agreement. 
7. Commission Changes. Any commission in the Schedule of Commissions cannot be 
changed until it has been ln effect for a period of at least one (i) year without your 
approval. 
8. Impact of Laws on Agreement. It applicable law is in conflict with any part of this 
Agreement, the Agreement wllf be considered modified to conform with the law. The other 
provisions will not be affected. In the absence of conflrcting laws or regulations, this 
agreement shall be construed by the laws of the state of Kansas and the rules and 
regulations thereunder. 
9. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be binding to you, your helrs, administrators, 
devises, successors and assigns. 
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SCHEDULE OF COMMISSIONS Until (Only applies when Upload upload available for ALL 
Avallable package covernges) RENEWAL 
FARM LINES 
AGRI-RANGE PACKAGE Farmowners coverages 15 * * 15 
Personal Automobile 15 * * 14 
Commercial Automobile 15 * * 14 
Personal Lines Property 15 * " 14 
OTHER FARM 15 * .. 15 
PERSONAL LINES 
AUTOMOBILE Package with Home, Country Home n/a 16 14 14 
Monollne n/a 16 14 12 
Youthful Operator .. 10 10 10 10 
Tier 4 or 5 ••• 10 10 10 10 
PROPERTY 15 * * 14 
COMMERCIAL LINES 
AUTOMOBILE Package with O!her Commercial 15 * * 14 
Mono!fne 15 * * 13 




Fidelity and l=orgery 20 20 




Personal Excess & Calastrophe !All underlylng policies with Farmers Alliance 15 15 
Commercial Occurrence Excess /Without Farmers Alliance underlying policy 10 10 
New business commission raies wHI change to 16% on "Uploaded' applications and 14% on "Other than 
Uploaded' applications when upload becomes available. Written notlncallon will be provided when upload is 
available for additional lines of business. "Uploaded" Is denned as policies submlfled elac!ronlcally lo Farmers 
Allfance, Including electronfc submission of down payment. 
•• Commission percentage applies only to the portion of the auto premium generated by the youthful driver. 
... Co1rm1Jsslon percentage applies only to the portion of the auto premium generated by the drlver asstgned to Tier 
4 or 5. AppHes only to Tiered Personal Auto Program, 
Addendum A Effective 8-1-2003 (10, OK) 




AGENCY CONTINGENT COMMISSION 
We agree to pay a Contingent Comm!ssion as an 
Incentive fora profitable volume of business produced by 
you. The Contingent Commission will be based upon the 
ratio of your most recent three-year cumulative incurred 
losses, plus ail uncollected premiums which you have 
returned to us for colfectlon, to the earned premium for 
the same three.year cumulative period. The combined 
results of Farmers A!Hance Mutual Insurance Company, 
Alliance lnsurMce Company, inc.. and Alliance 
Indemnity Company will be used in determining the 
Contingent Commission. Crop Insurance premium will 
be used to meet written premium requirements only. 
Crop insurance is defined as crop hall insurance, mum-
peril crop insurance and grain fire insurance written 
through Farmers Crop Insurance Alliance, Inc. 
The Contingent Commission Program rates are listed 
below: 
3·year %of 3-year %of 
Loss Earned Loss Earned 
Ratlo Premium Ratio Premium 
0 5.0 28 3.2 
1 5.0 29 3.1 
2 5.0 30 3.0 
3 5.0 31 2.9 
4 5.0 32 2.8 
5 5,0 33 2.7 
6 5.0 34 2.6 
7 5.0 35 2.5 
8 5.0 38 2.4 
9 5.0 37 2.3 
10 5.0 38 2,2 
11 4.9 39 2.1 
12 4.6 40 2.0 
13 4.7 41 1.9 
14 4.6 42 1.8 
15 4.5 43 i.7 
f6 4.4 44 i.6 
17 4.3 45 1.5 
18 4.2 46 1.4 
19 4.1 47 1.3 
20 4.0 48 1.2 
21 3.9 49 1.1 
22 3.8 50 1.0 
23 3.7 51 0.9 
24 3.6 52 0.8 
25 3.5 53 0,7 
26 3.4 54 0.6 
27 3.3 55 0.5 
You wll! quallfy for the Contingent Commission Program 
by compliance with the following requirements: 
1. Your annual written premium volume must exceed 
$125,000 during the calendar year, of which 20% 
may be crop Insurance. If the Initial period covers 
less than twelve (12) months, this minimum 
requirement of premiums written will be reduced In a 
Effective January 1, 2004 (crop company defined) 
(Rev. 9-2004) 
pro rata proportion to the number of ac!ual months In 
the Contingent Commission period. 
2. Your account must be paid within the terms specified 
in the Company-Agency Agreement. 
Each calendar year shelf be treated as a separate 
Contingent Commission perfod. The written premium 
volume, earned premiums and incurred losses shall be 
based upon our Home Office records. 
In the event your agency is sold, !he Buyer shall assume 
the incurred losses and earned premiums of your agency 
and same shall be included in Buyer's total for the 
qualifying period. Any earned Contingent Commission 
shall be paid to the parly owning the agency al the end 
of the calendar year. Any division of Contingent 
Commission agreed upon between Buyer and Seller 
shall be thetrresponsibility and shall not be binding upon 
us. 
Your qualifications for the Contingent Commission 
Program will be determined by us. Our decision shat! be 
final and no representa!lve, flefdman or agent has the 
authority to change any provision of the plan. 
This Contingent Commission Program shall be effective 
January 1. 2004, and wlll supersede all previous 
Contingent Commission Programs, shall run concurrently 
wl!h each calendar year. and may be terminated by us at 
any time upon written notice to you. lf the regular 
Company-Agency Agreement is cancelled, your 
participation In the Contingent Commission Program is 
automalicallytermlnated, and no Contingent Commission 
will be paid for the Contingent Commission period during 
which notice of !he termination occurs. Payment of the 
Contingent Commission will be made on or about 
March 1 of the year following the ContingenlCommission 
period. 
Growth Bonus: 
After you have completed one full calendar year with us, 
you become elig!ble for lhe Growth Bonus in the 
followlng Contingent Commission period. You may earn 
the additional Conllngenl Commission Growth Bonus 
when yout annual written premrum volume for the cuuent 
Contingent Commission period exceeds the written 
premium. for the previous period by at least 15%. This 
growth must be achieved through new business to us, 
and not from the purchase or acquisition of exfsl(ng 
business wrilten with us from another agency. The 
amount of the bonus will be an additfonal 10% of your 
Contingent Commission Including any Advantage Agent 
Bonus you may qualify for (see Addendum C). 
Addendum B 
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·~ Name · 
Title 
By, ~ In behalf of ·  
Farmers !!lance Mutuai"lnsurance Company :[} 
Alllance Insurance Company, Inc. 




If the agency Is a corporation, you as an individual and an officer of the corporation, guarantee the faithful 
performance ol the corporation and to pay any sum which the.corporation may become llab!e to pay us. 
Dated at ____ ~--------
-------------, 19 __ 
Witness _____________ ~ 
Form No. MK-64 
(Rev. 6·9SJ 
Signature of Two Officers 
